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Virtue and Inquiry, Knowledge and Ignorance: Lessons From the Theaetetus 
 
Jennifer F. Ingle 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Plato’s dialogues are set in fifth century Athens but they are performed for a 
fourth century audience.  The context of his dialogues, then is wider perhaps than other 
philosophers and because of the difference in periods, it is clear that it is necessary for an 
audience member to possess knowledge of the events of the previous generation, viz., the 
fifth century BCE.  When its cultural context is taken into account, the Theaetetus can not 
be read as an attempt by Plato to establish an epistemology in the modern sense of the 
term.  While the characters of the dialogue are searching for the ‘essence’ of knowledge, 
Plato is teaching the audience of the dialogue to consider the knowledge that different 
practices of paideia produce and to evaluate that knowledge in light of its implications on 
the individual and the polis.  The answer that emerges is that philosophy is the paideia 
that will produce the best individual and the best polis, because it is only the practice of 
philosophy that teaches intellectual virtue.  The Theaetetus is an account of the practice 
of philosophy and the practitioner of philosophy. 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
Chapter One 
Situating Plato’s Dialogues Historically:  
The Place of Dialogue in Ancient Greek Paideia 
For [Plato] himself knew so well that his philosophy arose in a particular climate of thought and held a 
particular position in the whole development of Greek mind, that he always made his dialectic take the 
dramatic form of a dialogue, and begin with an argument representatives of various types of contemporary 
opinion.  On the other hand no great writer more clearly reveals the truth that the only lasting element in 
history is the spirit, not merely because his own thought survived for millennia, but because early Greece 
survives in him.  His philosophy is a reintegration of the preceding stages of Hellenic culture…. [Plato] 
must be the culmination of any history of Greek paideia.1 
 
This study of Plato's Theaetetus proceeds from a perspective that is, at 
once, philosophical, historical and literary.  This approach, I will argue, befits Plato's 
dialogues, and is required if one aims at understanding just how important they are in the 
history of philosophy.  Accordingly, its first task is to situate the Platonic dialogue in its 
historical context, that is, as a contributor to the cultural conversation of Greece, what is 
called paideia.  There is no denying that the Theaetetus is about knowledge; the overall 
question Socrates, Theaetetus, and Theodorus attempt to answer is indeed ‘What is 
knowledge?’  Yet, I will argue, the dialogue cannot be treated as an attempt to establish 
an epistemology, at least not in the way that contemporary philosophers know and treat 
epistemology.  Plato asks the question in the context of his time, and so asks it for the 
purpose of establishing a new type of paideia, philosophy.  Working against the 
standards of the fifth and fourth centuries of who counted as wise, Plato attempts to 
define the practice of a philosophos, Socrates, in his dialogues.  The question ‘What is 
knowledge?’ does not stand alone; the question is asked in a particular context, fifth and 
                                                 
1
 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture: In Search of the Divine Centre, vol. 2 
(New York:  Oxford UP, 1943) x. 
 
 2 
fourth century Athens, for a particular reason: to demonstrate the inadequacy of archaic 
and classical conceptions of paideia, evaluated on the basis of their claims to knowledge 
and truth.  The investigation carried out in the Theaetetus exposes the flaws not only in 
considering sophists, poets, or the Presocratics to be sophoi, it exposes the problems with 
democracy and reveals the necessity for a stable, unchanging ground for an education in 
aretē.    
The Function of Archaic Poetry in Greek Paideia 
 Plato often singles out the problems with poetry as a vehicle for Greek paideia, 
most notably in Ion. There Socrates alludes to problems with the practices and the 
reception of both the rhapsodes and the poets.   There is additional criticism in the 
Republic, and again in the Laws poetry is blamed for the degenerate state of the polis.2  
To understand Plato’s criticism, one must understand the role of poetry in Greek society, 
education, and politics in both fourth and fifth century Greece.  Plato, Isocrates, 
Arisotphanes, Euripides, Gorgias, Protagoras, Pericles, Solon, Pindar, Homer, Hesiod – 
these men all deal in poiesis, and so are poiētai.  Poetry was an all-encompassing term 
that could be applied to any prose work – oral or written.3  Eric Havelock has argued that 
                                                 
2
 The dialogues are literally littered with jabs at poetry, poets, those who perform poetry, and those 
who accept it as authority.  Poetry is mousikē; poetry was sung, often accompanied by musical instruments 
and probably dance.  Thus Socrates often speaks of music and poetry as the same, and they often receive 
the same treatment.  See Rosalind Thomas, Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1992) 118ff. 
 
3
 See Thomas, Literacy 113-117.  Though properly speaking, Homer and Hesiod are aoidoi 
(singers or bards), not poiêtai.  There was a shift in archaic Greece from aoidoi to poiêtêi, probably due to 
“changing socio-political realties of the polis” (Jeffrey Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2000) 20).  Poiēsis has as its “the root sense the notion of ‘doing’ or ‘making’ or ‘fabricating’ 
something, and can include the notion of ‘making up’ an invented tale or a lie” (Walker 19).  Poetry was 
created in the performance, the relation between the poet or singer and the audience.  Only with the 
suppression of dance did a mind and body split, such as is shown in the Phaedo, become thinkable.  
Thinking is no longer in the thumos, ste/thos, kradia – in short, thinking was no longer integrated with the 
physical body as it had been in Homer. 
 3 
the importance of poetry in early Greek paideia is a function of the long period in which 
writing was not available for cultural purposes among Greek speaking people.4 
The time period in which Plato wrote, the fourth century, was still in process of 
becoming a “literate” culture.5 Though the Greeks had been writing in some form as early 
as the fourteenth century, the fall of the Mycenaean civilization resulted in the loss of the 
script Linear B, leaving the populace illiterate once more, if ever they were literate.6  
There is no evidence that Linear B was used for purposes other than keeping inventory of 
palace goods and it is doubtful that the knowledge of Linear B went beyond the palace 
scribes.  Writing was in use again in the eighth and seventh centuries, though Linear B 
had been replaced by the Greek alphabet, a system of writing that bears no obvious 
resemblance to Linear B.7  Prior to the invention of the Greek alphabet, oral composition 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4
 Of course, societies have long existed and endured without writing systems to record their 
speech.  Speech is present in all human societies; writing is, as Eric Havelock notes, a relatively recent 
invention.  See Eric A. Havelock, The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1982). 
 
5
 The problem of defining a literate culture stems from the imprecision of the term “literate.”  
What does it mean to be literate?  It has long been held that the ‘miracle’ of Greek rationality was produced 
by their alphabetic literacy.  Goody and Watt argued that it was Greek writing that created “democracy, 
rational thought, philosophy and historiography” (Thomas, Literacy 17).  But is literacy to be confined to 
learning letters? The results from an assessment of the ‘literacy’ of a culture will be inadequate because any 
definition of literacy is itself arbitrary, Thomas reminds us, citing UNESCO’s 1958 attempt to define and 
survey world literacy (Thomas, Literacy 3).  Because there are degrees of literacy – for instance, being able 
to read and write at varying levels to signing one’s own name to simply ‘knowing one’s letters’ – setting 
the boundary between literacy and illiteracy will be with respect to the literate culture making the 
distinction.  Regarding the progress of Greek literacy, see Eric A. Havelock, Prologue to Literacy 
(Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati) 1971, and Kevin Robb, Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984).  Literacy is tied to techniques; Thomas reports that the form and even the 
typeface conveys meaning to the content (Thomas, Literacy 75).  
 
6
 William V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989) i; G. S. Kirk, “Orality and 
Sequence,” Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy, ed. Kevin Robb (The Hegeler Institute: 
LaSalle, 1983) 89.  For discussion of the extent of Mycenaean literacy see T. G. Palaima, "Comments on 
Mycenaean Literacy," Minos 20-22 (1987): 499-510. 
 
7
 Though it is debatable, evidence supports the Greek alphabet having been adapted from the 
Phoenician script and not from Aramaic.  Comparing the earliest Greek inscription with contemporaneous 
 4 
appears to be the only method available for the preservation and transmission of Greek 
myth, customs, rituals, history, and knowledge throughout Magna Graecia.8  It is worth 
noting that the earliest extant instances of Greek alphabetic writing recount sentences 
expressed in dactylic hexameter verse, the language and verse of Homer.9 
Early Greek writing is also found on sepulchral inscriptions and names scrawled 
onto pottery.10  The uses for writing spread, ranging from public writing to graffiti.11  In 
the fifth and fourth centuries, writing was used in the courts and to inscribe laws, and the 
Sophists, Presocratic philosophers and the poets performed the compositions they had 
written.12  Writing was used as a supplement to oral communication, and there is no 
                                                                                                                                                 
Phoenician inscriptions shows a greater degree of similarity than other possibilities.  The meter of poetic 
speech probably provided the impetus for the separation of vowels and consonants.  See Kevin Robb, 
“Poetic Sources of the Greek Alphabets,” Communication Arts in the Ancient World, ed. Eric A. Havelock 
and Jackson P. Hershbell (New York: Hastings House, 1978) 23-38, and Eric A. Havelock,  “The 
Alphabetization of Homer,” Communication Arts in the Ancient World,  ed. Eric A. Havelock and Jackson 
P. Hershbell (New York: Hastings House, 1978)  3-22. 
 
8
 Thomas, Literacy 62ff; Jesper Svenbro, Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient 
Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993) 12-27; Hershbell 28ff; Eric Havelock, 
‘Alphabetization’, Preface to Plato (Harvard UP: Cambridge) 1963, The Muse Learns to Write (Yale UP, 
1986); Joanne Waugh, “Neither Published Nor Perished: The Dialogues as Speech, Not Text,” The Third 
Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies, ed. Francisco J. Gonzalez (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield 
Publishers) 1995; Thomas Cole, The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP) 
1991; Bruno Gentili, Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the Fifth Century, trans. 
Thomas A. Cole, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP) 1988; Deborah Steiner, The Tyrant's Writ:  Myths and 
Images of Writing in Ancient Greece (Princeton:  Princeton UP, 1994);  Rosalind Thomas, Oral Tradition 
and Written Record in Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989) and Literacy esp. 101 – 127; 
and Harris 1989.  For the problems of ascertaining the details of an ancient oral culture; see Charles Segal, 
“Spectator and Listener,”  The Greeks, ed. Jean-Pierre Vernant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995) 194; and see Niall W. Slater, “Literacy and Old Comedy,” Voice Into Text (Leiden: Brill, 1996) 99-
114, for a discussion of the impact that literacy had on Old Comedy.   
 
9
 See Robb, Literacy esp. 21-73.  Dactylic hexameter verse acted as a mnemonic aid, in place of, 
or before there were, written texts.  That the earliest alphabetic writing was in dactylic hexameter implies 
the priority of song. 
 
10
 Svenbro, Phrasiklea 9. 
 
11
 Thomas, Literacy 57-61.    
 
12
 Though writing was used in the courts and the law, it is unclear to what extent the oral codes 
and laws were reflected in the written law; archaic writing was, Thomas speculates, “in the service of the 
 5 
evidence that it was intended (initially) as a replacement.  Texts were means as a 
mnemonic aid, Thomas writes, “an aide-mémoire, a silent record of a much richer 
experience.”13  Moreover, as ancient Greek writing is scripta continua, written without 
spaces, it can only be made readily intelligible by reading it aloud; vocalization was 
necessary to establish meaning for the audience.  “What is written,” Svenbro writes, “is 
incomplete until such time as it is provided with a voice.”14  Only with the introduction of 
word separation did silent reading become intelligible.15  Though the poetry of Homer 
and Hesiod had been written onto scrolls of papyrus at some time, the poetry continued to 
have an oral and primarily performative dimension.16  In the Archaic and Classical ages, 
                                                                                                                                                 
spoken word” (Literacy 68-72).  See also Thomas, Literacy 128-ff for a discussion of the status of written 
testimony in the ancient Greek world.  The Athenians had a mistrust of written testimony, Elinor West tells 
us, when it was not vocally endorsed by eyewitnesses (Elinor J. M.  West, “Plato’s Audiences, or How 
Plato Replies to the Fifth-Century Intellectual Mistrust of Letters,” The Third Way, ed. Francisco J. 
Gonzalez (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 1995) 48-49).  A written document could not be 
interrogated, asked for clarification; the letters were silent, as in the example of Hippolytus (West 49).  See 
also Rosalind Thomas, Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1989) for a discussion of the Athenian’s mistrust of sophists in the context of the Athenian mistrust of 
writing. 
 
13
 Thomas, Literacy 119; see also 101-127.  As evidence that writing was used as a device to aid 
memory, Thomas cites the lists of names of victors or officials; she also discusses officials known as 
mnemones and the authority they and their memory held over and above writing (Thomas, Literacy 66-71).  
Reading silently may have been done as early as the fifth century B.C.E., but it was by no means a common 
practice.  See Svenbro, Phrasiklea 163-164; cf. M. F. Burnyeat, “Postscript on Silent Reading,” The 
Classical Quarterly ns 47.1 (1997): 74-76. 
 
14
 Svenbro, Phrasiklea 44-63. 
 
15
 See Paul Saenger, Space Between Words: The Origins of Silent Reading (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1997) for a detailed explanation of the importance of word separation and the development of silent 
reading. 
 
16
 Havelock suggests that the poems were written down first as a mnemonic aid, much in the same 
way that rhythm and what he terms the ‘echo principle’ were used as mnemonic devices.  The poetry was 
eventually preserved in the manner it should be performed – it is “conceived as a performance to be heard 
and seen and memorized but not read” (Alphabetization 19).  See Gregory Nagy, The Best of the Achaeans: 
Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry, Rev. ed. (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999). 
 
 6 
writing did not replace the oral preservation and transmission of cultural communication; 
rather, writing enabled modifications of oral public discourse.   
Indeed, Hesiod tells us of the poet’s roles in archaic Greek society in the 
Theogony, which is echoed by the description Aeschylus gives of poets in Aristophanes’ 
Frogs.17  Thus was the role of the poets, such as Homer and Hesiod, to educate the 
Greeks on customs, rituals, history, laws, and morals – in short, their role in Greek 
society was enculturation, paideia.  As Socrates observes in the Republic, people 
“…praise Homer and say that he’s the poet who educated Greece, that it’s worth taking 
up his works in order to learn how to manage and educate people, and that one should 
arrange one’s whole life in accordance with his teaching …” (606e), echoing 
Xenophanes: “Since from the beginning all have learned according to Homer …” 
(DK10).18 
Hesiod tells us in the Theogony he sings “of all the laws and all the gracious 
customs of the immortals” (66-67).  To sing of the laws of the divine is to impose 
normative standards to the listeners.  As anthropomorphic beings that are necessarily 
‘better’ than the “shepherds of the wilderness” (61), the gods set a standard for behavior 
in society and the home, in both public and in private interactions.   
                                                 
17
 Hesiod, in the Theogony, describes the singing Muses as singing of “the laws and all the 
gracious customs of the immortals,” (Hesiod, Theogony, trans. Richard Lattimore (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1959) lines 66-67).  In Frogs, Aeschylus informs Dionysus, Euripides, and 
the audience that “… the poets, who helped us escape from the laws of barbaric society.  ‘Twas Orpheus 
who taught us to reverence life, a religion of mystical piety; Musaeus who brought us oracular wisdom, and 
magical methods of healing; And Hesiod told of the tillage of the earth, her opulent beauty revealing…” 
(Aristophanes, Frogs, The Complete Works of Aristophanes, ed. Moses Hadas (1962 New York: Bantam 
Books, 1988). 
 
18
 Xenophanes, Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, trans. J. H. Lesher (1992 Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001). 
 
 7 
Thus the poets were the ‘masters of truth,’ as Marcel Detienne puts it, for poets 
had the ability to sing truth – a talent endowed by the Muses.  Note that aletheia, which 
we translate as truth, is the opposite of forgetfulness, lethē, and that poetry’s function in 
Greek culture was to ensure its topic, person, or event was not forgotten; poetry was a 
practice that was “seen as transmitting and preserving the truth.”19  The compositions and 
epics of Homer, Hesiod and the other poets were acoustic narratives that helped to 
maintain the social, political and religious structure of Greece.20  The term ‘poet’, in 
archaic Greece, encompasses a number of what currently might be considered separate 
roles: philosopher, historian, sage, lawgiver.21  Thus poetry is not something that may be 
described as merely an aesthetic work; its influential role in Greek society, as authority in 
Greek paideia, is evident in the extent of its power in the polis.22 
The poets claim to be ‘masters of truth’ because they can trace their authority to 
the Muses.  The claim undergoes a transformation which some scholars have linked to 
the rise of the polis and the opportunities writing afforded the poets to other traditional 
forms.  Detienne’s analysis of the work of Simonides of Ceos details the transformation 
                                                 
19
 Thomas, Literacy 115.  See Nagy. 
 
20
 The demonstrations that the Iliad and the Odyssey were composed in a style typical of oral 
compositions and performance was provided by Milman Parry in a series of journal articles, collected by 
his son Adam Parry and published as The Making of Homeric Verse.  That Parry’s critical thesis is true has 
won almost universal acceptance.  There are and doubtless will continue to be debates about the details.  
For further discussion, see Milman Parry, The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman 
Parry, ed. Adam Parry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) and Nagy. 
 
21
 Performers are excluded from this list as aoidos is the term for singer, or bard, and so is more 
properly applied to performers. 
 
22
 That is not to say that the poetic qualities were unimportant.  Rather, artistry enabled the poet to 
be the educator of men.  Svenbro emphasizes the importance of kleos to ancient Greek culture, and the 
association between voice and kleos.  To have your name sung by the poets was to achieve a certain 
measure of immortality.  Thus, one of the reasons that poetry was revered is that through it, one could share 
divine characteristics. 
 
 8 
from the type of poetry of Homer and Hesiod to a poetry disassociated, to a certain 
extent, from the divine.  Simonides treated poetry as a profession, as something to be paid 
for, rather like a pre-sophist.23  Of course, in the case of Simonides, this was 
‘scandalous’, according to Pindar.  But Simonides marked out a new path for poetry by 
replacing Homer’s ideal (of agathos) with “the ideal of the ‘healthy man (hugiēs anēr), 
whose virtue is defined by reference to the Polis (eidōs g’ onēsipolin dikan).’”24  Poets 
after Simonides were no longer ‘masters of truth;’ by breaking the ties between truth, 
memory, and the divine, truth began to take on a more familiar meaning.  Parmenides’ 
truth, for instance, claims the status of objective truth.25  The Presocratics’ use of muthos 
and logos suggests a more complicated picture than the traditional one. 
The Presocratic philosophers stood “poised between literacy and nonliteracy” and 
so “their style of composition is a mediation between ear and eye.”26  They, principally 
Heraclitus, attacked the poets in order to establish a different genre of disembodied 
discourse.27  The Presocratics rejected the narrative account of the world preserved in 
Homer and Hesiod and aimed at a rational explanation of the kosmos – in particular, the 
processes of causation.  Rather than rely on Olympian gods as the cause or origin of the 
kosmos, they introduced impersonal forces, non-anthropomorphic notions of the divine 
                                                 
23
 Marcel Detienne, The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone 
Books, 1996) 107.  Detienne reminds us that sophistry, like Simonides’ poetry, is “founded on ambiguity” 
(116).   
 
24
 Detienne 114. 
 
25
 Detienne 133. 
 
26
 Eric A. Havelock, “The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics,” Language and Thought in Early 
Greek Philosophy, ed. Kevin Robb (La Salle: The Hegeler Institute, 1983) 9. 
 
27
 Heraclitus’ work was not intended for oral performance. 
 
 9 
and non-Olympian gods (i.e. the unnamed goddess of Parmenides).  Xenophanes is quite 
explicit in his dismissal of muthos in favor of logos; for example, he says “for all things 
are from the earth and to the earth all things come in the end” (DK27).28  It is also quite 
evident that the Presocratics were interested in revising morality and customs through an 
injection of rationality.  For example, Heraclitus criticizes the manner in which blood 
crimes are dealt with – if one has committed a blood crime, he suggests sacrificing 
animals is not the way to rid oneself of miasmos: “They vainly (try to) purify themselves 
with blood when defiled (with it)! – as if one who had stepped into mud should (try to) 
wash himself off with mud!” (DK5)29  Unlike Homer and Hesiod, the Presocratic 
philosophers were not so concerned with the preservation of existing cultural values as to 
challenge traditional ways of thinking – all the while trying to please their audiences with 
their performances.30   
The instructional tenor of their work initiated a shift from muthos to logos.  Jean-
Pierre Vernant summarizes the traditional view of the Presocratics: 
It is said that in the Milesian school logos was for the first time freed from myth, 
just as the scales fall from the eyes of a blind man; it was not so much a change in 
intellectual attitude, a mental mutation, as a single decisive and definite 
revolution: the discovery of the mind.  It would accordingly be futile to seek the 
origins of rational thought in the past: true thought could have no origin outside 
itself.  It lies outside history … This is the meaning of the Greek ‘miracle’: in the 
thought of the Ionian philosophers, a nontemporal reason was embodied in time.  
The arrival of logos is thus held to have introduced a radical discontinuity into 
history.  Philosophy is seen as a traveler without luggage, entering the world 
                                                 
28
 Xenophanes DK27. 
 
29
 Heraclitus, Heraclitus: Fragments, trans. T. M. Robinson, (1987 University of Toronto Press: 
Toronto, 1991); Richard D.  McKirahan, Jr., Philosophy Before Socrates, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994) 13. 
 
30
 Havelock, Linguistic 9. 
 
 10 
without a past, without antecedents, without affiliations; it was an absolute 
beginning. 31 
 
The Milesians were the first to move away from myth and towards reason, but it is not 
correct, Vernant stresses, to assume that the Milesians abandoned muthos entirely to 
supplant it with logos.  Rather, the Presocratics mimicked the structure and the details of 
the myths while removing the “dramatic imagery,” and so enhanced and amended what 
the poets of old had begun.32  Nor can the importance of the performative aspect of 
poetry be neglected; poetry was something that, unlike poetry in a fully literate age, was 
“actually created through a process of collaboration and interaction between artist and 
public.”33  The rationality of the Presocratics was mirrored and, Vernant claims, 
derivative from changes in the political structure of the polis.  It was Simonides who first 
noticed and expounded upon the change in value, that ‘The city teaches the man’ (polis 
andra didaskei).34   
Political Aretē and Public Discourse 
What changed was the political and civic space of Greece.  In the eighth century, 
the political structure in Athens changed from the rule of a basileus (king) to the rule of a 
group of men called the Areopagus.  This council held power over the people until the 
                                                 
31
 Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought Among the Greeks, trans. Janet Lloyd with Jeff Fort 
(1983 Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2006) 371.  See also Bruno Snell, The Discovery of Mind in Greek 
Philosophy and Literature (New York: Dover, 1982). 
 
32
 Vernant, Myth 402; Vernant, Myth 372ff; see also F. M. Cornford, From Religion to 
Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). 
 
33
 Gentili 14. 
 
34
 Detienne 115. 
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reforms of Solon, himself a poet at well as a lawgiver, at which time the Areopagus was 
limited to acting as a judicial body.  As Vernant indicates, there were  
affinities between a man like Thales and his contemporary in Athens, Solon, the 
poet and legislator.  Both were included among the Seven Sages, who, in the 
Greeks’ eyes, embodied the first kind of Sophia to have appeared among men: a 
wisdom permeated with moral reflection and political preoccupations.35 
 
Solon was a noble who freed the peasants from their endless cycle of debt, which often 
resulted in the debtor’s enslavement.  He expressed concern for nobles and commoners 
alike, and put forth laws that had a decidedly moral bent.  But it was not until the reforms 
by Cleisthenes, beginning in 508, that Athenian democracy became possible.  He 
reformed Solon’s Boulē so that it was no longer based on wealth or privilege; every male 
citizen had a role in the polis through participation in Cleisthenes’ Assembly.36  It was the 
polis with its institutional structures that allowed for rational debate, for politkē, a 
discourse that was both political and competitive. 37  Ober writes that what was at stake in 
public discourse was no small thing: 
Every major public confrontation was a chance for a public speaker to establish or 
elaborate upon his own reputation, and to undermine the reputation of his political 
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 Cleisthenes organized the civic space of the polis, which in turn had a ‘democratizing’ effect on 
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opponents…  The stakes were high, finally, because major speeches to large 
audiences were occasions for public deliberation on the core values that 
underpinned the democratic polity and the relationship of those values to 
practices, public and private: how individual Athenians acted and behaved in 
institutional contexts and in their everyday lives.38  
 
Public discourse was the basis for Athenian political institutions; it also defined and 
revised truth, “assimilating local knowledges into an overarching democratic 
knowledge.”39  Truth was produced in the Assembly and the law courts, through public 
forum and debate; in short, truth was assembled under the hegemony of public discourse.  
Athenians, Ober says, “predicated their decisions on … ideology rather than established 
doctrine or scientific principles.   Athens’ democracy operated on the basis of opinion, 
not truth.”40    Ober relates that for fifth and fourth century Athenians, it would never 
have occurred to them that truth and knowledge were anything but political; the political 
construction of truth was the norm, and accepted by the elite and the demos alike.  
Vernant likens public discourse to a ‘political game’ – and that political game became an 
‘intellectual game’ for “alongside the mass of common beliefs that everyone shares 
without question, a new notion of truth takes shape and is affirmed: open truth, accessible 
to all, and justified by its own demonstrative force.”41  Such was the shift from muthos to 
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logos: truth and rationality take center stage while explanations grounded in myth must 
stand aside.42   
Even though there remained economic class distinctions within the political 
power structure, as it took wealth to hold the appointed positions, through the leveling 
force of the Assembly, power was dependent upon a man’s ability to deliver convincing, 
persuasive speeches:  “Through speech men were effective in assemblies, established 
their command, and dominated others.”43  The importance of oratory to Athenian culture 
is made clear by adopting Ober’s analysis of power in democratic Athens as a “discourse 
paradigm.”44  In this paradigm, power is produced through “the production of social 
understandings regarding what is true and what behaviors are right, proper, even 
conceivable.”45  All social interactions are intertwined in the dominant power structure by 
necessity; if the ideology of Athenian society is constructed through discourse, then all 
social communications accept, or assume, as their basis that fundamental ideology.  The 
power that oratory held is that through discourse, the social understandings of Athenian 
society were “produced and reproduced – or challenged and overthrown.”46  Power, then, 
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43
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 Ober, Athenian  90.  Gorgias, in his piece Praise of Helen, speaks to the power logos has:  “She 
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was discourse – persuasive public speech.47  It is in terms, Gentili writes, of “expertise in 
public discourse,” that “the activity of the ‘wise man’ (sophos) is conceived in Greece 
from the earliest period down to the end of the fifth century.”48  The debates, Ober 
reminds us, waged in public were parallel to “debates among philosophers, by whom I 
mean all those who claimed the title philosophia for their own intellectual enterprises.”49  
A ‘philosopher’ was anyone who claimed such an expertise; moreover, if sophos was 
linked to public discourse then education was aimed at producing experts in public 
discourse.50  Hence, many sophists focused on improving their students’ rhetorical 
abilities, and thus people like Meno and Thrasymachus claim that virtue has more to do 
with power and control than any of the ‘cardinal’ virtues.   
Comedy was an important a vehicle for political discourse: the comic poets 
“could, indeed were expected to, comment on, and seek to influence public thinking 
about matters of major importance.”51  There are parallels to the seating arrangements of 
the theatre and the seating arrangements of the Boulē; “the money paid out to citizens to 
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attend the festival was distributed by the deme and was tied to registration on the deme 
census lists.”52 
Paideia in Athens’ Classical Age 
Despite the fact that in the fifth century the aristocracy was probably literate, no 
one seemed to recognize the full potential of this new technology of writing.  Thus, the 
culture remained dependent on performed speech – which persisted as the primary 
vehicle for paideia.  The educational program of the classical period did not differ 
dramatically from that of the archaic age; paideia was mostly oral, although in the fifth 
century boys probably learned their letters around the age of puberty.53  Traditional 
aristocratic education consisted of two parts: gymnastics and mousikē.  Aristocratic youth 
had to be prepared to take part, and compete, in the religious festivals in Athens, 
Panhellenic competitions and the military.  Archaic paideia and classical education did 
just that.  Most importantly, the youth were to memorize poetry in order to absorb the 
values and virtues contained within that poetry.   After the boys had been educated in 
these three categories, they were left to learn the laws from the polis.   
Then, their fifth-century education was complete.  The problem with this 
education was the gap between the time that the boys finished their education and the age 
that they were allowed to participate as citizens in the polis.  From the ages of fifteen to 
twenty-one the young men needed instruction in how to be a Athenian citizen, for they 
had finished their core education by age fifteen but were not able to participate as citizens 
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in the Assembly until age twenty-one.  During this time fathers or guardians chose 
mentors for their sons; this practice became known as sunousia.54  From the attitude and 
opinions of Anytus in the Meno, we can infer that one reason Socrates was put to death 
was that he was perceived to be interfering with sunousia, e.g., Anytus condemns the 
practice of hiring a sophist for instruction.  Implicit in his condemnation are two key 
points: that hiring a sophist replaced the need for sunousia, and that he takes Socrates as a 
sophist (or at least as presenting the same problems to society as a sophist):  “It is much 
rather those among the young who pay their fees who are mad, and even more the 
relatives who entrust their young to them and most of all the cities who allow them to 
come in and do not drive out any citizen or stranger who attempts to behave in this 
manner” (Meno 92a-b). 
Sunousia, an association with the ‘right’ man that often took on a sexual 
character, filled the years from fifteen to about twenty-one with instruction on the 
responsibilities of citizenship and the laws of Athens.55  The older man (erastēs), 
theoretically an accomplished and wise citizen and typically a friend of the family, would 
educate the young man (eromenos) in politikē techne, the art of being a good and 
accomplished citizen – gaining experience in what it means to be an expert in public 
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discourse.  The youth was to listen, absorb the wisdom of the older man and learn his 
skills, as well as imitate the older man’s virtues.  The origins of sunousia are found in an 
oral society, and sunousia continues until the last quarter of the fifth century, when texts 
became more available, popular, and the institutions of the polis began to depend on 
texts.  Until a culture has acquired a critical mass of literate writers as well as textbooks 
and schools, most cultural knowledge would still be transmitted orally.  Athens’ defeat in 
the Peloponnesian war had called into question the paideia of the fifth century; 
specifically, the traditional educational archetypes for making virtuous young men.  Thus, 
many young men – and their fathers – were turning to a new class of instructors: the 
sophists.56  The aretē that traditional pedagogy worked to inculcate in young men was 
political excellence (dikaiosunē), and that aretē was expressed in the Assembly through 
the quality, and the success, of their discourse.  Developing a talent for rhetoric or 
oratorical speech was mandatory for public achievement as the fundamental outlook of 
Athenian society was “established and constantly revised in the practice of public 
debate.”57  Sophists billed themselves as professional educators who could be hired, at a 
substantial price, to give instruction in aretē (public discourse) or to write speeches.  
The Sophists furthered the project the Presocratic philosophers had begun, 
supplanting the divine inspiration of the Muse with persuasion (peithō).  The Sophists 
aimed at educating the mind, and, according to Jaeger, had two distinct methods for 
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educating it.  The first was to furnish it with encyclopedic variety of facts – the material 
of knowledge – and the second was to give it formal training of various types.58  The two 
methods had in common that they aimed at teaching political aretē by increasing the 
powers of the mind through some type of training.  Increasing political aretē meant 
increasing the capacity one had to influence effectively and to convince the Assembly 
and thereby to win debates.  Sophists also provided texts or instructional speeches that 
citizens could memorize to use in the courtroom or the Assembly in order to increase the 
citizen’s ability for persuasive speaking.  Thomas Cole describes how it was that 
sophists’ texts were adopted by those citizens willing to submit themselves to a text:59 
The busy sessions of courts and assemblies, and the crowded halls dedicated to 
Sophistic or eristic debate were an inseparable and characteristic part of Athenian 
life in the fifth century.  The neophyte confronted by choice or necessity with the 
prospect of taking part in such sessions would be an eager user of any text that 
could select and compress what was likely to prove of recurring practical value in 
the performances of recognized masters and preserve it in isolation from what was 
less valuable.60  
 
The instruction or demonstration texts of the sophists were a pedagogic technique that 
failed to move much further beyond the imitative principles of traditional pedagogy. As 
with the exemplar from epic poetry, demonstration texts did not address the particular 
situation in which the speaker found himself.  The speaker had to realize, without help, 
how the particular situation might be relevantly similar and dissimilar to that expressed 
by the formulae or example.  Neither traditional nor sophistic education included training 
in reasoning, the speaker would not necessarily possess the critical reasoning skills 
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required to tailor the demonstration text to his situation and so the speech that he gave 
was easily otiose, covering irrelevant topics as well as not addressing the appropriate 
relevant topics.61  While students might learn techniques of oratory from sophists, they 
did not acquire skills that would allow them to reason.   
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Chapter Two 
 
Platonic Dialogue as Paideia 
 
If we view Plato’s dialogues in their historical and cultural context, one in which 
texts are produced to serve the needs of Greek paideia, the question that arises is how did 
Plato’s dialogues work to educate their audience?  Philosophic texts, like other 
compositions, were written by an author in a particular time and place.  In order to best 
understand any text, including philosophy, readers need to understand as much as 
possible about the cultural context that the work was composed in, written for, and 
written about.  For Plato more than any other philosopher, these elements are essential to 
understanding his philosophy for his philosophy is in dialogue form and the speakers are 
figures with counterparts from history, with whom his audience was undoubtedly 
familiar. 
Plato’s works are kindred to the tragedies and comedies of his predecessors for 
they each have a setting, characters, and, as James Arieti says, “conversation in the 
character’s own persona without benefit of a narrator.”62  At least, this is the case with 
some of Plato’s dialogues, the ‘late’ dialogues such as the Theaetetus.  Harold Tarrant 
believes that Plato initially wrote narrative dialogues in an effort to capture a typical oral 
narrative (it is assumed that Plato’s audiences would be accustomed to this type of 
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delivery), and then developed the dramatic dialogue modeled after the mimes of 
Sophron.63 
The details that allude to historical events are only possible due to the dialogue 
form.  According to Diogenes Laertius, Plato might as well be regarded as the inventor of 
the dialogue, although Aristotle reports that the inventor was Alexamenus of Telos (Poet.  
I). But Plato was not the first to write dialogue; he was preceded by Aeschines and 
Aristippus.64  Nor was Plato the only one to write Socratic dialogues; in the Poetics, 
Aristotle tells us about a type of imitation that has no name and does not fit into the 
standard conventions of what is called poetry; Sokratikoi logoi are among the 
representatives of this category.65   Though there is evidence that points to dialogue as an 
established literary form, it is one among several; Plato had no shortage of choices for 
literary styles. 66  He could have mimicked the tragic, comic, or epic poets with their use 
of rhythm and meter; certainly, Plato demonstrates in the Phaedrus, Symposium and the 
Republic that he does indeed have the skill requisite to craft (good) poetry proper 
(tragedy and comedy).  Plato also demonstrates in the Protagoras, Gorgias, and 
Symposium that he possesses the skill to write prose speeches like those of the Sophists.  
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That Plato chose dialogue over the other literary forms of his day suggests that there is 
something peculiar to the dialogue form that best expresses his philosophy – or that he is 
able to reach the wider audience beyond the Academy. 
The Platonic dialogues appear remarkably similar to Attic drama with regard to 
Plato’s choice of characters.  Plato uses historically significant figures as Socrates’ 
interlocutors throughout the dialogues.  Like the comedies of Aristophanes, “the 
personae of the dialogues are people of historical reality, the topics are contemporary, 
and the discussions contain commentaries, parodies, and critiques.”67  Indeed, Socrates 
himself has historical significance (though unquestionably not as much significance as he 
attained post-Plato).68  The reason for Plato invoking historical figures, Mark Gifford 
contends, is that it is necessary for the use of a literary technique that draws on the 
audience’s common knowledge.69 
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Dramatic irony, understood generically, is made possible by a discrepancy 
between a character’s view of himself and his circumstances, on the one hand, 
and the reality of his situation, on the other – a discrepancy which the dramatist 
deliberately produces with the intention that his audience appreciate this disparity 
between appearance and fact.70 
 
Gifford argues that Plato specifically uses a specific type of dramatic irony to convey his 
philosophical message: tragic irony.  Tragic irony was a staple of fifth-century tragedies; 
for example, Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex employs the technique in that it assumes the 
audience already knows what happens in the end; the audience is presumed to be 
‘omniscient’.71  The audience watches Oedipus make his mistakes that ultimately lead to 
his fate; they see the qualities of his character prove to be the same qualities that are his 
undoing.  It is only through their full knowledge of the Oedipus myth that the tragedy 
gains a secondary character: the audience is able to reflect on Oedipus’ choices and the 
qualities of his character while the action of the play unfolds, increasing the emotional 
impact of the drama and providing a secondary message about self-discovery.  When the 
chorus sings after Oedipus’ lineage is revealed, already the audience has been aware of 
the transitory and illusory nature of human happiness throughout the entire work: 
 Show me the man whose happiness was anything more than illusion 
 Followed by disillusion. 
Here is the instance, here is Oedipus, here is the reason 
Why I will call no mortal creature happy.72 
 
Like the mythological figures of fifth-century drama, Plato’s characters’ utterances often 
resonate with the life of the historical person, that is, the life of the person after the 
                                                 
70
 Mark Gifford, “Drama and Dialectic in Republic I,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, XX 
Summer 2001, 37. 
 
71
 Gifford 42. 
 
72
  Sophocles, “King Oedipus,” The Theban Plays, trans. E. F. Watling (Baltimore: 1957) 59.   
 
 24 
dramatic date of the dialogue.  Plato’s dialogues are composed with the assumption that 
his audience knows the main events of the lives of his fifth-century characters.  
Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, Nicias, Cephalus – these are all names and lives that 
would be familiar to every person in fourth-century Athens.  Nails reminds her readers 
that 
Plato did not invent Athenians with names, demes, and kin; he wrote about real 
people – some of them active and still living in Athens – people with reputations, 
families, neighbors and political affiliations, people who show up elsewhere in the 
existing historical record: lampooned in comedies, called as witnesses, elected to 
office, being sold, marrying, buying property, traveling, dying.  Socrates’ society 
was not only a matter of institutions and ideologies, but a matter of actual people, 
individuals within a nexus of familial, social, and political relationships, without 
whom Plato’s dialogues would be denatured.73 
 
The majority of people in the dialogues exist in other historical records as well as the 
dialogues, providing ‘empirical’ evidence that Plato did not simply invent characters.  
The fact that he used real persons should not, however, lead to the conclusion that the 
event of the dialogue itself – that is, the interchanges between Socrates and his 
interlocutors – actually took place.  There is nothing about the dialogues that necessitates 
a conclusion that Plato is reporting history.74  Plato is writing – and speaking – 
philosophy using historical persons in a literary form.75  While the interlocutors and 
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Socrates – the audience in the dialogue – share a certain perspective and this is reflected 
in their speech and their actions, the audience of the dialogue has the advantage of full 
historical knowledge and so will, more often than not, find the characters’ perspectives 
pathetic, tragic, and comic.  The last lines of the Charmides, for instance, become sinister 
in their allusion to Charmides’ future installment as one of the Thirty Tyrants:76 
We are not conspiring, said Charmides.  We have conspired already. 
And you are about to use violence, without even giving me a hearing in court? 
Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since [Critias] orders me, and therefore you 
had better consider what you will do (176c-d). 
 
This explicitly shows a darker side to the youth, one that is prophesied by Socrates and 
hinted at in Charmides’ earlier exchanges with Critias.77  One particular way in which 
Plato employs dramatic irony is to draw attention to the ‘epistemic hubris’ of an 
interlocutor.78  Ion, a rhapsode, declares that he is an expert in Homeric poetry, making 
                                                                                                                                                 
details for his own purposes.  What can be learned from the plays are the generalities – the names of the 
places and people, a general flow of events, the manner in which people of that time period (or 
Shakespeare’s time period) interacted, their values.  Similarly, by understanding the accuracy of the 
historical content, we may gain insight into what Plato is doing in the dialogue.  Because the audience of 
Plato’s time would have been familiar with the history and with the historical events and personages, they 
would have detected discrepancies and recognized the discrepancy as important to the overall message of 
the dialogue. 
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the outrageous claim that he deserves “to be crowned with a wreath of fold by the 
Homeridae” (530e).  Socrates proceeds to reduce Ion’s claim to absurdity, for by 
claiming expertise it turns out that when Ion claims he is the most able rhapsode, Ion is 
claiming to be the most able general as well (541a-d).  That the claim is preposterous is 
clear to the reader, as is Ion’s hubris; Ion, however, maintains that it is the case – due to 
political and military practices, Athens would not accept him as a general, and so the 
rhapsode persists in his epistemic hubris to the very end of the dialogue and most likely 
for the rest of his life.  But the historical significance of the characters performs a task 
separate from that of generating irony; they are chosen because, as Gifford writes, 
… rather than leaving it to the audience to infer the value of a character’s life 
from the philosophical deficiencies in his action-guiding principles (proof lo g%), 
Plato could set directly and vividly before the minds of his readers the practical 
implications which certain mistake ethical beliefs can and perhaps actually did 
have for the quality of a person’s life (proof e rg%).79 
 
The significance of the characters and the familiarity a fourth century audience would 
have of their fates provides a didactic lesson as well.  While the dramatic irony at work in 
Attic tragedy requires, in many cases, a reversal and a discovery, but a reversal of the sort 
found in Attic tragedy is not clear in the dialogues; the reversals of the dialogues rely 
completely on the knowledge their audience members possess. 80   Platonic discoveries 
are more explicit.  Jill Gordon finds three types of discovery in the dialogues: “(1) an 
interlocutor’s discovery of his own identity; (2) the reader’s discovery of an interlocutor’s 
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 27 
identity; and (3) the reader’s discovery of her own identity.”81  Theaetetus is an example 
of the first type of discovery and the above example of Ion’s epistemic hubris may be 
recast as the second type of discovery. 82  The third type of discovery, the self-discovery 
of the audience member, is the undocumented – yet prevalent – discovery of the listener 
or reader.  I say it is prevalent, obviously so, for the dialogues have inspired listeners and 
readers, for over two millennia, to examine themselves, and maybe even examine others. 
Dialogue and Dialectic 
Though Plato’s dialogues share features with drama and sophistry, the dialectic 
Plato portrays is meant to be different from the dialectic used by the sophists and 
dramatized by the poets, as well as the dialectic of common discourse.  That difference is 
spelled out in Republic VI and the Phaedo, the foundation of which is the method of 
hypothesis.  In the Phaedo, Socrates imparts that, due to the failure of others, he was 
forced to develop a method that he could use to explain causation.  Lapsing into 
characteristic metaphor, Socrates explains that rather than burn out his eyes by staring 
directly into the sun, he would study it through reflection in water or other surfaces 
[hypotheses] (99d).    The metaphor of the sun is a natural way for Plato to exemplify, 
using a particular, the abstract concept of knowledge.83 
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 Bruno Snell traces the link between sight and knowledge to archaic Greece and, he postulates, it 
arose naturally through the Greek language.   
As far as [Homer] is concerned, ideas are conveyed through the noos, a mental organ which in 
turn is analogous to the eye; consequently ‘to know’ is eίdêvai which is related to ίdeîv ‘to see’, 
and in fact originally means ‘to have seen’.  The eye, it appears, serves as Homer’s model for the 
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In the Phaedo, Socrates says that “I decided that I must have recourse to theories, 
and use them in trying to discover the truth about things” (99e).  This method, the method 
of hypothesis, does not approach directly the topic of discussion but rather approaches it 
obliquely through things we say (logoi).84  In the Republic, Socrates informs Glaucon and 
the rest of his audience:  
By the other subsection of the intelligible, I mean that which reason itself grasps 
by the power of dialectic.  It does not consider these hypotheses as first principles 
but truly as hypotheses – stepping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the 
unhypothetical first principle of everything.  Having grasped this principle, it 
reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a 
conclusion without making use of anything visible at all, but only of forms 
themselves, moving from forms to forms, and ending in forms (511b). 
     
Socrates does this to distinguish dialectic from the sciences that accept hypotheses as first 
principles, like geometry and mathematics must do.  Mathematical objects are not really 
understood because the discipline accepts hypotheses as first principles.    As such, the 
discipline does not know its subject in the same way philosophy does; philosophy uses 
hypotheses as tools in order to see, or know, the object itself.  The mathematical sciences 
                                                                                                                                                 
absorption of experiences.  From this point of view the intensive coincides with the extensive: he 
who has seen much sufficiently often possesses intensive knowledge (18). 
Homer, of course, was influential in the formation of Western philosophy as ‘his’ works had a profound 
effect on the evolution of the Greek language. The link of noos to the eye created an occular metaphor that 
would form the foundation of “Western epistemological vocabulary: eidos, eidetic, idea, ideation, intuition, 
theory, theorize, and the whole cluster of more directly ‘optical’ expressions such as reflect, speculate, 
focus, view, inspect, introspect, insight, outlook, perspective, etc.” (James M.  Edie, “Expression and 
Metaphor,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23.4 (1963) 552).  See also Snell, especially 1-22 
and 226-245.  In the Enlightenment, the commitments of ocular epistemic metaphors expanded to include a 
disembodied objectivity, forming the basis of what John Dewey termed the ‘spectator theory of 
knowledge.’  Vision, as our primary metaphor for knowledge, encourages and promotes the perceived 
separation of knower from object, as well as a particular conception of objectivity.  Dewey stresses that 
theories of knowledge are “modeled after what was supposed to take place in the act of vision” (John 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (1929 New York: Capricorn Books, 1960) 23).   
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peri\ ai)ti/aj kai\ peri\ tw=n a)/llwn a(pa/ntwn [o)/ntwn], a(\ d' a)\n mh/, w(j ou)k a)lhqh=” (Phaedo 
100a). 
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can ‘know’ their subjects, but they apprehend without understanding, without discourse 
(logos).85  It is discourse that renders knowledge transparent and reveals truth.86  Plato’s 
thought, however, is greatly influenced by the paradigm of mathematics.  Mathematics is 
placed after philosophy on the Republic’s divided line precisely because it is a practice 
that sees a stable truth, a truth that cannot be controverted by any speech (logos), unlike 
truth for the sophists.  For the sophists, masters of dissoi logoi, any truth is controvertible; 
for every argument there is a counter argument. 
Since sophists’ texts did contain dialectical dialogue, distinguishing the sophists’ 
writing from Plato’s writing was quite difficult for the average Athenian.  R. B. 
Rutherford explains that the “antithetical and antagonistic forms developed by the 
sophists, and more particularly the use of mythical dialogue by Hippias and Prodicus for 
moral instruction” shared elements of Plato’s full-blown dialectical discourse.87  As Plato 
presents in both the Meno and the Apology, separating the practice of sophistry from the 
type of discourse that the Platonic Socrates practiced was no easy task for Athenians.  
Plato indicates through the character of Anytus that the conservative elements of 
Athenian society felt threatened by the practices of the sophists because they interrupted 
the traditional education (paideia) of Athens. The historical Anytus is both one of 
Socrates’ accusers and one of the most important of the democratic politicians that 
returned at the end of the reign of the Thirty Tyrants.  He was the son of a wealthy tanner 
and, although not an aristocrat, was still able to receive a traditional education.  Because 
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of his political importance, Anytus was an influential man that many Athenian citizens, 
including some aristocrats, would both respect and listen to; thus, his views on sophistry 
and education are important to Socrates’ trial.  In Meno, Anytus finds no difference 
between the practice of Socrates and that of a sophist.   It is clear that Anytus harbors an 
intense dislike for the practices of the sophists; when Socrates postulates that a sophist is 
a person capable of teaching virtue, Anytus responds with extreme antagonism.  Sophists 
“clearly cause the ruin and corruption of their followers” and, he claims, they “manifest 
ruin and corruption of anyone who comes into contact with them” (Meno 91c).  Those 
that are willing to pay fees to the sophists “are mad,” he says, and implies that Socrates is 
in fact a sophist at 92b: “Worst of all are the cities who allow them in, or don’t expel 
them, whether it be a foreigner or one of themselves who tries that sort of game,” 
finishing with a mild and, for Plato’s audience, portentous threat to Socrates at 94e, 
warning him “to be careful” (91c, 92a-b).  Guthrie writes that during Socrates’ lifetime, 
the Sophists were all foreigners and if this is the case, Anytus’ statement is strange unless 
he is accusing Socrates, “one of themselves,” of practicing sophistry.88  In this brief 
exchange, Plato depicts Anytus as antagonistic both towards sophists and Socrates and 
we can infer from historical and textual evidence that Anytus truly considered Socrates to 
be a sophist.  In the Apology, Socrates begins by claiming that his accusers misrepresent 
him by depicting him as an orator, for, he says, “I have not the slightest skill as a speaker 
– unless, of course, by a skillful speaker they mean one who speaks the truth” (Apol. 
17b).  It does not seem to be the case that Socrates’ accusers intend ‘skillful speaker’ to 
mean ‘one who speaks the truth’ for the prosecutors do not desist from bringing charges 
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meant for sophists against Socrates (17b).  Plato has implicitly criticized the profession of 
orators – to be an orator does not necessarily mean to speak the truth.  The irony of 
course lies in the text – that Plato’s Socrates was indeed a skillful, or effective, speaker.  
Within the first few lines of the Apology, Plato establishes that there is a difference 
between what Socrates does and what sophists do – moreover, Plato lets us know that 
what Socrates does is truthful, affixing a normative element to both practices. 
The Apology sets Plato’s practice apart from sophistry and poetry as well as 
competing definitions of ‘philosophy,’ Isocrates’ conception of philosophy being a 
primary example.  Isocrates, Plato’s contemporary, wrote eulogies as advertisements for 
his school of rhetoric and it is likely that, Arieti claims, Plato was in competition with 
Isocrates for students for his Academy. 89  For Isocrates’ part, Antidosis incorporates 
Plato’s Socrates in order to assail Plato’s conception of philosophy and the philosopher, 
using the character as a foil to promote and defend his own idea of philosophy.90  Ober 
relays that Antidosis  
is also a discursive form that seeks to demonstrate alike to ‘those who are wise’ 
and ‘those who are ignorant’ why it is that Isocratean rhetoric is the most suitable 
vehicle for achieving personal integrity and the renewed political order that could 
… replace the currently messy business of democratic public life.91   
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The content of Socrates’ apologia works to establish a definition of philosophy by 
comparing and contrasting it with sophistry by means of a defense against charges of 
sophistry (Apol. 19b).  When Plato has Socrates defend himself against the charge of 
being a sophist, Plato informs us what his idea of philosophy is not.  Of course there is no 
reason for the prosecutors or the audience to realize that Socrates’ practice differed from 
that of a sophist until Socrates’ defense, just as philosophy itself has no technical 
definition until Plato assigns one.92  The ancient Greeks did not consider wisdom to be a 
gift from the gods or a natural capacity, but something that one must strive to attain.  
Prior to Plato, to be a philosopher, or to engage in philosophy, was simply to engage in – 
to value – the pursuit of wisdom. ‘Philosophy’ meant only the attempt to acquire wisdom, 
or to cultivate one’s intellect.93  Plato establishes the boundaries of the genre ‘philosophy’ 
by setting out what is not philosophy – philosophy is not sophistry, and philosophy is not 
poetry – whether tragic, comic, or epic. 
Through common discourse, which was informed by the dialogues of Plato and 
the speeches by Isocrates (and Alcidamas), parodies by Aristophanes and the other 
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Sokratikoi Logoi, philosophy acquired meaning as a way of living, educating and 
conversing.94  Philosophy is a certain type of discourse, dialectic, which is defined 
against the type of discourse of the sophists and the poets.  The form of the dialogues 
demonstrates the definition of philosophy in a ‘positive’ fashion by showing Socrates 
practicing the art of dialectic.  While the form of Plato’s dialogues give the definition of 
philosophy in a positive sense, the content of his dialogues focus, for the most part, upon 
a negative method for defining of philosophy, that is, defining it through what it is not.  If 
Plato had chosen to write philosophical treatises rather than dialogues, the tension 
between positive demonstration and negative content would not be possible.   
It is easy to see why the practice of philosophy as conducted by Socrates was not 
received well by the conservative elements of the Athenian society.  Yet it is just as easy 
to see, for a contemporary audience, how Socrates’ practice of philosophy differs from 
that of the sophists.  His method is aimed at discovering truth through dialectic, often 
using the hypothetical method; philosophy is a dialectical process.  Concepts, and 
understanding of concepts, occur through dialectic.  A dialectical method does not aim to 
achieve an answer or a solution as a sophist’s speech aims to do; philosophy is not a 
rhetorical tactic used to ‘win’ an argument.  The result of dialectical discourse is rarely an 
answer to an argument, though dialectic is truth-searching, aimed at achieving 
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understanding while producing an account for the beliefs that have passed the test of 
consistency.  
Philosophy and Midwifery 
The midwife metaphors present in the Symposium and the Theaetetus suggest that 
philosophy is a method for giving birth to ideas, or concepts, and testing the ideas and the 
person.  Philosophy is a method that is distinct from the persuasion and rhetoric of the 
Sophists.  It aims at knowledge, whereas sophistry stops at opinion.  Outwardly, the two 
disciplines may appear to mimic each other as some sophists’ texts used dialectic and 
both are pedagogical practices. It is perhaps the case that only a careful observer or active 
participant would have been able to distinguish between the two.  Socrates’ elenchus 
forces the interlocutor to examine his own set of beliefs and assumptions about the 
subject matter, which, in most cases, is ethics.  This is protreptic, propedeutic; now 
Socrates is able to engage in genuine dialegsthai.95  The interlocutor or acute observer 
typically realizes that they are not being told what to believe or what to think, as happens 
in the case of sophistry, and that if they stopped to consider, there is no appeal to 
emotions as there is with sophistry and tragic, comic, and epic poetry.   
  Socrates does not ask irrelevant questions of his interlocutors.  Within the 
Platonic corpus we find Socrates asking about the nature of temperance, courage, 
friendship, justice, and implied, if not stated, in each inquiry are the ground for the 
possibility of teaching each virtue.  Socrates inquires about the merits or disadvantages of 
poetry, sophistry and writing as a means by which to acquire virtue or knowledge, which 
will amount to the same thing.  Plato’s inquiry, in the Theaetetus, into the nature of 
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knowledge is not a separate, compartmentalized project but rather a question that arises 
naturally from his primary inquiry into how to improve the characters of the future 
citizens (leaders) of Athens.  To tackle that project, he must ask about the nature of 
virtue, not only enumerating the virtues but inquiring into the essence of each virtue; 
above all he must consider a method for educating men to be virtuous and in the process 
evaluate current methods of teaching arête; and finally, knowledge comes into play when 
discussing the educational aspect of his project.  The art of midwifery – philosophy, 
truth-searching – is a metaphor about the task of dialectic.  In Theaetetus (148e-151d) 
and Symposium (206b) Socrates likens himself to a midwife, saying that he helps others 
give birth to ideas – helping men give birth to ideas as a midwife helps women give birth 
to children.  Socrates describes himself as a midwife, because, he explains, he helps 
others’ minds give birth to “something true and genuine” (Thea. 150c).  Socrates’ 
midwifery delivers the beliefs of his interlocutor and then examines the belief to 
determine if it is a viable belief, or if it is a “wind-egg” (150a-b).  This metaphor is 
analogous to the art of dialectic and the method of hypothesis; testing a person or a 
hypothesis for consistency and eventually leading in the direction of an ultimate, 
uncontestable hypothesis – but never reaching that hypothesis (Phaedo 101c-e).  Once a 
person gives birth to an idea, that idea must be examined through discourse to determine 
its merit – before it can take root in the soul.  If a ‘bad’ idea lives in the soul, it can be 
difficult to tear out at a later point in time.  Ideas link together to form conceptual 
frameworks and ‘lifeworlds’ and so attempting to correct an idea can involve revising an 
entire conceptual framework – a difficult and often traumatic process.  Socrates’ dialectic 
has an affect on the interlocutor; in the aporetic dialogues, Plato gives us the image of the 
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angry or the livid interlocutor time and again.  Theaetetus is a notable exception, and this 
is due, in part, to his training as a mathematician.  He is already at a level of thinking 
where conversation is possible.  Philosophical conversation is active in transforming the 
interlocutor, revealing their true (historical) character and giving the audience reasons for 
the fates the characters will suffer.  Philosophic discourse is distinct from all other types 
of conversation, as Socrates chides himself and Theaetetus: 
We seem to be adopting the methods of professional conversationalists: we’ve 
made an agreement aimed at getting words to agree consistently; and we feel 
complacent now that we have defeated this theory by the use of a method of this 
kind.  We profess to be philosophers, not champion conversationalists… (Thea. 
164c).96 
 
Philosophic discussion moves beyond superficial conversation, which makes the words 
agree but not necessarily the concepts.97  Plato’s complaint, here, is not limited to 
sophists but to anyone else that professes to conduct the activity of philosophy. 
While differences are indeed espoused in argumentation, style of discussion, and 
context of the interactions between Socrates and his interlocutors, it is important to 
realize as well the positive demonstration of that difference in the structure of the 
dialogue itself.  It is not only the intertextual ‘play’ that establishes boundaries between 
philosophy and other disciplines but that the dialogues are depicting embodied speakers.  
The form of dialogue constructs Plato’s conception of philosophy as it supports and 
provides a vehicle for the intertextual discursive oppositions required the ‘negative’ 
definition.  Poetry is memorized and repeated with the intention of preserving the exact 
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meaning as carefully as possible.  Sophists give specious speeches to amaze and persuade 
or to teach others how to do this; they also write speeches that will enhance the speaker’s 
power.   It is Plato’s unique dialectical conversation that forms the primary difference 
between philosophy and other practices.  Concepts, and understanding of concepts, occur 
through dialectic as opposed to rhetoric, wherein concepts are given as stable, if not 
static, propositions from a persuasive speaker.98  As Plato is addressing the genres of 
discursive practices that make claim to producing a certain type of wisdom, Plato is 
concerned with the knowledge that a person may walk away with from each practice.99  
Plato’s dialectical method of instruction, while a universally applicable method, is in 
practice particular to both the questioner and to the interlocutors or respondents.  The 
success or failure of this method to achieve its didactic apex of understanding also 
depends on the particularities of the respondents.  What is shown in Plato’s dialogues is 
that we understand concepts through dialectic with ourselves and each other – and in the 
aporetic dialogues this is shown negatively, in a failure to achieve knowledge of a 
propositional definition of a concept.  The failure shows only that language and 
statements are not enough – expressions and lists add nothing to our true notions.  
Sophistry, on the other hand, is devoted to apparent propositional definitions that cannot 
yet be trusted for as Socrates relates to Theaetetus, orators and lawyers are “men who use 
their skill to produce conviction, not be instruction, but by making people believe 
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whatever they want them to believe” (Thea. 201a).  From the Apology and the other 
dialogues we can infer that Plato’s idea of philosophy was superficially similar to the 
practice of sophistry, similar enough that demonstrating the divergence between the two 
was of great importance.  Moreover, the form itself presents the difference between 
philosophy and other genres of public discourse while retaining the customs inherent in 
oral communication, and introducing a new layer of concerns with the technology of 
reading and writing.  
The contemporary trend of examining Plato’s dialogues in a holistic fashion, that 
is, viewing the dramatic and literary forms of the dialogue as inseparable from the 
philosophical arguments, reveals that the characters themselves often provide dramatic 
demonstration of the philosophical argument and concept.100  Rather than understanding 
an aporetic dialogue as a failure to reach a definition of virtue, holistic interpretations 
agree that a positive definition of the philosophical concept is demonstrated, if not 
spoken: a non-propositional understanding is reached, though a propositional definition is 
not.  The analytic tradition as it is seen in Gregory Vlastos, Terence Irwin and Gail Fine, 
committed to the logical analysis of arguments, has failed to recognize the value of this 
approach.  Indeed, on this approach it makes sense to ask whether there is a system to be 
found in the dialogues at all.  The practice of attributing doctrines to Plato by 
constructing arguments that are not made by any character in the dialogues is at odds 
with the approach adopted here, according to which Plato chooses to write dialogues in 
which he never speaks in his own voice- attributes than are antithetical to the presentation 
of a systematic philosophy.   
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Plato, in attempting to map out the enterprise of philosophy against the 
background of an oral culture, created a new type of public discourse.  But this new type 
of discourse did not emerge fully formed and all at once.  Plato’s philosophy was, in part, 
the product of an evolution of public discourse.  Nor did that evolution stop with him.  
Nietzsche writes that “The Platonic dialogue was, as it were, the barge on which the 
shipwrecked ancient poetry saved herself with all of her children: crowded into a narrow 
space and timidly submitting to the single pilot, Socrates, they now sailed into a new 
world ….”101  Through Plato, archaic and classical paideia were transformed by his 
appropriation of the term philosophy.102  Poetry had ‘shipwrecked’ herself between 
Scylla and Charybdis, between the instability of muthos and the relativism of isonomia.  
One must situate Plato’s project historically, in order to grasp its full import and see the 
way between the natural disaster and the monster.  The next chapter addresses the 
importance of interpretative strategy with regard to Plato’s philosophy.  If, as I have 
attempted to show in Chapter I, Plato is challenging conventional practices of paideia by 
establishing a new practice, philosophy, then conventional interpretative strategies must 
be rejected in favor of a hermeneutical approach.  Conventional interpretation strategies 
generally assume that Plato has doctrines, either exoteric or esoteric, and do not consider 
the historical context of the dialogues – nor do they see form, and content, as necessary 
for Plato’s philosophy. 
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Chapter Three 
Reading the Dialogues: In Search of an Interpretative Strategy 
 
The Problem of Mimēsis 
In the Poetics, Aristotle begins his discussion of poetry with an enumeration of 
the different types of poetry:  
Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-
playing an lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation 
(mimh/seij).  But at the same time they differ from one another is three ways, 
either by a difference of kind in their means, or by differences in the objects, or in 
the manner of their imitations (mimei=sqai) (1447a10-15). 
 
The Sokratikoi logoi belong to a nameless class of poetry, a type of poetry that “imitates 
by language alone, without harmony, in prose or verse …”103  As Plato wrote Sokratoi 
logoi, what he wrote was (according to Aristotle) a type of mimēsis.  What does it mean 
that the dialogues are a species of mimēsis, particularly considering Plato’s critique of the 
poets in the Republic?  Eric Havelock reminds us that mimēsis, which is imperfectly 
translated as imitation or representation, was applicable to more than poetry – and that 
poetry, for the ancients, had a different role in their society, than that of contemporary 
poetry.  Ancient poetry also had a different purpose in its composition.104  For us, poetry 
is not used primarily or exclusively for the purpose of conveying custom, tradition, moral 
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knowledge as it was in ancient times; instead, it is used to express emotion and provoke 
aesthetic pleasure in its readers or listeners.  The role of poetry in ancient Greek society 
was educational.  Mimēsis is a complex term that cannot be captured in a one to one 
correspondence with an English expression, because mimēsis implies much more than 
mere ‘imitation’ or representation as late as the classical period.  Indeed, Ferrari goes so 
far as to claim the meaning of mimēsis is closer to identification or emulation.105  Eric 
Havelock speculates: “Poetry represented not something we call by that name, but an 
indoctrination which today would be comprised in a shelf of text books and works of 
reference;” however, the centrality of the role poetry plays in education was not the 
passive works of reference found in contemporary libraries, but active instruction “on the 
ground that it provided a massive repository of useful knowledge, a sort of encyclopedia 
of ethics, politics, history, and technology which the effective citizen was required to 
learn as the core of his educational equipment.”106   
The mimēsis which Plato attacks in the Republic is not all forms of mimēsis, but a 
particular kind that evokes a particular effect on the audience.  As Ferrari remarks, the 
exposure to poetry today is similar, if not as pervasive, to the exposure of ancient times: 
“citizens experienced poetry … as members of an audience.” 107  For contemporary 
citizens, poetry may be experienced in the context of a classroom, theatre, or coffee 
house but in ancient Greece, the social context was much broader.  Plato is attacking the 
authority the poets held over moral knowledge in particular, challenging their claim of 
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knowledge and expertise.  “Poetry,” Ferrari offers, “being oriented towards the values of 
performance, is by its nature indifferent to the wisdom it its practitioners.”108  This, he 
claims, is the lesson we are to learn from Plato’s Ion and why he has Socrates engage 
such a vain peacock in conversation.  It is only because we can see from the character of 
Ion that he is vain and a rather silly, though apparently quite talented, rhapsode, that the 
problems with poetry are revealed, that is, that poetry does not value truth as we think of 
it, i.e., as what the philosopher seeks, but instead values truth as what the poet performs, 
the knowledge of “what is, and what is to be, and what was before now,” the knowledge 
he gains from the Muses.109 
Plato’s critique of poetry is not a critique of poetry per se but a critique of the 
values poetry holds and expresses, not to mention the psychological phenomenon created 
by public performance.110   Havelock writes that in the fourth century “mimēsis has 
become the word par excellence for the over-all linguistic medium of the poet and his 
peculiar power through the use of this medium … to render an account of reality.”111  The 
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poets use the medium to twist reality “by appealing to the shallowest of our 
sensibilities.”112  Poetry, like sophistry, appeals not to our rationality, as Plato would have 
it, but to our unthinking emotions.  The performance of poetry that he critiques in 
Republic III is a critique of poetry that does not promote truth-yielding inquiry: he 
critiques the muthoi that deceive.  Though Havelock posits that during Plato’s lifetime 
Athenians were literate, the content of cultural communication continued to include – 
even in Plato’s dialogues – the stories that were central to the success and appeal of the 
oral poetic performance.   
In the fifth century Simonides made poetry something that could be bought and 
sold, and once it had ‘cash’ value, the poets’ focus became even more a concern with 
performance over content.  Because the focus is on performance, no one is critically 
assessing the content of the poetry – most importantly, the values and virtues that an 
audience member might be swayed to imitate, or to think correct.  Moreover, Simonides 
sings the praises of men for either heroic acts for the polis or being victorious at athletic 
competitions and, in so doing, he alters Homeric ideals.113   
Poetry engenders a value in performance that surpasses any value placed on the 
content, except insomuch as the content can enhance the performance.  Yet Plato levels 
criticism at both the form and the content of poetry, in the Republic.  In the Republic, 
Socrates critically assesses the values expressed in the content of poetry.  Socrates objects 
to the stories “that Homer, Hesiod, and other poets tell us” because they are false stories 
that do not ‘paint a pretty picture’ of the gods, for they tell of the gods acting in ways 
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men should not (Rep. 377d ff).  These misrepresentations of the gods and heroes are, as 
Xenophanes had said, “all sorts of things which are matters of reproach and censure 
among men; theft, adultery, and mutual deceit” (DK11).  Poetry is problematic for 
Socrates, Waugh insists, due to “the mechanism by which it affects beliefs and behavior” 
for when it portrays gods and men ‘doing wrong,’ it “inspires its performer and audience 
imaginatively to identify with them in their immoral behavior.”114  As Socrates informs 
Adeimantus, the poets are dangerous because of the role and authority the poets held and 
the eagerness by which the young men soaked up the lessons contained in the poetry: 
they will “listen to these stories without ridiculing them as not worth hearing” and so will 
imitate the behavior of the characters, lamenting every small misfortune and other, more 
dangerous behaviors (Rep. 388d). 
Plato continues the attack on the poetic tradition that begins with the Presocratics 
because poetry, in Plato’s time, is still “first and last a didactic instrument for transmitting 
the tradition.”115   What values might an audience take away from a performance, that 
Socrates finds so objectionable?  Poetry promotes the fear of death, which is surely a 
problem for educating future warriors (386b ff).  Moreover, poetry preserves the 
lamentations of gods and heroes, thus encouraging that type of behavior, which is the 
behavior of ‘cowardly men, and women’ (387c ff); it tells of violent mood changes 
(389a), which can hardly be a good thing for an audience to ‘imaginatively identify with’ 
when moderation is a considered a virtue.  Not all poetry corrupts; there are some 
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instances when poetry upholds the values that Socrates and company wish to instill in 
their ideal city, i.e. moderation, which Homer’s Diomedes encourages (389e).116  The 
problem is that contradictory values are expressed in Homer and the other poets, as 
Socrates quotes an earlier passage from the Illiad that demonstrates a lack of moderation 
(389e) and a passage from the Odyssey demonstrating, again, a lack of self-control 
(390a).   
The dialogues are Plato’s replacement for poetry as a vehicle of paideia and for 
sophistic speeches as means of generating truth.  They are meant to instruct the audience 
of the dialogue on how to live a good life; the instruction received by the audience in the 
dialogue contributes to the larger discussion of the good life by showing philosophy as a 
search for non-relative truth.  If Plato’s dialogues are of the genre of Sokratikoi logoi, and 
Sokratikoi logoi are a form of mimēsis, then the dialogues must be seen and treated as 
mimēsis, as an educational method and a way of life.  A Platonic dialogue, then, is 
operating on several levels.  The first is as a paradigm of paideia.  This encompasses its 
form, its aim, as well as its actual practice.  An analysis that takes the dialogues as a form 
of mimēsis must also take into account the external audience – what is the intended 
effect?  What does (should) the audience learn from the dialogue?  Second, the dialogues 
critique fifth and fourth century educational practices so that there is an interaction 
between different forms of mimēsis – Plato defines his form through criticism of other 
                                                 
116
 Though of course what they are busy constructing is not the ideal city, the ‘city of pigs’, but 
rather the city of luxury.  See John P. Anton, "Plato as Critic of Democracy, Ancient and Contemporary,” 
Philosophical Inquiry: International Quarterly 20.1-2 (1998): 1-17.  
 
 46 
forms as he articulates the practice of philosophy.117  The third level is also internal to the 
dialogue, and that is the positive demonstration of technique shown in the dialogue.  For 
this analysis, the audience within the dialogue needs to be considered.  How are they 
being educated?  What should they learn?  What do they learn, if anything?  If not, why is 
that the case?  Because of the historical importance of Plato’s choice of characters, their 
historical counterparts must be taken into account in any ‘internal’ analysis, as must any 
cultural details for which we have evidence.118  Finally, there is the consideration of the 
philosophical concepts in the dialogue.  It remains to be seen how interpreting Plato’s 
dialogues as mimēsis affects our understanding of Plato’s philosophy, for many 
contemporary philosophers writing in the analytic mode ignore, if not dismiss, the 
techniques and assumptions required to examine the dialogues as mimēsis.  But 
increasingly philosophers are taking an approach that is historical rather than merely 
analytic; they believe that looking at the dialogues as mimēsis is essential to 
understanding Plato’s purpose. 
Hayden Ausland, for instance, insists that “Plato’s dialogues require a treatment 
in terms germane to their philosophical nature” and that they “need to be appreciated as 
real works of literary art, conveying what they do as poetic wholes rather than as vehicles 
for views attributed to select characters.”119  As his works are dialogues that never feature 
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the character Plato, Plato relinquishes authorial authority and, in so doing, avoids 
appropriating the audience’s understanding in a dogmatic fashion.120  Instead, he shapes 
the audience’s understanding by directing their attention to key questions and issues – but 
he does not attempt to control it.  The conversation in the dialogues is extended to the 
reader; moreover, as Ruby Blondell remarks, “dramatic mimēsis just is the suppression of 
the authorial voice.”121  Yet, Ausland relates, most scholars who do attempt interpret the 
dialogues mimetically “still seek to maintain the reader somehow critically outside the 
theater of action.”122  In an attempt to treat the Theaetetus as mimēsis, one of the features 
of the interpretive strategy I will take is a sensitivity to the audience of the dialogues. 
Problems in Interpretation: Dialogue, Drama, and Doctrine 
Acknowledging that Plato’s dialogues are a species of mimēsis requires that one 
give careful consideration to the manner of their interpretation.  The interpretative 
strategies recognized and adopted by many scholars fall into two main categories that we 
will designate as doctrinal and esoteric.  In keeping with Aristotle’s characterization of 
the dialogues as a species of mimēsis, these strategies must be assessed in terms of their 
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capacity to deal with both the form and content of the dialogues.  What does it mean if 
one interprets Plato as treating form and content as (1) separable and (2) inseparable? 
Interpreting Plato is not an easy thing to do, as Schleiermacher remarks, for there 
is not only the customary difficulty of deciphering philosophical thought, there is also 
“his utter deviation from the ordinary forms of philosophical communication,” i.e., 
treatises.123  Of course, Plato did not write in a form that deviated from the norm of 
writing in his day – it is only due to the two millennia that have passed since Plato wrote, 
two millennia filled with philosophical treatises establishing systems of philosophy that 
present enchantingly “straightforward” and “clear” philosophical notions and doctrines, 
that scholars consider Plato an eccentric.124  Schleiermacher continues, “Whoever then is 
spoiled by use of the expedients which these methods seem to afford, will necessarily 
find everything in Plato strange, and either devoid of meaning or mysterious.”125  While 
Schleiermacher does attempt to base his interpretation in the idea that Plato’s dialogues 
are mimēsis, he finds the purpose of that mimēsis is to produce Plato’s doctrines and such 
an assumption, I will show, is problematic at the very least.126   
Mining the dialogues for Platonic doctrines is not incompatible with seeing the 
dialogues as a species of mimēsis, as we can see in Schleirmacher’s case.  The esoteric 
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approach also arrives at Platonic doctrines, but on this approach one can only arrive at 
Plato’s thought by reading the dialogues as drama.127  The doctrinal approach has several 
defining characteristics, but the approach generally begins with the assertion that Plato’s 
thought developed over the years.  However, the doctrinal approach often takes the form 
of ignoring most, if not all, of the dramatic aspects of the dialogues.  The character of 
Socrates is sometimes granted dramatic significance, but more often than not Socrates is 
seen as the mouthpiece of Plato, or representing the historical Socrates’ views, or 
frequently as both.  ‘The Socratic problem’ – that is, locating the historical Socrates’ true 
thought – has been dealt with by such doctrinal scholars as Vlastos and Irwin through 
viewing the Socrates of the ‘early’ or ‘Socratic’ dialogues as representative of the 
historical Socrates.128  In The Philosophy of Socrates, Vlastos writes: “The Socrates of 
this book is the Platonic Socrates … That this figure is a faithful and imaginative 
recreation of the historical Socrates is the conclusion of some very reputable scholars 
…”
129
  Vlastos offers, as an alternative to this view, Xenophon’s Socrates, but then 
refutes the alternative immediately thereafter.  The problems with searching for the 
historical Socrates are many, and typical of the problems of the doctrinal position as a 
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whole.  The dependency on chronology – that is, Vlastos clearly relegates the ‘historical’ 
Socrates to the ‘early’ dialogues, yet does not deal with several ‘early’ dialogues that 
would confound his position, as well as including ‘middle’ dialogues when it suits him – 
is problematic because of the problems with chronology in general as well as the 
haphazard fashion by which scholars adhere to it.130  Havelock refers to Aristotle’s 
Poetics and argues that if we take Aristotle at all seriously, we must recognize that 
Plato’s dialogues are “mimetic ‘poiesis’” and as such, when Aristotle refers to Socrates, 
he is referring to the character Socrates; moreover, while refuting the collective positions 
in Vlastos’ volume, Havelock observes that “It is amazing how many readers of Plato can 
get hung up on a confusion between the two [the historical Socrates and the character 
Socrates], as though dramatic realism were a sign of historical fidelity.”131 
Doctrinal types of interpretation of the sort found in the work of Gregory Vlastos 
and Terence Irwin came to prominence when the Anglo-analytic tradition was at its 
strongest, i.e. from the 1960’s until the mid-1980’s.  This type of interpretation mines the 
dialogues to put together systematic doctrines, usually relying on chronological 
composition schema to buttress that system with developmentalism.  In “The State of the 
Question” Gerald Press outlines six principles that, by and large, these mainstream, 
dogmatic interpretations employ as principles:  doctrines, development, didactic function, 
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probative arguments, seriousness, and treatises.132  Press points out that the doctrinal 
element of contemporary interpretation can be traced back to Eduard Zeller who claimed 
that to be a philosopher, one needed a doctrinal system.133  If so, Zeller has had a marked 
and lasting effect on the scholarship, though perhaps not for the reasons he might have 
preferred.   
The second element in the doctrinal approach is the assumption that Plato began 
with a Socratic system of doctrines, became disenchanted with Socrates’ ideas and finally 
developed his own system.134  Developmentalism holds that there are three periods of 
Platonic writing that register the developments of his doctrines and system.135  
Interpretations grounded in the developmental view are especially problematic given the 
inherent uncertainty in ascertaining chronological composition and authenticity.136   The 
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developmental view is intertwined with the view that Plato had doctrines, though it is not 
necessarily the case that a scholar who finds doctrines in Plato must also hold with 
deveopmentalism.137  Adopting a developmental thesis means that the scholar constructs 
doctrines by stringing together pieces of the dialogues in accordance with a chronology – 
which is clearly problematic, given the inherent uncertainty in ascertaining chronological 
composition.  Developmentalism advocates the view that the contradiction among the 
dialogues is evidence par excellence of Plato’s development of a systematic 
philosophy.138  Doctrinal and esoteric interpretations tend to assume a didactic principle 
of sorts, although they do not recognize the dialogues as paideia, it is assumed that Plato, 
as is the case with later philosophers, wrote dialogues in order to “teach or communicate” 
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these doctrines and the arguments in the dialogues are arguments for those doctrines.139  
Another flavor of the doctrinal position involves rejecting the humor and irony of the 
dialogues on the grounds that its purpose is to mask the doctrines that were unpalatable to 
audiences of Plato’s time.  Finally, doctrinal interpretations cannot help but strip the 
dialogues of the features of the dialogue form in order to make clear the propositions that 
the dramatic elements confuse; as Press puts it, “[for them] literary and dramatic 
characteristics are merely formal, at best unimportant sugar-coating, at worst, confusing 
and inhibiting.”140   
 When scholars seek out ‘Platonic’ doctrines, little to no thought is given to the 
possibility that assuming that there are doctrines, and especially these particular 
doctrines, is all it takes to find those doctrines in the dialogues.   On the basis of this 
circular reasoning, some philosophers mine the dialogues for support of these doctrines – 
either positively or negatively – and in so doing, assume that the very form of the writing 
is unimportant to the philosophy contained within. 141  An assumption that is often 
prominent to systematic interpretation is that Socrates – or the main speaker in each 
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dialogue – is espousing Plato’s views and that the other characters of the dialogue are 
unimportant ancillaries.   
Unwritten Lectures and Esoteric Doctrine 
The Tübingen school is most representative of contemporary esoteric 
interpretations of Plato.  The Tübingen school holds that Plato does indeed have doctrines 
but these doctrines are unwritten.  While they reject Schleiermacher’s principle that form 
is inseparable from content, they endorse the principle that Plato’s philosophy is 
systematic.  According to some of the esotericists, the unwritten doctrines may be 
understood only through a study of secondary sources, for they were delivered orally by 
Plato to the Academy.  The Tübingen school takes as the foundation for their 
interpretation Aristotle’s mention of the doctrines Plato delivered orally (the lecture ‘On 
the Good’ and the One and the Indefinite Dyad).142  It is a revival of the Neoplatonic 
tradition, where Neoplatonic indicates, as Tigerstedt lays out, “the transformation into a 
metaphysical or theological system, occurring in the last century B.C. and the first two 
centuries A.D.”143   
While the esoterists are grounded in the Neoplatonic tradition, they have staked 
out differences between oral and written.  The Neoplatonists made no such distinction; 
for them, the dialogues were the same as Plato’s oral teaching and the results of their 
interpretation was at once both theological and esoteric.  Wilheim Gottfried Tennemann 
is often seen as inspiring contemporary esotericism, of which the most prominent 
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contemporary exponents are Konrad Gaiser and Hans Joachim Krämer.  According to 
these esoteric interpretations, Plato delivered the doctrines orally to his students in the 
Academy, in which case the only way to learn of his doctrines is through secondary 
sources.  As evidence, they point to the Phaedrus, the Seventh Letter, Aristotle and 
sources referring to Aristotle.  Giovanni Reale sums up what the esoteric tradition 
accomplishes: “by revealing the essential characteristics of the Unwritten Doctrine, and 
hence offering us that plus that the dialogues lack, bring us knowledge of the chief 
supporting axes (that the highest concept or concepts) that organize and unify in a 
remarkable way the various concepts as presented in the dialogues.”144  For Reale, there 
is “no doubt” that Plato was interested in constructing a system – that is, when ‘system’ is 
considered not in the Hegelian sense, but as “an organized connection of concepts, in 
function of a central concept (or of some central concepts).  And, naturally, understood in 
this way, the system does not involve any rigid, dogmatic, closed ordering, but rather it is 
an open-ended project of chief supporting axes of researches and of connected supporting 
axes and their implications.”145  
Reading Between the Lines 
Leo Strauss’ version of the esoteric position is distinctive; it is a rejection of 
Neoplatonism and a return to what Strauss views as the original Plato.  Strauss’ aim is to 
recover a Plato that modernity and history had perverted – one that establishes the 
original link between philosophy and civic life.  Esoteric interpretations blur the line 
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between seeing form and content as separable/inseparable. And Strauss and his followers 
do, at least, see the form and content as inseparable, while most traditional doctrinal 
strategies do not.  Leo Strauss believed that given the history of the phenomena of 
persecution, writers adapted their literary techniques in order to hide their actual theories.  
In this way, Strauss can make the claim that works have an exoteric and an esoteric 
meaning; the exoteric is meant as a cover for the masses, to prevent persecution, while 
the esoteric is meant not for “the unphilosophic majority nor the perfect philosopher as 
such, but the young men who might become philosophers.”146  Strauss advocates reading 
between the lines to reveal the unwritten doctrines intended for the potential philosopher.  
In the case of Plato, this involves considering the dramatic elements of the dialogues.  
Straussians may be viewed as a branch of the esoteric school of interpretation, stressing 
the import of every dramatic detail of the dialogues, sometimes in order to realize 
unwritten doctrines.  Because Straussians are constructing a system, their interpretation is 
open to the same criticism of the doctrinal interpretation.  Still, their stress on the 
dramatic provides interesting and worthwhile observations.  For instance, Klein’s rich 
commentary on the Meno is governed by his attempt to see the dialogue as a drama, and 
takes seriously the device of irony.147  Klein writes that “Everything about Socrates’ 
irony depends on the presence of other people who are capable of catching the irony, of 
hearing what is not said.  A dialogue, then, presupposes people listening to the 
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conversation not as casual and indifferent spectators but as silent participants” and, he 
continues, the dialogue “has not taken place if we, the listeners and readers, did not 
actively participate in it.”148  But Klein does not find the dialogues to be devoid of 
doctrines – he just denies that there is a philosophical system to be discovered in the 
dialogues.149  He advocates being wary of certain ideological interpretations: “to become 
obsessed by the view that the chronology of the Platonic dialogues implies a 
‘development’ in Plato’s thought” or “to render what is said and shown in the dialogues 
in petrified terms derived – after centuries of use and abuse – from Aristotle’s technical 
vocabulary”  is to distort our understanding of Plato’s philosophy.150 
In his introduction to the Republic, Alan Bloom immediately displays for us one 
of the main problems with the Straussian interpretive principles: “The dialogue is,” he 
says,  
the synthesis of these two poles and is an organic unity.  Every argument must be 
interpreted dramatically, for every argument is incomplete in itself and only the 
context can supply the missing links.  And every dramatic detail must be 
interpreted philosophically, because these details contain the images of the 
problems which complete the arguments.151   
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The problem is with the notion of ‘completeness.’  It requires assumptions about Plato’s 
dialogues, namely, that they are imitations of oral teachings and that there is a systematic 
completeness to be had.  Berger argues that Straussian interpretations fail to avoid 
making dramatic assumptions about the text, even when they avoid making philosophic 
assumptions (of doctrines or a system).  Klein, specifically, “assign[s] the written text the 
job of completing the unfinished oral discussion by its representation of ‘the drama itself, 
‘the deed,’ the ‘work,’ the ergon’ [17].’”152  Straussians all, by and large, assume the 
‘mouthpiece fallacy,’ that is, assuming that the major character in the dialogue speaks for 
Plato and searching out the ‘true doctrines’ of Plato.  
In some instances, the esoteric position takes its point of departure from Aristotle 
and the Seventh Letter.  Many scholars now consider the Seventh Letter to be authentic, 
as debates about its authenticity are not as vigorous as they once were.153  Bowen writes 
that we cannot necessarily depend on the most temporally proximate interpreters for  
Aristotle and the Neoplatonists … aimed to determine what Plato was really 
trying to say, always in contexts determined by their own immediate 
philosophical purposes; they very clearly felt no obligation to render Plato’s 
thought as he thought it, that is, to defend by reference to the text their accounts as 
ones to which Plato would have assented or to connect these accounts closely 
with the letter of the text [emphasis added].154   
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Bowen’s criticism of Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato is startling, until one considers 
analogous contemporary examples.  R. M. Hare believed that his students got him wrong 
– and so, David Sedley argues, it is easy “to imagine a Plato who denied or minimized 
discontinuities in his own work, even when challenged by his eminent pupil Aristotle, 
who is widely agreed to make a sharp distinction between Plato’s Socratic dialogues and 
those representing his mature work.”155 
A Third Way of Interpreting Plato: The Hermeneutical Approach 
Instead of attempting to recapture an oral doctrine, Berger advocates a different 
approach, one that avoids the mouthpiece fallacy: 
To approach Plato in terms of a dialectic between oral and written discourse is to 
situate the interpretive project in a more general discussion that has been going on 
for some time.  I refer to the hermeneutic theories of Gadamer, Ricoeur, 
Benveniste, and others, and more specifically to Ricoeur’s two basic propositions 
about the changes produced by the transfer of a text from speech to writing: (1) 
emancipated or ‘distanciated’ from speech, speaker, and author, the text becomes 
autonomous, is appropriated by readers … and opens itself up to the endless 
conflict of interpretation; (2) in this process, the intentional control of a speaker 
and author over their texts diminishes, and the margin or surplus of unmeant 
meaning increases.156 
 
Revealing the shortcomings in these two general categories of interpretation speaks to the 
need for a third way of interpreting Plato.  Recently, a number of scholars have sought to 
interpret the dialogues using a hermeneutic approach, in order to avoid the problems of 
the first two strategies.  The hermeneutical strategy begins by seeing the dialogue form as 
necessary and involves examining the dialogue as a unity, taking into account the literary 
and dramatic details for, as mentioned above, the burden of proof rests on those who 
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would assume that the dialogue form is not necessary to convey the content. Indeed, a 
hermeneutical strategy disputes the very division between form and content.  This 
strategy situates a text in relation to the author’s original audience.  Attempting to situate 
the text in its original context requires an examination of the assumptions made about the 
past.  By addressing the fact of presuppositions, any interpretation is left open for future 
revision.  The result is a position irreconcilable with both the aforementioned groups, 
because the hermeneuticists shun the notion of unwritten doctrines, as it implies the 
dialogue form is not necessary, and, in fact, some call into question whether Plato had 
doctrines at all or at the very least, deny that Plato had a system.  Most controversially, 
they point out that there is little evidence in the dialogues for the ‘doctrine of Forms’ as it 
has been articulated by those who attribute doctrines to Plato.157  The movement is an 
attempt, writes Francisco Gonzalez, to move away from “interpreting the dialogues as 
aiming to either establish or refute philosophical doctrines.”158  A main feature of this 
third way is to emphasize the importance of the historical, literary and dramatic elements 
of the dialogues – in short, to see the dialogues as integrated wholes.  Distinguishing 
form from content is to treat the content alone, but the content without the form is an 
incomplete picture of Plato’s philosophy.  Gonzelez writes that “if we can show the real 
opposition between philosophy understood as systematic and philosophy understood as 
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dialectic and show further that Plato sides with the latter conception of philosophy, then 
we will be in a position to avoid both ‘developmentalism’ and ‘esotericism.’”159 
Hermeneutics imparts a method of understanding, the paradigm of which is found 
in our understanding of texts and works of art.   ‘Hermeneutics,’ which of course comes 
from the Greek word e¨rmhnei¢a, was initially used (in modern times) to describe a 
method of interpreting the Bible, and Schleirmacher expanded the use of hermeneutics to 
include interpreting Plato.  Dilthey moved further away from Biblical hermeneutics by 
appropriating hermeneutics as the methodology of the human sciences.  Seen in this way, 
hermeneutics was not only applied to texts, but also to “any human phenomena 
whatsoever, including actions, historical events, monuments, works of art, and social 
institutions.”160  To understand humans, it is necessary to make sense of the revisionist 
narrative that human beings bring to their lives. 
In Truth and Method Gadamer makes explicit the basic conditions for 
understanding (a text or another person) through an analysis of why understanding is 
often not achieved between persons.  There is no exact method for understanding.  
Gadamer observes that method as such conceals; method superimposes a ‘grid’ on its 
object of study, forcing things to fit into a pre-given blueprint of assumption.  The best 
we can hope to do is to avoid a systematic, pre-defined approach and instead make use of 
a phenomenological attitude and describe the process of understanding.  With this 
attitude Gadamer can impart the basic conditions required for understanding.  Like other 
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hermeneutical philosophers, Gadamer believes that every individual is entangled in a 
historical culture and as such always possesses a tacit understanding, or prejudice 
(Vorurteil), of what things mean in our world:  “Long before we understand ourselves 
through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in 
the family, society, and state in which we live…That is why the prejudices of the 
individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.”161  
Prejudices are the conditions for our understanding, as interpretation is always a circular 
process.  To understand any part of the text or conversation, we must already possess 
some grasp of the whole; yet, to understand the whole, we must possess understanding of 
the parts.  The tacit understanding we possess is our frame of reference.  Any 
conversation is an attempt to reach an agreement, based on a shared understanding, and it 
occurs in the context of this hermeneutical circle.  In a conversation, we begin with this 
pre-understanding absorbed from our historical culture, and our questions and answers 
proceed from presuppositions.  As the conversation progresses, we revise the initial 
presuppositions.  The importance of acknowledging that humans bring tacit 
understanding to a conversation is twofold.  To understand a text or another human being, 
it is necessary to understand the historical context of that text or human, else the process 
of understanding cannot be undertaken.  Second, the misunderstandings that arise in a 
conversation are dependent upon the inferences that each individual brings to the 
conversation from their tacit understanding of the subject matter at hand.  To understand 
texts that we are temporally distant from, we must attempt to gain like-mindedness with 
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the culture of that time, to reconstruct.  Human nature is essentially the same – that is, we 
begin from “a shared understanding that results from our enculturation into communal 
practices and our mastery of a common language” – and thus it is not an impossible task, 
but it is a task that necessitates imperfection, especially considering that ancient Greek is 
a dead language. 162  If we follow Gadamer’s advice and conceive of philosophy as “a 
human experience that remains the same and that characterizes the human being as such” 
then the task, recast thus, is well within reach.163  Press calls for a different type of 
interpretation that, like Gadamer’s, requires that “the dialogues are no longer taken to be 
the kinds of texts they were widely believed to be at mid-century.  There is need for a 
broader inquiry into the nature, presentation and audience of the texts based on historical 
knowledge,” for large and pivotal portions of the dialogues involve myths and character-
building.164  Only by ignoring the text can scholars truly proceed with a doctrinal or 
esoteric interpretation.   
What criteria can be used to evaluate interpretive strategies?  To evaluate 
interpretive strategies is to give voice to value systems that are often incommensurable – 
at best incompatible.  Perhaps we can recur to the criterion used as a primary evaluative 
factor in sorting out scientific theories: explanatory power.  Explanatory power seems a 
good rule of thumb by which to judge these strains of interpretation and the end result is 
that a hermeneutic interpretation ignores the least amount of actual text and require the 
least amount of juggling to make the ‘idiosyncrasies’ of the dialogues fit within a 
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philosophical system or set of doctrines.  Press asks, “Given the growing consensus that 
Plato is not (directly, primarily) teaching doctrines in the dialogues, for example, we need 
to investigate what kind of ‘philosophic meaning’ the dialogues might have other than 
dogmatic or doctrinal?”165 
 At the end of the day, surprisingly enough, this study will take to heart Terence 
Irwin’s advice regarding interpretative strategies, although surely not in the way he 
intended it, and certainly not in agreement with his conclusions.  Irwin suggests that it is 
a mistake to focus exclusively on questions of interpretation; “We are likely to take a 
method of interpretation more seriously if it produces philosophically interesting and 
significant results … It is an illusion to think we can find the right interpretative methods 
and strategies in advance of considering the philosophical merits of the conclusions they 
yield.”166  Though I think Irwin is misguided in an apparent belief that the ‘philosophical 
merits’ of a strategy will exclude the hermeneutic or philological approach to Plato, and 
that he intended this bit of advice as an admonition against just such interpretative 
strategies, I will treat it as serious advice.  The fact of the matter is the third way of 
interpreting Plato does yield “philosophically interesting and significant results” – though 
the results of these analyses often are in opposition to the analytic approach that Irwin 
upholds.167   
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Because I adopt a hermeneutic approach to the dialogues, I recognize that it is 
impossible that one may approach a text with no assumptions or preconceptions – thus, I 
will list the assumptions I consciously bring to the interpretation of the Theaetetus:168 
1. The dialogue form is necessary to Plato’s philosophy.  I will assume that the 
dialogue form is important, integral, to Plato’s philosophy.  This assumption is 
in no way outlandish or unsupported by the dialogues themselves; the frequent 
jabs Plato takes at the sophists throughout the dialogues are often grounded in 
the lack of discussion that is inherent in the form of discourse of a sophist – 
giving speeches and not inquiry.169 
2. If the dialogue form is necessary, the characters, setting - in short, the 
dramatic details which make up a dialogue are necessary to convey Plato’s 
philosophy.  It is the entirety of the dialogue that demonstrates Plato’s 
dialectical method, i.e., the reopening of questions presumably closed, not 
solely the character Socrates or Socrates’ questions, answers, and arguments.  
The respondents are equally as important as the main speaker, and the 
respondents must be understood in terms of the arguments they offer, their 
historical counterparts, and their dramatic actions in the dialogue in order to 
investigate the meaning of the dialogue. 
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3. Plato is first and foremost concerned with paideia. 
4. Like all plays, the dialogues have two distinct audiences: the audiences in the 
dialogues, and the audience of the dialogues.  The meaning of the dialogue 
differs according to the perspective of the audience.170  In Chapter I, I outlined 
Mark Gifford’s discussion of the literary technique known as dramatic irony.  
Ultimately, this technique depends on the audience of the dialogue possessing 
a fuller and more complete understanding of a character’s life.  Thus, the 
external audience will grasp a meaning of the dialogue that differs from that 
of the audience in the dialogue, the audience that does not possess the future 
knowledge.  The audience in the dialogue participates in philosophic inquiry, 
and the audience of the dialogue participates in philosophic inquiry of a 
related, yet disparate, sort. 
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Chapter Four 
Problems in Interpreting the Theaetetus 
The Theaetetus appears to be an anomaly among the dialogues, or so some 
scholars have held, for several reasons: the embedded dramatic dialogue, the uniqueness 
of Theaetetus’ appearance and character, its aporetic character despite it being a ‘later’ 
dialogue, and its being the only dialogue of Plato’s (ostensibly) devoted to the question of 
knowledge.171  I will argue that the Theaetetus is not an anomaly; the embedded dialogue 
serves a philosophic purpose, as does the oft-neglected prologue, and that Theaetetus’ – 
and others’ – characterizations are essential to achieving its purpose.  Finally, I will argue 
that the Theaetetus is not concerned with the epistemological question qua epistemology, 
viz., what is knowledge, but rather with understanding how to pursue knowledge; the 
concern is centered on pedagogy (paideia) and not epistemology by itself.  The reason 
why some scholars see these features as anomalies is that the scholars in question attempt 
to turn Plato into a contemporary philosopher, i.e., they attribute to Plato their own 
philosophical conceptions instead of looking for his.   
False Starts 
The first sort of interpretative strategies ignore, completely, the dialogue form.  
Any scholar working from the dogmatic interpretative principles described above will 
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ignore the prologue.  Gail Fine is a good example of a scholar working within this sort of 
interpretation.172  She accepts the common chronological grouping of the dialogues, 
though notes – and skims over – that there are alternative chronologies as well as 
arguments warning against chronological groupings at all.  Following Vlastos, Fine 
assumes that the early, or Socratic, dialogues represent the historical Socrates’ 
philosophy, not Plato’s.  Fine extracts a full-blown epistemology from Theaetetus, Meno, 
and Republic and in doing so, strips away the dialogue form and examines the dialogues 
as if they were no more than dressing for treatises.  Reducing the dialogues to 
propositions and principles is indeed one method of interpretation that yields 
‘philosophically interesting results’ and enables the construction of a systematic 
philosophy.  It is not that Fine constructs a theory from nowhere; her type of 
interpretation has the advantage of being able to point to the text, as opposed to some of 
the esoterics who at times forfeit that luxury of using Plato’s texts as evidence.  The 
problem with this type of interpretation is that it does not consider that which is most 
evident about the text – that the text is a dialogue, or if you will, drama or poetry.  Thus, 
by excluding the dramatic elements of a dialogue, scholars that indulge in this type of 
interpretation inadvertently shape Plato’s philosophy in an anachronistic manner and 
more often than not, they interpret the statements in the text in the language emblematic 
of contemporary philosophy.  This is not to say that such analyses do not bear useful or 
interesting results.  It is to say that they should be considered with a critical eye.   
A reductionist, analytic interpretation of Plato’s dialogues necessarily ignores the 
dramatic nuances, as well as entire sections of the text.  For instance, nowhere does Fine 
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discuss the prologue; based on her interpretative strategy, there can be no information 
useful to her analysis within the prologue.  Even Rosemary Desjardins’ commentary on 
the Theaetetus begins with the interchange between Socrates and Theaetetus, skipping the 
prologue.173  In terms of explanatory power, this method of interpretation falls short as 
the only explanation for numerous lines must be “trivial dressing.”  Such interpretations, 
while philosophical in a most familiar way, lapse into proleptic. 
A second sort of interpretation takes into account the dramatic elements of the 
dialogue yet holds that the philosophic content does not depend, or is separable, from the 
dramatic form.174  For example, Cornford’s interpretation of the Theaetetus does make 
mention of the prologue, using it as an opportunity to mention the problems with fixing 
its dramatic date, as well as to remind the reader that it is possible that the prologue we 
have now may not have been the original.  The prologue that is currently attached to the 
dialogue is there to commemorate Theaetetus – a familiar view that Cornford feels no 
need to defend.  The prologue explained as a commemoratory addendum releases the 
prologue from having philosophic import, either on its own or contributing to the 
philosophy of the dialogue proper.  He devotes a scant two paragraphs to a section he 
titles ‘Midwifery and Anamnesis’.  Had Cornford turned his attention to the characters 
and the proem, he might not have downplayed the importance of the Theaetetus: “the 
dialogue is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition, our awareness of the sense-
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world and judgments involving the perception of sensible objects.”175   Cornford’s 
contention is that the Theaetetus, a ‘later’ dialogue, serves only the purpose of making it 
clear that any epistemology requires the Forms.  The dialogue fails, Cornford believes, 
due to the omission of the Forms. 
Guthrie, like Cornford, finds doctrines in the dialogues and yet Guthrie himself 
writes that “the dialogues are not systematic treatises” and “there are limits to the extent 
to which they can legitimately be synthesized.”176  He does not dispute the categorization 
of the dialogues in the typical early, middle, and late periods and yet for the most part 
manages to avoid relying on that chronological structure in his discussion. Guthrie’s 
commentary on the Theaetetus does mention the dramatic elements, the historical and 
cultural content of the dialogue, but he does not link the two and thus remains at the level 
of analyzing the philosophic content apart from the dramatic and historical content.  
Guthrie calls the Theaetetus a  
brilliant adaptation of the manner and plan of the earlier dialogues to the more 
critical and probing approach to knowledge of Plato’s late maturity.  The 
restoration of Socrates to his original role, with much of his original personality, 
shows Plato still anxious to be regarded as the true heir and continuator of 
Socratic teaching.177   
 
Plato shows the Socrates of the Theaetetus to be similar to the Socrates of the earlier 
dialogues.  Invoking the midwife analogy, Plato shows Socrates is “not just a thinking-
machine like the Eleatic visitor,” the Theaetetus and Sophist work together, with a 
philosophical purpose: “the one aporetic, setting forth problems, the other didactic, 
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solving them.”178  For Guthrie, the Theaetetus is replete with reminders of the earlier 
dialogues: Socrates desires to discover the best and the brightest boys; Socrates and his 
interlocutors set out to give a concept a definition, the first suggestion is comprised of 
instances; and the dialogue “ostensibly ends in failure.”179  Knowledge is the concept 
under scrutiny, Guthrie says, that sets the Theaetetus apart from the other aporetic 
dialogues.  The question is not an ethical or aesthetic concept, but knowledge itself.   He 
looks at the opening moves of the dialogue with the intention of making the relation 
between the Theaetetus and the early aporetic dialogues.  But surprisingly, he has nothing 
to say about the midwife metaphor as he did with regard to the proem. 
 Burnyeat’s commentary on the Theaetetus involves more discussion of the 
dramatic elements than either discussion of Cornford or Guthrie, and also takes an 
approach that is more open-ended, in the spirit of Socrates’ dialectic.  In the Preface, he 
refers to own approach as unorthodox,180 which is immediately evident in his 
commentary on the prologue: “we should not fail to think about the dramatic emphasis 
which Plato has contrived to place on the notion of expertise.”181  But he does not address 
anything in the outer dialogue beyond that single provocative comment, and neither does 
he comment about the midwife metaphor.182   
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In an effort to provide a maieutic commentary on the dialogue, Burnyeat presents 
multiple possible interpretations in order to allow the reader to discuss and decide on her 
own which interpretation is more likely.  He begins by stating “This is a dialogue, not a 
treatise.  As such it invites us not merely to witness but to participate ourselves in the 
philosophical activity of the speakers.”183   Burnyeat splits the dialogue into three parts, 
as most scholars do, but his reasoning is a little different: he claims the first and longest 
part is a discussion that could be used to educate undergraduates, the second for graduate 
students, and the final section is for fellow academics.  Keeping in line with the 
protreptical nature of the dialogue, Burnyeat wishes for the readers of his commentary to 
make their own decision about the interpretations he presents.  But for the most part he 
favors discussing the philosophic content, and while he does not dismiss outright the 
dramatic elements from the interpretations he presents, he does not present an 
interpretation to counterbalance the dogmatic interpretations or attempt to construct one 
himself.  He carries two interpretations throughout the commentary, which he labels ‘A’ 
and ‘B’.  Though Burnyeat prefers the ‘B’ interpretation, the interpretation that follows 
Bernard Williams, Burnyeat presents an alternative interpretation that follows Cornford.  
Burnyeat’s error is that his commentary lacks the synthesis of philosophical and 
contextual elements.   
David Sedley, uses Burnyeat’s presentation as a launching point for his own 
interpretation.  Sedley makes clear from the outset the strategy which he will use to 
interpret the Theaetetus, situating it between contemporary and traditional interpretations.  
He does not dispute, but upholds, the traditional ordering of the dialogues.  Along the 
                                                 
183
 Burnyeat, Theaetetus 3-4. 
 
 73 
same lines as Vlastos, Sedley believes that there are Socratic and Platonic phases, while 
conceding that “the dialogues of the [Platonic] phase necessarily succeed in achieving 
historical authenticity … [they] showcase, for better or worse … Plato’s own perspective 
on the historical figure Socrates.”184  He considers the interpretations of both Cornford 
and Burnyeat.  On the Cornford interpretation, the dialogue fails shows that one cannot 
construct an epistemology without the Forms, setting the stage for the Sophist.  On 
Burnyeat’s interpretation, he says, dialogue is to be seen as a “dialectical exercise rather 
than a doctrinal one.”185  For Sedley this involves a “double dialectical confrontation” – 
one within the text, the other between the audience and the text.186 Sedley echoes A. A. 
Long’s approach to the dialogues: “Long properly emphasizes where most others have 
failed to do so is its Socratic aspect: in one way or another, the Theaetetus is Plato’s re-
evaluation of Socrates.”187 
Sedley’s appears to be a third sort of interpretation that he calls a ‘maieutic 
interpretation’.188 According to Sedley, Socrates is forced to stop at the end of the 
dialogue: 
Because, as the dialogue tells us, the correct philosophical method is that of 
midwifery, where it falls to the interlocutor, and no one else, to give birth to the 
true doctrine.  Once Plato has brought us, the readers, as close as he can to the 
true definition, short of actually stating it, his work is done.189 
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Sedley’s is a motley interpretation, with bits from each of the afore-mentioned 
interpretations.  He takes the idea of the Theaetetus as a late dialogue, and as such 
evincing late Platonic doctrine, adding Burnyeat’s idea of two simultaneous readings, and 
recognizes there the distinction between the author and the character Socrates, who in this 
case is a version of the Socrates that appears in the early dialogues.190  To that medley 
Sedley injects his own “maieutic interpretation: that the internal and the external dialectic 
are both, in their own way, applications of philosophical midwifery.”191  Sedley’s 
interpretation, he himself notes, is in opposition to the essays found in Press’ 1996 
collection, in that Sedley’s reading takes the most recent of many ‘orthodox’ positions – 
the view that the main speaker, generally Socrates, espouses Plato’s own views.192  
However, the Theaetetus should be seen as an exception to treating speaker and author as 
one, for he feels that Theaetetus involves “autobiographical self-commentary.”193  
Sedley’s interpretation does not involve a break from characteristic doctrinal 
interpretation, but he does approach the hermeneutical way of interpreting Plato.  Sedley 
does not believe that Plato’s message in the Theaetetus is voiced by Socrates for 
“Socrates fails to see the Platonic implications, and instead it is we, as seasoned readers 
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of Plato, who are expected to recognize and exploit them.”194 In a move that is favorable 
to the third way of interpretation, Sedley makes explicit that there is a distinction to be 
found between the intended results of the dialogue internally and the intended result of 
the dialogue externally; that the internal dialogue’s midwifery fails but the external 
midwifery has a chance at success: “the external midwifery consists partly in the 
dialogue’s power to bring us to the point where we are ready to abandon the written text 
and continue the dialectic for ourselves…”195  But Sedley is also caught up in the 
dogmatic, doctrinal approach to Plato and thus constructs his analysis on the following 
assumptions: that Plato has a doctrine of Forms and that it is found in, at least, the 
Republic; that the Theaetetus was written after the Republic; and that because this 
doctrine is not present in the Theaetetus (yet is present in ‘later’ dialogues) its absence 
must be accounted for, in order for the system of doctrines to continue to cohere.196  
Notably, Sedley finds the purpose of the Theaetetus is just that – to show Plato’s 
systematic coherence; he writes that “by developing this implicit portrayal of Socrates as 
the midwife of Platonism, Plato aims to demonstrate, if not the identity, at any rate the 
profound continuity, between, on the one hand, his revered master’s historic contribution 
and, on the other, the Platonist truth.”197  Sedley devotes a few words for the dialogue’s 
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frame, comparing it with other dialogues’ proems that stress the source of the information 
as well as the relation between memory and writing.198   
Though Sedley addresses the prologue and the metaphor of the midwife, it is not 
taken so seriously as to become a cornerstone for Sedley’s argument; on his interpretation 
there remain many unanswered questions.  Beginning with the assumption that the 
prologue was written by Plato – even assuming its dedicatory capacity – why choose 
Eucleides, one might ask, as the record-keeper; why begin with the Megarians?  Why 
spend time developing the similarities between Socrates and Theaetetus, and why are two 
mathematicians chosen for Socrates’ interlocutors in a dialogue about knowledge?  Mark 
McPherran suggests that these questions might be answered with due consideration to the 
nature of philosophic character, i.e. by answering what is it about Socrates and 
Theaetetus that characterizes the virtue, moral excellence, of the philosopher. 
The Interpretation of Literary Form and Philosophical Content 
This is precisely what commentators such as Paul Friedländer and Ruby Blondell 
attempt.  Of the prologue, Friedländer says it has significance in three ways: it fixes “the 
ideal historical accuracy of the report,” emphasizes the main dialogue’s importance, and 
it provides information about Theaetetus’s character as a grown man: we are shown how 
the youth of good (epistemic) character becomes a man of good moral character.199  
Because we learn in the prologue that the conversation between Socrates and Theaetetus 
took place before the events of the Apology, the references later in the dialogue about 
court become intelligible and hold meaning beyond what is gained from an analysis of 
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the digression.200  As the final scene in the dialogue is also a reference to Socrates’ trial, 
Friedländer finds that the dialogue, bookended by the references to the trial (and death) of 
Socrates, “shows the sublime yet precarious existence of the philosopher.”201  Friedländer 
thinks it significant that Plato chooses the same Megarians that are present at Socrates’ 
death in the Phaedo to be the prologue’s speakers.  These dramatic details as well as the 
connection with dramatic details of other dialogues give what Friedländer terms a 
“personal dimension” that provides the grounds for the later discussions.202  Friedländer 
focuses on the likeness between Socrates and Theaetetus, both the physical and the 
psychic resemblance; surely there is significance in the resemblance and the question of 
the dialogue – in that there is something that inheres in Theaetetus that is relevant to the 
question at hand, so that the question ‘what is knowledge?’ may only be discussed with 
Theaetetus.  Similarly, the inclusion of Theodorus is for both personal and philosophical 
reasons.  Friedländer sees the midwife metaphor as an extension of the relevance of the 
‘personal dimension,’ noting that the practice establishes an idea of a model teacher and a 
model student.  He sees Theaetetus in terms of one of the Republic’s guardians, as does 
Ruby Blondell.  Blondell also emphasizes the interrelationship between form and 
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content.203   The approach is a necessary one for she adopts a hermeneutical principle, 
and so takes as her basis that “the fundamental literary-critical axiom that every detail of 
a text contributes to the meaning of the whole” but cautions against attempting to give 
equal weight to every detail.204  A consideration of the dialogue form recognizes that 
what the dialogue shows is people, and Blondell believes that the dialogue form lends 
itself to the conclusion that it is “a vehicle for characterization.”205  Specifically, Blondell 
argues that: 
Through the characters and their interactions, abstract epistemological issues are 
shown to play themselves out in the world of specific, particularized human 
beings, with their varied abilities to learn from the world, themselves, and each 
other.  It is this personal dimension of epistemology – the fact that we are 
particular, embodied individuals – that generates most of the problems explored in 
the dialogue (especially the reliability and the subjectivity of sense-perception).  
This makes Theaetetus peculiarly self-referential in a dramatic sense, in so far as 
its subject is the very process in which the participants are engaged.206 
 
Blondell’s hermeneutic approach takes into account both the literary and dramatic 
context; what is lacking and what must also be accounted for is the historical context.If 
we take the literary context seriously,  then we must also take the historical context 
seriously – for Plato writes dialogues populated with historical figures related to 
historical events, in existing settings and about actual issues.   Thus, his philosophy 
demands that an interpreter account for context.  Indeed, one may miss or mistake his 
philosophy if one does not account for the historical context in the synthesis of form with 
content. 
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A method for relating form and content has been suggested by Holger Thesleff:  
“the so-called ‘pedimental’ principle of composition.”207  This means that the literary 
composition is like a Greek temple, with the most important thing is in the center – Greek 
temples have arrangements of figures in this manner, as do other genres of ancient 
literature.208  This principle of composition is seen in other ancient genres and involves 
placing the most important things in the center.209  At a basic structural level, then, the 
heart of the Theaetetus is the self-proclaimed digression about philosophy.  Drawing on 
Thesleff’s ‘pedimental’ concept, I will assume that because the ‘digression’ regarding the 
philosopher is set at the heart of the dialogue it is what is most important about the 
Theaetetus.  As Benitez and Guimares point out, making such an assumption does not 
obviate the discussion of knowledge; in fact, the discussion of knowledge has everything 
to do with the discussion of the philosopher, as I will show.210  If knowledge is wisdom 
(145e), and a philosopher is a lover of wisdom, a philosopher is a lover of knowledge.211  
The question of the dialogue, then, pertains and is directly related to the question of 
philosophy – both what it is (in terms of a practice, a way of living) and its object (what 
is produced by that practice).  I will argue that the future character of Theaetetus is at 
                                                 
207
 Thesleff, Looking 19. 
 
208
 Thesleff, Looking 19 n4. 
 
209
 Thesleff relates this to that arrangement of figures in a Greek temple. 
 
210
 Benitez, Eugenio and Livia Guimaraes, "Philosophy as Performed in Plato's Theaetetus," 
Review of Metaphysics 47.2 (1993): 297-328. 
 
211
 This is a surprising move, for it seems Socrates equates sophia with epistēmē:  tau)to\n a)/ra 
e)pisth/mh kai\ sofi/a.  However, it is not entirely the case that Socrates thinks the two are one and the 
same, for very soon thereafter (150b) he claims that his knowledge (techne) of midwifery does not grant 
him wisdom (150c). 
 
 80 
stake; determining what knowledge is, or rather what educational technique will produce 
it, will in turn shape his life.  The description philosopher does, and how he lives his life, 
should be paramount to Theaetetus’ further education.  Theaetetus must be ‘matched’ to 
the appropriate instructor.  While the audience in the dialogue is having a specific, 
controlled discussion about knowledge, the audience of the dialogue is participating in 
that same discussion but on a much larger scale.  Fourth century audiences, as the people 
that determine endoxa, are part of the ongoing debate as to what constitutes a sophos, as I 
noted above.  What they witness in the dialogue is slightly different than the audience in 
the dialogue; they see a youth in need of further education; representations of a sophist, a 
mathematician, and a philosopher are present to display their wares and so, the audience 
is directed to compare the knowledge that each discipline brings.  The dialogue asks the 
audience to evaluate which is the best type of education for Theaetetus and presumably 
their own sons.  Clearly the answer to the best type of education for Theaetetus worked; 
the prologue tells us as much by vouching for the character of the future Theaetetus. 
Even if the Theaetetus were written before the Republic, it does address questions 
that are raised and discussed in the Republic.  In so doing, the Theaetetus raises questions 
that are central to the Republic.  This would be true even if the language in which 
Theaetetus is described were not that of a Guardian, as Ruby Blondell has noted.  The 
Republic is central to any discussion of Platonic paideia and so the discussion of the 
Theaetetus as concerned with pedagogy must consider the Republic.  Like the Republic, 
the Theaetetus is also concerned with the problem of mimēsis, although it is not readily 
evident to present day audiences as it would have been to fourth century Athenians.  
Indeed, the character of Socrates unites the dialogues as do his concerns and his projects; 
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thus, my concern with the relation of the dialogues to each other is not in terms of 
doctrines, but character-oriented.  The projects of other characters, as well, shape the 
dialogues and Socrates’ questions (and manner of questioning).  Henry Teloh identifies a 
distinction between two ‘modes’ of Socratic dialectic: elenchus and psychagogia.  
Psychagogia is used when the interlocutor is favorably situated towards the inquiry, or as 
Teloh puts it, uncorrupted.  Elenchus is reserved for confrontational interlocutors and 
“refutations proceed by making use of the beliefs of an answerer, and hence we cannot 
infer that Socrates endorses the premises used in refutation.”212  In the Theaetetus, I 
believe Socrates engages in psychagogia with both Theaetetus and Theodorus, leading 
them towards the realization that it is only through dialectic that they might grasp 
knowledge, if only for a moment.   
`The ‘Outer Dialogue’ (142a – 143d)  
At first glance, the prologue, a scant two Stephanus pages, does not seem to 
contain any philosophical insight if ‘philosophical insight’ is identified with contributing 
to ‘Platonic epistemology.’  It has traditionally been seen as a charming dedication to a 
fallen comrade before ‘getting to it’ – discussing philosophical doctrines concerning 
knowledge and ontology.  Paying tribute to Theaetetus could be the reason for the 
dialogue’s frame.  Still, it is doubtful that Plato would have written a frame that was not 
tied to the main dialogue in some substantial manner.  In any event, in applying the 
hermeneutical principle and adopting Thesleff’s pedimental assumption, we must ask 
how it contributes in the procession to the highpoint of the dialogue – the ‘digression’ 
about philosophy. 
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In the opening scene, set in Megara, Terpsion meets up with Eucleides, who has 
just returned from the harbor.213  There, he informs Terpsion, he witnessed Theaetetus 
being transported from an army camp in Corinth to Athens.  Theaetetus, though badly 
wounded, wished to return home to Athens rather than stay in Megara.  Eucleides 
mentions that he has heard Theaetetus’ praises sung and reflects to Terpsion that after a 
conversation with Theaetetus, Socrates remarked that Theaetetus would certainly become 
famous, if he lived to adulthood.214  Theaetetus, Eucleides says, has lived up to Socrates’ 
prophecy.  Terpsion inquires as to the specifics of the conversation between Socrates and 
Theaetetus, and we learn that Eucleides did not witness the conversation, but had 
Socrates recount the conversation to him, which he then wrote down in full, making 
several trips to Athens to be certain he got it right.215  He went to extremes to be sure that 
he had the story exactly as Socrates told him, for he checked his written account with 
Socrates several times.  Eucleides offers to have the written version of Socrates’ 
conversation with Theaetetus read to Terpsion; Eucleides either cannot remember the 
conversation in full, or he does not trust his memory.  The dialogue is thus “authored” by 
Eucleides, and though the manuscript is ostensibly a record of Socrates’ narration, 
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Eucleides has taken the liberty of editing out the “I said” when Socrates spoke and the 
“he said” when Theaetetus or Theodorus spoke.  Just as Plato writes dialogues in which 
there is no character Plato and so writes himself out of the dialogue, Eucleides writes 
both himself as the author and Socrates as the narrator out of the text.  
John McDowell, in his commentary on Theaetetus, remarks, as many other 
scholars do, that although it is not unusual among Plato’s dialogues for the main dialogue 
to be embedded within a dialogue frame, “Theaetetus is unique in that the embedded 
main dialogue is in dramatic, not narrative, form.”216   Through the Megarians’ 
conversation, the frame narrative strategically positions several concepts for further 
exploration in the remainder of the dialogue: the issues of writing, reading, recollection 
and understanding, to say nothing of the death of Socrates and of Theaetetus.  
These issues of writing, reading, recollection and understanding are not minor issues, 
despite the fact that contemporary philosophers often treat them as such.  That they 
should appear to be unimportant to contemporary philosophers simply underscores the 
fact that for us, reading and writing are so familiar and so taken for granted, that we fail 
to consider the material and cultural differences in paideia between fifth and fourth 
century BCE.  Today, writing is used in every sector of our society, from communicating 
information to storage of information.   
To modern day philosophers, the use and significance of writing has become 
transparent, as the outermost ring, something we take for granted, even going so far as to 
label oral cultures ‘pre-literate’.  Illiteracy is regarded as a problem and a disadvantage 
for full participation in our culture, though the illiterate person undoubtedly mastered oral 
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communication – or sign language.  Part of what is not captured in written texts is the 
performative aspect of language – an aspect which is readily present in oral 
communication.  J. L. Austin identifies sentences that do things as performative 
utterances: that the utterance is itself the action; for example, by saying ‘I do” when 
asked ‘Do you swear to tell the truth …’ you have performed the action with the 
utterance.  ‘I do’ is not a report of the action; it is the action itself.217  In archaic Greece, 
writing was a supplement to oral practices of communication and information 
preservation.  We need to remind ourselves that the attitudes towards writing and reading 
in archaic and classical Greece were quite different; it is unlikely that the ability to read 
and write were widespread in the fifth and fourth centuries, and even more dubious that 
silent reading was a common practice.  The first mention on record of a solitary reader 
reading a text for the sake of enjoyment alone is in Aristophanes’ Frogs (405 BCE); 
reading and listening was, in archaic and even classical Greece, a shared experience – at 
least, for the audience. 218  The role of the reader was separate from that of an audience 
member.   
 Svenbro talks of a gap between a reader reading a text aloud and an actor 
performing memorized lines, stressing that the actor is not reading: “they may have read 
the text to memorize it, but during the performance their voices replace the text, 
conspicuously absent from the stage.”219  Moreover, reading a text aloud meant that the 
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reader was subjugating himself to the author; a performer does not suffer that same 
binding: “a reader’s voice simply does not have the autonomy of the actor’s voice.”220  
Note that in of both types of speech acts the audience members are considered passive.221  
In classical Greece, reading was an activity fit for slaves because to speak others’ words 
was to turn oneself into an instrument of the author, thus submitting oneself to a status of 
powerlessness.222  The author dominates the passive reader.  Thus it is the slave who 
reads the words Eucleides has written – that were, originally, the words of Socrates.  That 
a slave is made to read Eucleides’ transcription of Socrates’ conversation is predictable 
and conventional.  But in the Theaetetus this reading aloud may have an additional 
purpose.  Tarrant attributes this shifting of authorial voice to the structure of oral 
narratives: 
In the Theaetetus the slave simply reads aloud, while the author sinks into the 
audience, thus allowing the words and arguments themselves to have their own 
independent effect upon his friends and colleagues. In allowing the slave to read 
he is allowing the book to speak for itself he is testing its ability to be released 
into the public domain, and thus to speak to others as well.223 
 
The issue of writing is one of the most important philosophic issues about the Platonic 
dialogues, but our literacy makes that issue disappear.  For the ancient Greeks, the 
performative aspect of language could not be replaced by written words.  Because 
reading was seen as emasculating, the use of written testimony in court was frowned 
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upon.  Writing was incomplete without a voice; the “purpose of writing … was to 
produce and to control a deferred oral statement.”224  Written contracts required 
witnesses, which implied “an agreement was built up partly from the memory and 
scrutiny of the witnesses, partly through the written document.”225 
As Tarrant remarks, written works are likely to involve a more complicated 
structure if the work is not committed to preserving an oral narrative.226  Certainly, this is 
indicated by Eucleides’ transposition of narrative to direct speech.  But even as direct 
speech, the framed narrative displays features of oral narrative and the frame story holds 
this tension of an oral versus a written narrative.  As Socrates protests in the Phaedrus, a 
failure of texts, and learning from texts, is the motionlessness of written words; the 
preference of motion to motionless is reflected in the Theaetetus, too, at 153b.  Even 
though a person wrote the text (or transcribed it), it is impossible to converse (sanely) 
with a text in order to determine if one has understood what the author was attempting to 
communicate.227  A problem of language is that it, and consequently the inferences drawn 
from it, is open to error.  Conversing in speech accommodates the fact that language is 
open to revision, to correct errors in understanding a hearer can ask the speaker for 
clarification or elucidation - one can ask as a midwife.  There is no midwife when dealing 
with texts, for their author is not present for questioning.  In the beginning of Theaetetus, 
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we learn that Eucleides makes several trips to Athens for the purpose of writing down the 
precise words of Socrates’ conversation with Theaetetus; however, Tarrant points out that 
“one recognized feature of oral composition is the tendency to repeat something with 
variation.”228  Despite Eucleides’ obsession with writing the precise words, it is unlikely 
that Socrates tells the tale using the same words every time, as if he were no more than a 
voice recorder.  What Socrates conveys is meaning – and exhortation – something that 
Eucleides may fail to grasp in his eagerness to capture, instead, the exact words.  The 
‘opposition’ that may be observed in the outer structure, between meaning, or 
understanding, and precision, is echoed in the dialogue by the use of mathematicians as 
interlocutors.  Just as it may be more precise to represent propositions, arguments, even 
speakers as symbols (i.e. ‘A’ and ‘B’) that precision is aimed at capturing a logical 
structure, not the underlying ‘messy’ inferences that convey meaning. 
Plato’s text, as opposed to Eucleides’ text, puts together both the transcription and 
the transcriber, calling attention to the dramatic elements of the dialogue, perhaps 
indicating that it is the meaning and exhortation, and not the words, that is important.  
Due to Plato’s melding of transcription and transcriber into dialogue, more, rather than 
less, of the meaning of the words are captured by the portrayal of actions, events, and 
speakers.  Plato appears to be gently injecting humor to the transcription process by 
pointing out Eucleides’ weaknesses as a philosopher.  Eucleides was the founder of an 
Eleatic school of thought that “denied potentiality and had recourse only to logos in 
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rejecting all phenomena.”229  Eucleides hears but may not understand; he preserves bare 
words but not necessarily their meaning.  He memorizes but misremembers.  Eucleides 
repeats the words of Socrates but it is not clear that he understands what the words mean, 
when taken as a whole.  As a whole, the sum is greater than the parts; the meaning behind 
the words can only make sense as a unity, as a whole – the parts alone are just random 
names.  For the Megarians, “language itself becomes an issue and is subject to 
revision.”230  Ironically, the Eleatic-minded Eucleides is a link between the past, present, 
and future; the Eleactics believed that there could be no motion, either temporal or 
spatial.  Eucleides, in the ‘present,’ has a slave read a dialogue Eucleides recorded in the 
past before the death of Socrates – and Theaetetus, the prominent interlocutor in the 
dialogue, is going to die in the near future.   The irony in the dialogue’s frame abounds, 
for though we are told that Socrates related the event to Eucleides and Eucleides writes 
down Socrates’ words, Eucleides proceeds to efface Socrates as author of the text, but 
notice Plato always does that to himself.  So how should we view the scribe, Eucleides?  
He is neither the author nor the reader, but stands in between the two as a seer stands 
between the divine and the individual seeking prophecy.     
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Hayden Ausland suggests that an outer dialogue is meant to increase audience 
involvement for “by observing a fictional surface dialogue about a hypothetical earlier 
dialogue we by analogy contemplate a further living dialogue about one or another of 
these.”231  Taking Ausland’s suggestion, I propose that the prologue of the Theaetetus 
points to an educational purpose for the audience of the dialogue; that by extension, the 
purpose of the Theaetetus – of any Platonic dialogue – is to bring the conversation to the 
audience so that they might discover the answers for themselves.  The dialogues are 
pedagogical works, and the telos of the works is increased understanding in a topic or a 
discussion.  Plato does not desire his audience to remain passive, like the slave reading 
Eucleides’ transcription.  Plato does not attempt to subjugate his listeners; by composing 
a dialogue, by extending the conversation to the listeners, Plato is inviting the audience 
members to participate – in both the inquiry and the ethical life. 
The dialogue is set grimly before Socrates faces the indictment by Meletus – in 
fact, the dialogue ends on that note – and thus the entire dialogue is shadowed by the 
impending death of Socrates.  There is no way to know precisely why Plato chose to set 
the dialogue before that event, but there are a few things that are perhaps so reasonable so 
as to escape the realm of idle speculation.  First, it is worthwhile to ask how Socrates, the 
philosopher of the Apology, compares with the philosopher described in the Theaetetus.  
Secondly, with Socrates’ death looming in the future and the many references to 
parentage and offspring in the dialogue, it seems right to see one aspect of the dialogue as 
addressing whether or not the young Theaetetus is a suitable replacement for Socrates: 
can Theaetetus be Athens next gadfly?  Finally, for the audience of the dialogue, it lends 
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a sense of urgency to the dialogue in general and the comparison of the attorney to the 
philosopher in particular.  It seems clear that the audience of the dialogue is meant to 
have the trial and death of Socrates in mind as they hear this dialogue – in fact, it is 
imperative that they make connections between the dialogue and the historical facts. 
The parallel between the appearances of Theaetetus and Socrates contributes to a 
reinterpretation of the death of Socrates as patriotic.  From the discussion of the 
Megarians, we might infer that since Theaetetus was dying due to wounds he earned in 
the military – surely a patriotic death – that we can infer that Socrates, too, dies a 
patriotic death, though he dies for the polis as a philosopher and not a soldier.  Plato here 
seems to be extending the concept of patriotism beyond dying for Athens on the 
battlefield, for Socrates dies for Athens’ paideia by portraying Theaetetus as someone on 
the road to becoming a philosopher – a Guardian – and Socrates as a philosopher, in 
contrast to Theodorus, the mathematician.232  But what is the process that will take 
Theaetetus from the level of mathematics to that of philosophy, i.e. from the purely 
theoretical to the existential?  The answer seems to be within the prologue: the midwife, 
wielding the art of dialectic.   
The Midwife of the Inner Dialogue (143d -151d) 
He explains to those assembled that much as his mother was a midwife to women, 
he is a midwife to men, delivering them of ideas.  In declaring himself a midwife, 
Socrates claims that he himself is barren, unable to conceive – a claim that matches with 
his usual claim of ignorance.  Socrates’ midwifery is also an art that distinguishes “the 
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true from the false offspring” – truth from falsehood (150b).  This is an apt description of 
Socratic elenchus, wherein Socrates generally leads his interlocutors to realize their 
beliefs are logically inconsistent and that should, but often does not, cause the 
interlocutor to reject the belief as falsehood.  But a midwife has a skill other than the 
abilities to determine if they ought to induce a birth or a miscarriage as well as to deliver 
a baby safely, and that skill is matchmaking.  A true midwife knows which two people 
will bring forth the best offspring.   
Socrates often complains when interlocutors make an appeal to authority, by 
reciting what others have said and not their own beliefs.  In the Protagoras, when 
Protagoras realizes the first logical trap Socrates has allowed him to walk into, he 
protests, claiming, “What does it matter? If you like, let us assume that justice is holy and 
holiness just” (331c).  Unable to respond, he appeals to Socrates to simply continue as if 
they had managed to reach an agreement on the subject.  Socrates’ reply is poignant: “It 
isn’t this ‘if you like’ and ‘if that’s what you think’ that I want us to examine, but you and 
me ourselves” (331c).  In other words, the discussion cannot uncover any truth unless 
both Socrates and Protagoras are engaging each other as they engage themselves.  Gifford 
agrees with the importance of the many instances that Socrates chides the interlocutor 
that it is their selves they should examine, to obtain any truth: 
…a main goal of Socratic questioning is to reveal the quality of an interlocutor’s 
life … it is in this dialectical form of argumentation that he himself mimetically 
replicates in the dialogues (however much he may modify it for dramatic ends of 
his own.233 
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Indeed, it is the willingness to examine one’s self that Socrates requires of the 
interlocutor.  The self-knowledge gained from the dialectical experience with Socrates 
may not be of any help in putting into words a definition of whatever concept they are 
discussing, but it should put them in a better position to put the concept into practice.  It 
provides the grounds for the possibility of virtue, both moral and intellectual virtue.  The 
problem is what paideia will bring a person to virtue – the answer is obviously 
philosophy.  In the Theaetetus the concern, I argue, is clearly with the epistemic virtues – 
and these virtues are specific to philosophers; philosophers must know, inquire, and live 
in the right way.  This can be seen in the moral character of Theaetetus and the guiding 
question of the dialogue.  Theaetetus is already a youth of good moral character, 
according to Theodorus.   
Michael Stokes writes that in order to take the dialogue form seriously we must 
take the characters of the dialogues seriously, and that “includes examining the 
constraints placed upon them by the context in which they speak.”234  This means both 
the constraints of the character – who and what they are – and the constraints of the 
actual conversation with Socrates.  Any action that the historical personage makes in life 
is taken to follow from the beliefs and desires expressed in the dialogues.   
While it is not novel to consider the Theaetetus as a dialogue about the 
philosopher, my interest lies in not only assuming that common conclusion, but 
examining what it is the external audience is to learn from the dialogue, in the context of 
learning what is required of the philosopher.  In the Theaetetus, we are able to see what is 
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particular to the goals and the practice of philosophy through its comparison to other 
epistemic practices, how the practice works, the kind of person a philosopher is, and the 
way of life a philosopher leads, as well as the way a philosopher dies.  In the case of 
Theaetetus, the manner of his death is addressed in the very beginning of the dialogue.  
By placing the death first, in a manner that demands attention from the audience, Plato 
may be giving tribute to Theaetetus, as many commentators have suggested.  But the end 
of the transcribed dialogue taking place right before the event of the Euthyphro and 
subseqently the Apology, suggests a significance to the concept of death – and elevating 
the prologue, with its references to both Socrates’ and Theaetetus’ death, above a 
laudatory tribute to an admired colleague.  Death may be a physical representation of the 
problems with the first definition, that knowledge is perception.  The knowledge of the 
philosopher extends beyond the ‘realm’ of physical perception, into the furthest reaches 
of the abstract.   
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Chapter Five 
 
Knowledge and Ignorance 
 
I have argued above that the fourth century was marked with a specific 
conception of sophos, one that stresses successful public speaking – that is, public 
speaking that sways and influences other citizens – as a criterion.  In the Theaetetus, as 
well as other dialogues, Plato subverts the meaning of sophos through a critique of 
knowledge-yielding practices, in order to establish the life and practice of a philosopher.  
Through a discussion of the meaning of ‘knowledge,’ Socrates shows that truth, or the 
failure to reach truth, is a direct result of the practice that yields that ‘knowledge.’  
Indeed, any knowledge-yielding practice requires that the learner possess particular 
virtues, and it is those virtues, as well as those practices, that fail to meet Plato’s standard 
of embodied virtue: Socrates.  In the other aporetic dialogues, it has been argued that 
Socrates exemplifies the virtue under discussion in both word (log%) and deed (e¦rg%): 
the Charmides shows him as temperate, the Laches shows him as courageous, the 
Euthyphro shows him as pious, and so on and so forth.235  In the Theaetetus we have a 
perplexing situation, if we wish to extend this trend among aporetic dialogues to include 
the Theaetetus: the ‘virtue’ in the Theaetetus is knowledge and Socrates is well known 
for his professions of ignorance.  How, then, can Socrates exemplify knowledge when he 
himself denies having it and the dialogue itself ends in aporia, irresolution to the 
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question?  As we, and Plato’s intended fourth century audience, are aware, Socrates’ only 
claim to knowledge is that he does not know: he claims to know that he knows not.  How 
can Socrates embody knowledge in the same manner that Socrates embodies sophrosūne 
or andreia, in both words and actions?  One can be courageous or temperate in words and 
deeds, it is easy to see, but it is not so easy to see in the case of knowledge.  If, however, 
knowledge is characterized by Socratic knowledge, a profession of ignorance of what one 
knows they do not know, then one can be knowledgeable in word and deed, through a 
display of epistemic virtue.  The profession of ignorance is a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition for a successful inquiry to occur; it requires a certain humility that 
indicates disinterest in power or winning.  It shows an interest in Truth.  To be 
knowledgeable in word and deed, then, is to inquire in a particular way, one that requires 
the speaker to have epistemic virtue.  
Knowledge as Species (143d – 151d)  
The transcribed dialogue opens with Socrates inquiring if Theodorus has come 
across exceptional Athenian youth – which, of course, Theodorus has.  Theodorus praises 
the boy in everything but his appearance – in appearance, Theaetetus looks rather like 
Socrates.236  Socrates uses this claim of similarity to launch into a discussion of the nature 
of knowledge.  Theaetetus’ first response is to enumerate the sciences – geometry, 
astronomy, mathematics – and adding to this list, crafts such as cobbling.  Theaetetus 
appears to be making the same mistake all of Socrates’ aporetic interlocutors make on 
their first attempt – answering with an example, an instance of the concept under 
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discussion.  His answer is also tied to personal experience, as seen in Laches, Euthyphro, 
and other aporetic dialogues, for he begins his enumeration with what the subjects he is 
learning from Theodorus, a not unimportant point as the dialogue unfolds.  Socrates 
gently shows him the error in attempting to form a definition from instances, and then 
declares him “pregnant.”  When Socrates proposes to deliver Theaetetus’ idea concerning 
knowledge and Theaetetus offers the definition of ‘knowledge as aisthesis,’ Socrates 
proceeds to refute the definition in the context of the sophoi with whom he identifies it, 
i.e, in the context of practices of paideia.   
Theaetetus has been training with Theodorus in the subjects of mathematics, 
geometry, and astronomy.  Of course, none of these subjects are the highest possible 
object of knowledge, that which is revealed in the pure science of dialectic, but 
considering what Socrates says in the Republic about the training of the guardians, these 
three subjects stand close to philosophy.  When Theaetetus’ first attempt to define 
knowledge is lacking, for it is only a list of instances of knowledge, Socrates offers an 
analogous definition of clay (147c-d) so that Theaetetus might better understand how to 
answer.  In return, Theaetetus tells Socrates about a problem he and Socrates the younger 
were attempting to solve.  Following a demonstration by Theodorus that was intended to 
show a “point about powers” (147d), the two boys attempted to define ‘power’ 
(dunamis).237  This is an example of “a transformed dialegesthai,” writes P. Christopher 
Smith, that is, “not as ‘talking’ something ‘through’ in ordinary word names, but as 
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‘sorting out,’ by collection into a genus (genos) and division according to species (eidê), 
some preconceived thing in its relationships to other preconceived things.”238  
Theaetetus’ description of his solution to the dunamis problem seems to rely heavily on 
diagrams and visual cues, as would be expected from a mathematician’s pupil.239  
Socrates advises Theaetetus to “Try to imitate your answer about powers …now I want 
you in the same way to give one single account of the many branches of knowledge” 
(148d).240  Theaetetus’ next attempt is then made using the mathematician’s method, the 
transformed dialegesethai – and, of course, it fails to satisfy the conditions of the 
philosopher. 
The philosopher inquires for the purpose of revealing truth.  Truth is the object of 
the practice of philosophy – but it is a particular type of knowledge that only a 
philosopher, one who possesses appropriate epistemic virtue and practices philosophy, 
one who lives the philosophic life, can pursue.  Truth is not necessarily the property of a 
proposition, and philosophy is not, or not merely, the formulation of propositions.  
Communicating what philosophy is – a way of living – requires at least dramatic 
embodiment.  All that is carried out in linguistic discourse – what is communicated in 
philosophy – also requires embodiment.  If the Theaetetus is about what it is to be a 
philosopher – which includes the practice of philosophy – then the question ‘what is 
knowledge?’ has a context: what is knowledge if one’s goal is to establish the practice of 
                                                 
238
 P. Christopher Smith, "Between the Audible Word and the Envisionable Concept: Re-Reading 
Plato's Theaetetus After Gadamer," Continental Philosophy Review 33.3 (2000): 327-44. 329. 
 
239
 Smith 329. 
 
240
 As usual, Socrates tailors his discussion to the individual he is speaking with, in this case, 
advising Theaetetus to attempt to answer in a manner with which he is comfortable and accustomed. 
 
 98 
philosophy?  In the dialogues, philosophy is shown to reveal non-propositional (and in 
many cases inarticulable) concepts.   
The Theaetetus presents misconceptions of knowledge in Athenian society, and 
how those misconceptions are tied to political practices, which are bolstered by practices 
of paideia.  Knowledge is typically conceived as perception– but this is wrong.  
Knowledge can not be perception nor can knowledge be the doxa that is a product of 
debates in the democratic polis.241  Since the practices of sophistry and poetry produce 
the conception of knowledge as relative and democratic, they should not be standard 
practice.  Philosophy is a type of discourse that allows for open-ended investigation; it is 
a dynamic process that does not have an assumed end, unlike debate in the polis.  
Endoxa, ‘received belief(s)’, is the starting point for rhetorical pistis, which is opposed to 
the self-evident arche of mathematical apodeixis.  A debate conducted by sophoi presents 
the speaker’s position and then contrives, through rhetoric, argument, and emotional 
persuasion, to ‘win over’ the audience.  A debate and sophistic speech or dialectic is 
always, first and foremost, about winning, about power, about skill in persuasive 
technique.  It is not aimed at establishing truth: the performative aspect of sophistry 
prevents it from being a truth-seeking practice.  The performative aspect of poetry does 
the same; moreover, the performative aspect becomes the reason for the practice of 
poetry.  Poetry (re)presents events and characters from history and myth, creating a 
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pleasurable experience for the audience, an experience in which they can forget their own 
troubles.242 
Knowledge as Aisthesis (151d – 186e) 
Theaetetus’ second definition of knowledge is that it is perception (aisthesis).  On 
one level, attempting to define knowledge as perception answers a challenge to Plato’s 
conception of philosophy.  The knowledge of the philosopher extends beyond the ‘realm’ 
of physical perception, into the furthest reaches of the abstract.  If sense perception is 
knowledge, then appearances are all that is.  There would be no need to look for a greater 
truth; no need for philosophy.  The good life is then comprised of whatever each person 
conceives it to be and the polis is left without clear direction, wallowing in the opinions 
of the moment (endoxa).  The discussion in the Theaetetus makes clear to the fourth 
century audience the problems involved in defining knowledge as perception, and implies 
that any practice resulting in perception can not be the ‘answer’ the polis needs: a lasting 
true standard.  It can not provide principles for the Good life. 
When examined from the perspective of a fourth century citizen, the Theaetetus 
is, as most of the aporetic dialogues seem to be, about defining philosophy as a new 
standard of paideia.  In particular, this dialogue highlights the differences between the 
practice of philosophy and that of mathematics, as evidenced by the choice of 
interlocutors.  However, the first definition of knowledge is arguably not about 
mathematics; and the lengthy discussion that knowledge is aisthesis seems to be more 
about democratic knowledge and traditional conceptions of a sophos.  Designating 
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knowledge as perception allows for Plato to accomplish several things. First, separation 
of the practice of philosophy from the practice of the poets, the sophists, and the 
Presocratics – from their language of word-names.  Secondly, this distinction draws 
attention to the failure of mathematics to completely devote itself to abstract, a priori 
reasoning; and thirdly, it draws attention to and deals with the common opinion of many 
Athenian citizens.  Aisthesis indicates the problem with mathematics as well, viz. its 
reliance on diagrams – or the staticity of sight, at least for puposes of paideia, as we see 
in the Meno.  Geometry concerns figures that have spatial dimensions, albeit ideal spatial 
dimensions.  
It is evident, when one situates the dialogue in its historical and cultural context, 
that Socrates’ response to Theaetetus’ suggestion that ‘knowledge is perception’ is a 
response that is meant to provide an opening of the practices of paideia to criticism.  
Thus, Socrates conflates Theaetetus’ definition with Protagorean relativism, that ‘man is 
the measure of all things.’  Protagoras, we see, is to represent the sophists, the class of 
educators who were mostly not Athenian but foreigners, and who educated the mekarion 
in virtue, or anyone willing to pay a hefty fee.  In the Protagoras, Plato has the character 
of the name argue that all the wise men before him were, in fact, sophists and so it is 
fitting that in the Theaetetus, too, Protagoras is grouped together with Heraclitus, 
Empedocles, Epicharmus and Homer. 
Understanding what these sophoi have in common and what Plato found 
objectionable about their positions will inform us of what Plato thinks philosophic 
paideia ought to be.  Most of the sophoi listed speak to a world of change, of becoming – 
the world that we are able to perceive.  All claim (or, others claim for them) that their 
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work is an instance of paideia.  Rather than addressing Theaetetus’ definition in an 
abstract manner, Socrates grounds the definition in terms of instances of sophoi, each of 
whom represents a particular practice of paideia and yet each one of these practices 
grounds Truth in a world of flux.  What is common to all is the implications for 
knowledge that emerge from their practices.   
The structure of the argument for knowledge as perception (aisthesis) has an 
introduction and two main refutations, interspersed with a ‘digression’ about the nature of 
the philosopher.  Upon Theaetetus answering ‘knowledge is perception’ Socrates 
immediately relates the definition to Protagoras’ doctrine: “Man is the measure of all 
things: of things which are, and of things which are not, that they are not” (152a).  Using 
the example of wind, an object that does not exist except as a perception, in a few brief 
moves Socrates equates ‘perceiving’ with 'appearing;’ the definition, with substitution, is 
now ‘knowledge is appearance.’  This, in turn, leads to the inclusion of … 
… all wise men of the past … Let us take it that we find on this side Protagoras 
and Heraclitus and Empedocles; and also the masters of the two kinds of poetry,  
Epicharmus in comedy and Homer in tragedy.  For when Homer talked about 
‘Ocean, begetter of gods and Tethys their mother’, he made all things the 
offspring of flux and motion (152e).   
 
The inclusion of these sophoi indicates the problem with the definition of knowledge as 
perception is tied up in the problem with public discourse, paideia, and the implications 
the definition has for morality.  Their conception of the ‘world of becoming’ is damaging, 
in particular, because of the authority these sophoi held over the general population as 
well as other sophoi.  These sophoi are present in the Theaetetus for the same reason they 
are included in other dialogues: Plato is attempting to appropriate the term philosophy for 
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a practice of paideia that stresses universal truth over temporary spectacles of 
appearance; a practice that examines the eternal divine and not the immediate now. 
This is a problem with these ‘fluxers,’ for neither truth nor knowledge can be 
grounded in perception.  Philosophers, after all, love the sight of truth, not of sights and 
sounds (Rep. 475d), whether of the sensible world or the poetic realms.  The changing 
sights and sounds catch the eye, and perhaps even the imagination; certainly, they catch 
the appetites, which come and go as does truth and knowledge in a democratic city.  
Socrates’ combination of these sophoi serves to demonstrate that the problem with the 
definition of knowledge as aisthesis, and the ensuing problematic implications, is a 
problem that reaches to the very heart of Hellas, for it is a problem entrenched in Homer. 
The poet and his audience inhabit a world of sights and sounds, one which 
Socrates tells us in Republic 10, is even less stable than the ordinary sensible world.  The 
poet need not understand the world of which he sings, or the sensible world that it 
imitates; the poet needs only to capture its look and feel.  Homer is chosen to represent 
the tragedians because of the authority and the established role his poetry held in archaic 
paideia, which Socrates also documents in Republic X.  In Homer, memory (aletheia) 
comes from the muses; whatever stability knowledge has, it has because of the Muses.  
Even the muses move and change and perform, as Hesiod, who is paired with Homer in 
Republic Books II and III, shows us in the opening twelve lines of the Theogony:  
Let us begin our singing from the Helikonian Muses  
Who possess the great and holy mountain of Helikon 
And dance there on soft feet by the dark blue water 
Of the spring, and by the altar of the powerful son of Kronos; 
Who wash their tender bodies in the waters of Permessos 
Or Hippokrene, spring of the Horse, or holy Olmeios, 
And on the high places of Heliokon have ordered their dances 
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Which are handsome and beguiling, and light are the feet they move on. 
From there they rise, and put a veiling of deep mist upon them, 
And walk in the night, singing in sweet voices, and celebrating 
Zeus, the holder of the aegis, and Hera, his lady 
Of Argos, who treads on golden sandals … 
 
Hesiod sings from the Muses, those who are tender and soft, and beguile men with their 
dances – dances which are part of the poetry.243  They rise from a deep mist – and mist, 
as we all know, obscures our senses and plays tricks on them. 
Of Epicharmus, little is known, though there is evidence to suggest that he was 
known as the first comic playwright and as a philosopher, but a fragment from 
Epicharmus reveals that his work, as well, has themes of transience and its implied 
relativism:244   
A. In the same way now consider mankind: one grows, another dwindles, and we 
are all subject to change every moment.  But what changes by nature, never 
remaining in the same state, must therefore be different from that which has 
suffered alteration.  Thus both you and I are not the same men now that we were 
yesterday; later we are others again and never the same according to the same 
argument.245 
 
Thus, one might argue that a man could not be tried for crimes he committed yesterday 
on the basis that the man in the present is a different man.246  It is easy to make the 
connection to Heraclitus and the theory of flux in the above fragment.  Epicharmus 
implies that identity can not be maintained without the stability of something beyond 
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appearance.  Identity requires an immaterial stability, which may be found in the divine.  
For the Greeks, whatever exists, never goes out of existence and is not visible – unless it 
chooses to be – is divine.  What makes the divine divine is that stability that Vernant 
attributes to the “divine super-body,” which stands in stark contrast to the ephemeral, 
congenitally doomed mortal body.247  The properties of the gods’ bodies are the 
contraries of mortal bodies and were not, contrary to common opinion, conceived as 
anthropomorphic because the human body was used as a model, but just the opposite:  
“the human body reflects the divine models the inexhaustible source of a vital energy 
when, for an instant, the brilliance of divinity happens to fall on a mortal creature, 
illuminating him, as in a fleeting glow, with a little of that splendor that always clothes 
the body of a god.”248   
The mortal body must return and lose itself in the nature to which it belongs, a 
nature that only made the body appear in order to swallow it up again.  The 
permanence of immortal beauty, the stability of undying glory in its institutions, 
culture alone has the power to construct these by conferring on ephemeral 
creatures the status of the illustrious, the ‘beautiful dead.’  If the gods are 
immortal and imperishable, it is because, unlike men, their corporeality possesses, 
by nature and even in the very heart of nature, the constant beauty and glory that 
the social imagination strives to invent for mortals when the no longer have a 
body to display their beauty or an existence that can win them glory.  Living 
always in strength and beauty, the gods have a super-body: a body made entirely 
and forever of beauty and glory.249 
 
But the gods, as portrayed by the poets, have fleeting emotions that give rise to arbitrary 
actions, anthropomorphic actions.  Perhaps it is the fact of this anthropomorphism that 
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makes the gods suspect in Protagoras’ eyes.  Among the fragments we have of 
Protagoras’ book – named, ironically enough – Truth:  “Concerning the gods I cannot 
know either that they are or that they are not” (DK B4).  According to Protagoras, we can 
not even have knowledge of the gods, calling into question the very possibility of an 
incorporeal, immortal existence.  Without the divine, then man truly is the measure.  It is 
this focus on the anthropomorphic characteristics of the divine that obscure what it is that 
Plato reveals: Plato points to a conception of knowledge and truth modeled on the divine, 
that deathless ‘shining, radiant existence.’   
As Socrates presses Theaetetus on the problem with relative terms, Socrates 
strengthens the bond between perception and flux.  Perception, if Protagoras is correct, is 
unerring – for the perceiver’s judgment of his perceptions is always correct for him.  
There are not, however, any reasons or arguments (logoi) given for the judgment.  The 
statement “I believe it is cold” is a subjective statement for no objective truth can follow 
from it.  A perceiver can report his perceptions, and while they are true for him, it is not 
necessary that they be true for anyone else.  It also follows that it is impossible for the 
perceiver to not know the things that he perceives (160d).  Assuming that the world itself 
is in constant flux, the problem for truth is worsened; it is not just that there is no truth 
between, or shared by, perceivers, but even subjective truth – truth for the individual 
perceiver – is called into question.  The world become unintelligible, and we cannot trust 
our own perceptions.  The only thing that could persist through flux is a priori 
knowledge: objects that do not have an appearance, objects that are non-sensible, i.e., 
intelligible objects.  Clearly, the world is in a constant state of becoming and we can state 
with assurance that sensible objects do not persist for eternity.  Knowledge, for Socrates 
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and Plato, must be akin to the “shining radiant existence” of the gods.  Thus, our 
perceptions are not the proper objects of knowledge because perceptions are ephemeral, 
and perceptions change as the world changes.  Moreover, reliance on appearance for 
description leads to a violation of the law of contradiction.  This is seen through Socrates’ 
example of the dice.  Six dice on a table are both more and less, depending on whether 
you add or take away dice from the table (154c).  Relational concepts such as greater and 
lesser, larger and smaller, generate these types of contradictions; four dice are more than 
three dice and at the same time, less than six dice.250  In order to resolve the contradiction 
caused by relational concepts, a kind of cognition that does not rely on appearance is 
necessary. 
 There are two types of change: there is relational change, as in the example of the 
dice, and there is absolute change, as in the example of the size of Theaetetus, whose 
change from a shorter, younger Theaetetus to a taller, older Theaetetus who grows no 
more (155b).  Everything is in motion – all is becoming and nothing is and there is no 
being – Socrates strives to remove all unity from the theory, to return to what William 
James called a ‘blooming, buzzing confusion.’251  Next, Socrates moves from sense 
perception to judgments and considers the judgments of the insane, diseased, and 
dreamers (157e) – and then having completed melding perception with flux, proceeds to 
bring objections to the theory and its associated parts. 
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 The two types of change correlate to the practices of paideia.  Philosophic 
dialectic brings about knowledge that transforms, absolutely, the knower while other 
practices create relative changes in the knower, that is, beliefs.  But as for knowledge as a 
fixed object, there is no room for that sort of knowledge in the doctrine of flux, in 
equating knowledge with perception.  Paideia that affixes Truth to phenomena lapses 
into relativism and confusion. 
This introduces the second of the two major figures that Socrates refutes: the 
Heracliteans.  One aspect of the problem with defining knowledge as appearance may be 
seen in the ontology of Heraclitus and Empedocles.  These two philosophers have been 
singled out because their theories of phenomena imply particularly provocative 
conclusions for one who shares Plato’s concerns about knowledge and truth.  Knowledge, 
for these sophoi, is relegated to descriptions of phenomena and their understanding of 
phenomena.  Knowledge is predicated on the shifting phenomena that is the world; for 
example, Empedocles tells us that 
… these things never cease from constantly alternating, at one time all coming 
together by love into one, and at another time again all being borne apart 
separately by the hostility of strife…in this respect they come to be and have no 
constant life; but insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging, in this 
respect they are always unchanged in a cycle (DK 25.6). 
 
Heraclitus’ ontology represents the world as a constantly changing entity.  All that we 
can say about our experience is to give a phenomenological account, but as Socrates 
ridicules the Heracliteans at 183b, they would have to establish another language in order 
to discuss their beliefs and not be hypocritical.  Logos, when pronounced and heard, has 
the status of phenomena.  Language fixes a description of phenomena; if the phenomena 
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are in constant motion, language needs to account for that, somehow.  Therefore, the 
position of Heraclitus and Empedocles make logos itself an impossibility.     
Nor is there room in the theory of flux for a necessary condition of knowledge: 
memory.  Memory is what allows us to recognize, re-identify and represent what we have 
perceived; through memory the world of which we are a part is stabilized, and its objects 
become objects of knowledge.  But as we are part of the world of appearances, 
coextensive with nature, how do we account for the fact that we can fix objects in 
memory?  The answer is dependent on understanding that the Greeks saw nature as 
intelligent and alive in its own right.  Nature, of which we are a part, is alive and 
intelligible if one knows how to think about it.  Vernant explains how the Greeks thought 
of their relationship with nature ”Man and his body are embedded in the course of nature, 
phusis, which causes all that is born here below to rise, mature, and disappear …. Man 
and his body therefore, bear the mark of a congenital infirmity; like a stigma the seal of 
the impermanent and evanescent is branded on them.”252  Because Man is embedded in 
the natural world, a soul that is not exactly part of the natural world is necessary for 
memory.  Memory is necessary for knowledge; a timeless soul is necessary for memory. 
The logos that must accompany true belief is that which talks of what is timeless 
in the language of the timeless ‘is’, the answer to the Socratic question ‘What is X?’  But 
this logos and the knowledge it reveals exceeds our grasp of the world of becoming.  In a 
world of becoming a mortal’s knowledge – a philosopher’s knowledge – of that logos is 
fleeting and insecure, but we must resist the impulse to comply with what we see and 
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hear and sense.  Protagoras’ maxim ‘man is the measure’ would provide us with a 
knowledge no less secure and fleeting than what we see when we glimpse the logos. 
The account – the logos – of our beliefs must reveal that knowledge that exceeds 
our grasp of the world of becoming; the logos must be stable, based on the model of the 
divine.  Non-philosophical practices of paideia do not reveal; the logos they offer is 
muthos, representation, and a narrative that is relativistic.  Heraclitus and Empedocles can 
only give accounts based on the now since the world of phenomena is completely 
changing.  Two paradigms were present in the ancient world: that of an ever-changing 
Heraclitean reality, and the Eleatic world, wherein all that we take for granted, our 
senses, is deceiving, causing false judgment.  Parmenides and Melissus are the only 
Presocratics that Socrates names who present the possibility of a timeless, unchanging 
‘is’. 
The wise’ mean those who are better at determining ‘better’ or ‘worse’ from 
previous argument; Protagoras says things are for every man what they seem to be 
(Theat. 170a); all men believe they are wiser than others in some area, and others are 
wiser than them in other areas: “You find also men who believe that they are able to 
teach and to take the lead” (170b).  Wisdom is what is true and false judgment results 
from ignorance.  For Protagoras, things are true for every man, as he believes – that the 
judgment a man makes is true for him.  What an individual judges is true only for him; it 
can be false for everyone else (170d-e).  Still, endoxa (received opinion) is quite 
powerful, and that power explains the use of persuasion: the more people that believe X 
is false, though one person holds X to be true, the more X seems false (171a).  If one 
holds man is the measure, she must admit that while her belief is true, that others who 
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think that man is not the measure have a true belief as well.  A contradiction is generated: 
“man is the measure” is both true and false.  At 172a, Socrates shows the relationship 
between the theory of flux with politics, and that some hold the same view of wisdom as 
Protagoras:  
“It is in those other questions I am talking about – just and unjust, religious and 
irreligious – that men are ready to insist that no one of these things has by nature 
any being of its own; in respect of these, they say, what seems to people 
collectively to be so is true, at the time when it seems that way and for just as long 
as it seems” (172b).   
 
Protagorean relativism is, as we all know, paradoxical and self-defeating: the claim that 
‘all truth is relative’ – a universal claim that, if true, makes the claim false.  A. A. Long 
points out that refutation itself is a problem for Protagoras: if he believes all truth is 
relative there is no point to attempting to defend his belief, just as there is no point to 
refuting a relativist.253  Discourse becomes moot; strangely enough, the relativism results 
in an unchanging and epistemically empty unity.  Socrates also makes this criticism 
against the Heracliteans at 183b, declaring that they would have to establish another 
language in order to discuss their beliefs and not be hypocritical.   
The problem that follows from the homo mensura doctrine is that it was the 
measure for Athenian politics – that justice is simply what the demos agrees it is – 
because all men’s opinions or expertise must necessarily be equivalently empty.  Justice 
was, in Homeric times, “a procedure, not a principle or any set of principles.”254  In the 
fifth century that convention was still in practice.  Justice was found in the agreement of 
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the demos, not in adherence to a rationally determined standard; thus, the definition of 
sophos has to do with the power wielded through public speech.  
The best thing a man can do, says Socrates later in the dialogue, is to become ‘like 
god,’ that is, to become “just and pure, with understanding” (176b).  To see becoming 
just as the best thing a man can do, Socrates implies that there are rational principles to 
appeal to; thus, “with understanding.”  Clearly, Socrates does not believe justice is a 
procedure, which follows naturally from the homo mensura principle – that there are no 
experts.  When pressed on the issue, his interlocutors do not agree on the equality of 
men’s opinions (as we see at 178b-e).  It is also unlikely that Protagoras believed that all 
opinions are equal – else there would be no need for his services as an educator. 
Theaetetus does recognize that something else is needed to persist through the 
world of phenomena when he offers that an illiterate person perceives letters – that is, 
knows the shape and color of the letters – but requires the additional perception of an 
instructor in letters (163b-c).  Yet what is perceived, there, is not perceived by the 
senses.255  He agrees with Socrates that “seeing is perceiving” and “sight is perception” 
(163d).256  To see is to know; thus, it only makes sense that to perceive is to know.  Given 
the Greek culture’s focus on ‘the spectacle,’ it was common to believe that knowledge 
was gained through the senses, particularly the sense of sight.  But what Theaetetus has 
realized is that sometimes we “see” with our soul rather than our physical eyes.   
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Knowledge as perception has two problems (1) the object perceived, an 
appearance, may be deceiving and (2) the locus of truth is with the perceiver.  The second 
problem has the added implication that it encourages relativism and coincides with the 
power struggles that took place in public debate.  Sense-perception cannot be knowledge 
and Theaetetus must now offer a different suggestion as to “whatever we call that activity 
of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things which are” (187).  That suggestion is 
that knowledge is true judgment. 
Knowledge as Doxa Alethēs (187b—201c) 
Theaetetus’ suggestion leads to a problem that Socrates has been bothered by 
before: the problem of false judgment.  Socrates begins by bracketing off learning and 
forgetting in order to concentrate on the idea that one either knows or does not know an 
epistemic object (188a).  The previous discussion revealed the necessity of memory for 
knowledge, which leads to the problem of false judgment.  To get at this problem as well 
as examine the definition that Theaetetus has put forth, Socrates formulates two models 
of the soul: a wax tablet and an aviary.  These two models allow for a discussion of the 
nature of knowledge acquisition and retention.  The soul, as the receptacle for knowledge, 
opens a space for the possibility of error, much in the same way a text opens itself to the 
possibility of error (as opposed to a speaker – who must rely on his fallible perceptions to 
determine if he is being understood correctly).  The reader of a text has no way of 
knowing whether or not she understands the text – or the author – correctly; she also is 
unlikely to have access to the author to discuss the text.   
If perceptions are directly pressed into the wax how, then, is it possible for a 
person to make an error, either in believing that one knows what one does not, or 
 113 
mistaking what one knows for something else that one knows, etc. (192a-d)?  Still within 
the analogy, Socrates explains that if a person’s wax is too hard or too soft, dirty or 
impure, then a correct corresponding imprint of the perception will not be made.  There is 
the self-evident problem of the unreliability of the senses, and there is the problem of 
forgetting.  Both are causes of error in judgment.  But once Socrates has come to the 
conclusion that false judgment does exist, he calls himself garrulous; he has not yet 
examined the possibility of an error made in pure thought, without a corresponding 
perception.  In that case, it becomes possible for a man to “know and not know the same 
objects” (196c) – which is a contradiction and as such, impossible.   
But if thinking is “a talk (lo/goj) which the soul has with itself about the objects 
under its consideration” (189e) and a judgment is a statement that is silently addressed to 
oneself (190a), then perhaps Socrates is suggesting exactly what is enacted by his 
discussion with Theaetetus.  In the Theaetetus, we have Socrates in discussion with a 
younger version of himself.  Socrates also carries on conversations between himself and 
himself posing as Protagoras, or an unnamed person.  One gets the feeling that Socrates 
is, perhaps, having a conversation with himself – his soul – about knowledge.  A 
dialogue, with yourself or another, is in motion.  There is no chance of inscribing 
‘knowledge’ into the wax during the dialogue – not until a conclusion is reached (and no 
conclusion is reached).  In the case of the wax block, Socrates expresses a tabula rosa 
model of the mind/soul/person.  Knowledge is inscribed – so that all we need do is be 
careful passive listeners, spectators, or readers in order to acquire knowledge.  This is the 
common way that knowledge and knowledge acquisition is thought of – in contemporary 
times, as attested by the practice of lecturing, and silent solitary reading.  It seems that in 
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ancient times it was also a common belief that knowledge could be obtained by a passive 
audience.  All knowledge – or opinion – is, as Socrates observes in the Protagoras, taken 
directly into the soul: “you cannot carry teachings away in a separate container.  You put 
down your money and take the teaching away in your soul by having learned it, and off 
you go, either helped or injured” (Prot. 314b).  If something is inscribed directly onto the 
soul without reflection or consideration, without a midwife’s dialectic, the resulting 
inscription is mere opinion.  The ‘inscription’ ought not be left unexamined – even if one 
passively listens and takes teachings directly into the soul without reflection, dialectic can 
still reveal and challenge the ‘inscription.’  Accordingly, the polis faced this same issue – 
polis andra didaskei.  Inscriptions, physical or otherwise, no longer are left the luxury of 
remaining untouched – reasons are required to express understanding.  Understanding of 
a concept is a process, a process that is represented – and fostered – by Socratic dialectic.  
One person may believe that they truly understand a concept – but discover that, in 
expressing it, they do not have the knowledge they thought they had.  In trying to make 
another understand, one’s own understanding must be understood.   
 Judgments are about epistemic objects that one knows or does not know.  In order 
for a judgment to be false, the man must judge an epistemic object that he knows as an 
epistemic object that he does not know, or vice versa.  According to this either/or setup, 
the possibility for false judgment appears non-existent.  Yet we see that Socrates and 
Theaetetus make false judgments; they catch themselves as they make false judgments, 
but they make them nonetheless.  The action of the dialogue allows a reader or listener to 
see the process of knowing, ignorance, learning: the making of true and false judgments.  
How is it that one is able to recognize false judgment?  We are given the answer through 
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demonstration; by talking it through rational discussion, Socrates is able to question each 
conclusion in a continual spiral of dialectic, never claiming to know, in fact, espousing 
ignorance – until he must leave the conversation.  
In order to talk about thinking, a new metaphor is introduced.  In this metaphor, 
again the soul is represented, this time by an aviary.  While the metaphor of the wax 
block discusses the errors that may follow from perception, the metaphor of the aviary 
discusses errors that may follow from theorizing, such as mathematics, and forming 
judgments.  How can one know that one does not know, viz., how is Socratic ignorance 
possible?  In the aviary are many different birds, in various combinations: flocks, small 
groups, and solo birds.  The aviary is empty when we are young, and gradually fills as we 
learn.  The birds represent pieces of knowledge.  Catching the birds for examination 
places a requirement of both activity and active attention to the knowledge acquisition 
process.  It also represents how easily we are reduced to confusion when we have many 
‘pieces of knowledge’ as well as the difficulty in holding on to a piece of knowledge that 
seems to always be struggling to elude our grasp.  As Socrates notes, towards the end of 
this portion of the dialogue (Theat. 200c-d), they need to answer the prior question, ‘what 
is knowledge,’ before attempting to answer ‘what is false judgment.’  This issue mirrors 
the Meno – surely they know something about what they do not know. 
Indirectly, Socrates critiques the mathematical sciences, for they can ‘know’ their 
subjects, but they apprehend without understanding, without logos.257  Socrates also uses 
the example of orators and lawyers to explain that Theaetetus is wrong in thinking that 
knowledge is true judgment.  The jury can make a true judgment but they do not have 
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knowledge.  If we think of knowledge as something to collect and hold, like a bird in the 
hand, and not use or achieve, then we are, in essence, playing the role of jury members. 
The wax tablet and the aviary present two models of pedagogy, the first static and 
the second dynamic.  Judgment can be false if the information is not gained in an active 
investigation that will waylay the possibility of error.  This is the necessity behind the 
philosophic method; avoidance of error.  What is distinct about philosophic dialogue is 
that it engages reason rather than emotion, promotes understanding rather than 
acceptance.  It is teaching rather than persuading – which is the difference between 
knowledge and true judgment.  The jury example that Socrates uses, shows that it is 
possible to have true judgment and not knowledge.  The jury is persuaded by testimony – 
and implied is the notion that the reporting of an experience is not knowledge – of a 
thing, but without the firsthand experience of the eyewitness, they do not have 
knowledge.   
Socrates’ critique of other practices of paideia established not only that 
knowledge is not aisthesis, but that knowledge must be infallible and stable.258  The 
practices that Socrates critiques – of the sophos – show that the character of the 
‘knowledge’ that the practices produce is one of ever-changing flux.  Next, Socrates 
considered the possibility of false judgment …. Showing that knowledge must be true.  
Between the two discussions, we realize that the truth – and knowledge – that Socrates is 
searching for must be produced by another practice, the one he is engaged in: philosophy.  
Finally, Socrates and Theaetetus turn to the last condition for knowledge: logos. 
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Socrates and Theaetetus turn to a definition that Theaetetus has ‘heard’ and 
Socrates dreamt.  Theaetetus had forgotten that he had heard of this definition – that 
knowledge was true belief with logos.  Considering the last part of the discussion, it 
seems relevant that Theaetetus forgot this, for now the external audience has an example 
of precisely what Socrates and Theaetetus discussed.  Theaetetus knew something but 
forgot and so he knew something that he did not know.  Socrates (ever the midwife) 
causes Theaetetus to remember.  This turns to a discussion of ‘knowables’ and 
‘unknowables’ – objects that we have no logos of and therefore no knowledge.  With 
unknowables defined as objects without logos, the previous understanding of ignorance is 
undermined.  Theaetetus’ forgetting no longer means he did not know something he 
knew. 
At 201c, Theaetetus remembers that someone suggested that knowledge is true 
belief plus logos.  Socrates asks him how it was that this someone distinguished between 
knowables and unknowables; when Theaetetus does not recall, Socrates offers ‘a dream 
for a dream’.  He relates a theory of primary elements “of which we and everything else 
are composed” that “have no logos” (201e).  Each element “can only be named” and the 
elements are “woven together” to become a sumplokē (202a-b).  Therefore, “the elements 
are unaccountable and unknowable, but they are perceivable, whereas the complexes are 
both knowable and expressible and can be the objects of true judgment” (202b).  In 
Socrates’ dream, people said that the primary elements “of which we and everything else 
are composed have no account” (201e).  These primary elements are nothing besides the 
name, neither being or not-being and, Socrates says, “the elements are unaccountable and 
unknowable, but they are perceivable, whereas the complexes are both knowable and 
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expressible and can be the objects of true judgment” (202b).  If knowledge is true belief 
with a logos, Socrates has already found an exception: these primary elements have no 
logos and yet it seems we must have knowledge of them in order to have knowledge of 
anything else.  Logos, here, means something different from merely ‘speech’ or ‘talk.’  It 
is not clear exactly what logos means at this point in the Theaetetus.  The ambiguity 
motivates disagreements among scholars as to the meaning of the entire final section of 
the Theaetetus.   
If we follow Gilbert Ryle in taking logos to mean ‘sentence’ or ‘statement’ then to 
not have a logos is to be unable to express the element in a proposition.  Gail Fine argues 
against Ryle’s suggestion that logos means ‘sentence’ or ‘statement’.  Fine argues that the 
dream theorist’s account is sensible only when logos is taken to mean account or 
evidence, the kind that brings knowledge.259  She circumvents the issue that elements can 
be described in other ways, that is, sentences may be ascribed to them, and settles on 
forcing a very modern epistemology onto Plato.260  The dream theory indicates that 
elements are unknowable, in stark contrast to both Russell and Descartes who hold a 
similar theory in order to avoid infinite regress (infinite analyzability) but that their 
elements may be known non-propositionally (intuited directly).  These elements may be 
named and perceived, but a name is hardly knowledge and perceiving as a source of 
knowledge has already been refuted.  Fine’s analysis of the dream theory contains the 
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following disclaimer: “I do not deny, of course, that in the Theaetetus Plato thinks 
knowledge requires propositional expression; indeed, I think Plato always assumes that 
knowledge is essentially articulate….”261   
Guthrie conflates the final attempt to define knowledge with the contemporary 
definition:  “A man knows that p … if (a) he believes p, (b) he has adequate evidence for 
p, (c) p is true … knowledge is justified true belief.”262  But, he adds, “there is a 
difference in that the modern definition speaks only of knowledge in propositional form 
(knowledge of facts) whereas in Plato it is more like knowledge of things, not 
‘knowledge that’ but knowledge with a direct substantival object.”263   
What is common to the aforementioned treatment of logos is the assumption that 
knowledge can be articulated, but it is by no means obvious this is the case.  For example, 
Frank Gonzalez maintains that knowledge of certain things in Plato is nonpropositional; 
“knowledge of something whose nature or essence cannot be reduced to a set of 
properties … it cannot be articulated in any proposition.”264  Some objects cannot be 
conveyed through proposition, but require analogy, metaphor, (unscientific) 
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demonstration – knowing how, or as Gonzalez describes it, “what is manifest without 
being describable.”265   
The nonpropositional character of knowledge for Plato is demonstrated in the 
dialogue form itself.  Knowledge is not simply description; the purpose of knowledge is 
action.  Success, in terms of knowing, is acting.  Dialogue enables people to reach an 
understanding with themselves and others which provides the basis on which to act.  
Though the conditions for understanding another speaker or text are never explicitly laid 
out in Plato’s dialogues, they are demonstrated by his use of embodied speakers.  
Understanding a concept requires a process of negotiation between one ‘horizon of 
understanding’ – which is confined and restricted by the tacit assumptions absorbed from 
a person’s culture – and another, resulting in a fusion of horizons.  The interactions of the 
speakers demonstrate that understanding, and knowledge, are gained through a dialectical 
exposure of assumptions through contradiction.  Plato’s conception of philosophy is 
expressed in the fluidity of dynamic interaction, in dialogue.  The understanding or 
knowledge achieved through dialogue is not the type of object that can be pinned to a 
wall and ogled for years to come, but an object that must be reconstituted anew each time 
it is considered.  Of the latter part of the Theaetetus, Hans-Georg Gadamer comments:  
Like all knowing, philosophical knowing is identification of something as what it 
is and has the structure of recognition, or ‘knowing again.’  But the object of 
philosophy is not given in the same way as the object of the empirical sciences.  
Rather, it is always reconstituted anew, and that occurs only when one tries to 
think it through for oneself. 266 
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Our interaction with the texts of Plato is the same hermeneutical interaction as the 
characters in the dialogue for the simple reason that Plato chose to write dialogues rather 
than treatises, to show characters perform concepts rather than present us with clear 
answers, with propositions.  A reader interacts with a text with the same hermeneutical 
methodology that is demonstrated in the dialogue and thus the structure of the dialogue 
itself mimics and reflects the hermeneutical content.  Rather than reaching propositional 
definitions, more often than not the characters of the dialogues are left in a state of 
aporia.  Our interaction with the text, then, is dialectical, for we are left to further the 
questioning with ourselves and others. 
Plato’s dialectical method of instruction, while a universally applicable method, is 
in practice particular to both the instructor or questioner and to the interlocutors or 
respondents.  The success or failure of this method to achieve its didactic apex of 
producing virtuous men and virtuous actions also depends on the particularities of the 
respondents.  What is shown in Plato’s dialogues is that we understand concepts through 
dialogue with ourselves and each other – and this is shown negatively, in a failure to 
achieve knowledge of a propositional definition of a concept.  The failure shows only that 
language and statements are not enough.   
While a variety of pedagogical methods serve to instruct a person in propositional 
knowledge, understanding is provoked strictly through the philosophic method 
demonstrated in Plato’s dialogues.  Still, there is a problem in thinking the dialectical 
method is all that is required to instruct and ensure understanding.  While a dialogue 
demonstrates how it is possible to provoke understanding in an interlocutor using the 
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dialectical method, aporia demonstrates that understanding, and incorporation of that 
type of knowledge, must proceed from the particular individual from a conscious, internal 
decision to recognize the knowledge that they do and do not know.  Once that 
understanding has been reached, a conscious choice must be made by the interlocutor to 
keep or reject the understanding he has attained.  Socrates’ method of inquiry, then, 
succeeds or fails due to no fault of his or his method; it is contingent upon the 
interlocutor’s decision to self-reflect.  If he does choose to engage in the self-reflective 
process, then he should be transformed.267  Dialegesthai with one’s self is the necessary 
self-reflection.  Yet not every conversation is a successful dialogue; not every 
conversation results in a shared understanding or insight between participants.
 Although the dialogue ends in aporia, one thing has changed: Theaetetus.  As the 
inquiry progresses, so does his skill at participating in the inquiry increase.  Theaetetus is 
learning something, though he is not learning the definition for knowledge.  Theaetetus is 
learning to inquire by inquiring; he is learning to philosophize by doing and speaking, 
and he is learning via the practice of philosophy.  Learning through poetic performance 
by means listening, absorbing, aping, imitating, but there is little in the way of active 
engagement.  It is intended for a passive receptacle: ‘Let the wisdom of the poets fill 
you!’  As Socrates makes quite clear in the Symposium, knowledge is not the kind of 
thing that can be passed like a cup of wine from one person to the next (Symp. 175d).  
What is gained by imitation is not knowledge, but the appearance of knowledge.  There 
is no deeper understanding underlying the appearances.  What Theaetetus learns is not 
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propositional; it is a knowing how, not a knowing that.  What philosophy teaches is 
virtuous inquiry (episteme). 
At the beginning of the dialogue, Theaetetus is putting his heart into the 
discussion – he genuinely attempts to answer Socrates’ questions.  Socrates describes 
Theaetetus as “inspired” (Thea. 154e) and Theaetetus calls himself “giddy” (155c).  He 
hardly contributes to the conversation, either agreeing with Socrates or asking for 
clarification, and admits confusion (at 157c, 164d).  After the ‘digression’, Theaetetus’ 
intellectual involvement in the conversation increases.  Socrates praises Theaetetus for 
answering him as “one ought – with a good will, and not reluctantly, as you did at first” 
(187c); Theaetetus encourages Socrates to pursue the question of false judgment if “this 
appears for any reason to be the right thing to do” for, he reminds him, they are not 
pressed for time (a quality of the discussion a philosopher holds) (187d).  However, 
Theaetetus is still clearly not the leader in the discussion – Socrates chides him at 189c: 
“you have not much opinion of me; you don’t find me at all alarming.”  Socrates is still 
the only one self-reflecting:  
“I should be ashamed to see us forced into making the kind of admissions I mean 
while we are still in difficulties.  If we find what we’re after, and become free 
men, then we will turn round and talk about how these things happen to other 
people – having secured our own person against ridicule.  While if we can’t find 
any way of extricating ourselves, then I suppose we shall be laid low, like sea-sick 
passengers, and give ourselves into the hands of the argument and let it trample 
all over us and do what it likes with us” (190e-191a). 
 
Socrates echoes his earlier statement later on in the dialogue: 
 
 “I’m afraid a garrulous man is really an awful nuisance … I’m annoyed at my 
own stupidity – my true garrulousness.  What else could you call it when a man 
will keep dragging arguments up and down, because he is too slow-witted to 
reach any conviction, and will not be pulled off any of them?  (195b-c) 
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Theaetetus makes an intellectual contribution in the metaphor of the aviary by suggesting 
that some of the pieces flying about the soul are pieces of ignorance (199e).  Socrates 
hints at the need for experience with his reference to a fable (200e-201a) and finally we 
see Socrates has stirred the soul of Theaetetus, for he remembers something a man said to 
him, that true judgment with logos is what constitutes knowledge (201c-d).  Plato’s 
critique of these other techniques of paideia and their ability to bring about an adequate 
account of aletheia concludes when the final definition of the Theaetetus is put on hold as 
Socrates and Theaetetus fail to put forth a logos that adds anything to true belief.  In the 
end, as Guthrie writes, Plato shows the need for the divine: 
though he enjoys playing with the indefensible thesis that all knowledge is 
provided directly by the senses … there is for him only one unassailable 
refutation of these theories, which he is saving for the end: the need for mind, 
which can go beyond the senses to use its peculiar power of reason, drawing its 
own conclusions from the data which the senses present but cannot interpret.268 
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Chapter Six 
Virtue and Inquiry 
 I suggested in the previous chapter that the only character in the Theaetetus who 
changes and grows is Theaetetus himself; he is the one benefiting from Socrates’ 
instruction in the dialogue.  But in what might Plato be instructing his audience?  To 
answer this question, we need to examine the structure of the dialogue – its physical 
composition and characters.  In a dialogue ostensibly about knowledge, it is safe to 
assume that the characters stand-in for something to do with the acquisition of 
knowledge.  In this case, the historical context, that is, the debate about what it means to 
be a sophos, an expert at public discourse, provides the orientation for the discussion.  
Representatives of different types of educational practices are instantiated by the 
characters: sophistry or rhetoric in Protagoras, traditional paideia in the poets, “physical” 
theories in the Presocratic philosophers, and mathematics or demonstration (apodeixis) in 
Theodorus.  Theaetetus represents the aristocratic youth that receive their education 
through such practices; in a more general sense, Theaetetus represents the future of 
Athens.  Socrates, of course, is a dialektikos, representing philosophy through the use of 
dialectic.  What is at stake in this dialogue is what a philosophos is, and does, and how he 
lives his life.  
While the internal audience works towards a definition of knowledge, the external 
audience is instructed in what is unique about philosophy as a pedagogical practice, 
Socrates’ dialegesthai.  It is unavoidable that the audience will compare this dialogue to 
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other Platonic dialogues they are familiar with, which is likely to include another aporetic 
dialogue, and it is unavoidable that the audience would ask the question: ‘Why does the 
execution of Socrates’ dialegesthai have a different tenor in the Theaetetus than in the 
other dialogues?’  Both the dramatic action of the dialogue and the content of the 
discourse exchanged between Socrates and the two mathematicians constitute an instance 
of pedagogy.  What we, members of the external audience, are learning is what is 
required for knowledge – epistemic virtue – even as Theaetetus and the internal audience 
strive to learn what knowledge is.  Even prior to establishing the essence of knowledge, 
one must have a method for obtaining the answer to the question.  Clearly, Plato’s 
method is philosophy and Socrates is his example of a philosopher.  But the curiousness 
of the aporetic dialogues leads one to wonder if it is the object of the inquiry that 
produces the result of aporia, or if it is the subject involved.  Given that objects of 
inquiry from non-aporetic dialogues such as the Republic are similar in nature to the 
objects of inquiry of the aporetic dialogues, I suggest that the difference in ‘epistemic 
success’ – that is, reaching a satisfying conclusion – among dialogues is the purpose, the 
telos, of the dialogue.  Aporetic dialogues are not intended to reach a propositional 
definition; rather, they are intended as a demonstration of inquiry that, when conducted in 
the proper way, leads to the very object under discussion.  The aporetic dialogues are 
explicitly about intellectual virtue, in the sense that they enact a mode of discourse that 
requires.  Obviously Plato’s “epistemology” is not modern epistemology, for Plato’s 
epistemology is not concerned with the same things as modern epistemology, at least its 
dominant formulations.  Still there are some topics in contemporary epistemological 
discussions that echo what we find in Plato.   
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We can see in the entirety of the dialogue, if we examine it from the standpoint of 
the audience, that Plato’s epistemology is more akin to what we might call a virtue 
epistemology, an epistemology inspired by contemporary conceptions of virtue ethics.  
This view of knowledge focuses on the concept of intellectual excellence – how and why 
we learn and should hold particular beliefs.  Contemporary epistemologists who favor 
this approach see “intellectual virtue is the primary normative component of both 
justified belief and knowledge, and their concern is with “epistemic evaluation on 
properties of persons rather than properties of beliefs or propositions.”269  We, the 
audiences of the dialogue, are in a constant state of evaluation when reading or listening 
to the dialogues.  As I argued in Chapter One, Plato engages in dramatic irony, which 
implies an expectation for the audience to evaluate the characters’ words, actions, 
choices, and lives.  The audience is expected to evaluate the statements that the characters 
make, but they are also in a position to evaluate how the characters conduct themselves in 
the inquiry.  Their conduct has an effect on the success of the inquiry, the length of the 
inquiry, and the other characters involved in the inquiry; the characters’ conduct is a 
product of their intellectual virtue.  One of the lessons learned from the Theaetetus is that 
intellectual virtue is key to being a philosopher.270 
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Theodorus, the Mathematician 
 Theodorus enthusiastically informs Socrates of Theaetetus, who he thinks is 
“remarkable” and “amazingly gifted” – for all that he looks like Socrates, with a snub 
nose and bug eyes.  Theodorus does not say that Theaetetus is like Socrates in terms of 
attitude towards inquiry and potential, but this is what Plato’s audience would infer.  
When he calls Theaetetus over, Socrates asks if they should accept Theodorus’ judgment, 
or should they discover whether Theodorus has the expertise required to make a true 
statement; Theaetetus thinks they need to inquire.  Socrates declares that they shouldn’t 
accept any claims that Theodorus makes about their physical similarities but should 
consider the claims that their souls are similar, for Theodorus is a master of geometry, 
astronomy, and arithmetic.  The assumption here is that Theodorus has expertise 
(wisdom) in those matters and so it is possible that Theodorus is making an expert claim.  
It is telling that Socrates discounts Theodorus as possessing expertise in drawing 
conclusions about physical similarities, in appearance – Socrates examines every claim 
before accepting it as truth.  However, Socrates is more concerned with whether 
Theodorus is an expert about that which can not be perceived with the senses: intellectual 
and moral characteristics.  The question of similarity between Theaetetus and Socrates is 
never really about their physical characteristics.   
Including Theaetetus’ teacher, Theodorus, in the dialogue gives the dialogue a 
feeling of commencement; Theaetetus is graduating from mathematics and moving on to 
dialectic, from one instructor to another: Theodorus the mathematician to Socrates the 
philosopher.  The metaphor of the midwife helps to indicate this potential 
commencement – the metaphor evokes the idea of Theaetetus’ beginning a new life, a 
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philosophical life in which he may realize his potential.  The mathematical instruction 
that Theaetetus receives from Theodorus uses demonstration, and this involves visual 
signs and symbols.  It is its dependence on the visual, which exists only in the 
phenomena, that relegates mathematics to a category of practice that cannot reach truth 
because the participants are not exercising the necessary epistemic virtues. 
Socrates’ attempts to have Theodorus take on the role of the sophist are met with 
fierce evasion.  Theodorus may not wish for the wisdom he has to be mistaken for that 
wisdom that Protagoras claims to possess and disperse through instruction.  Theodorus is 
identified as an expert in geometry, mathematics, astronomy, and music – and these are 
the subjects that he teaches (or will teach) Theaetetus (145a-c).  But what else do we 
know of the character?  Socrates implies with his response to Theaetetus at 145c that he 
believes Theodorus is a truthful man.271  He opts out of the forthcoming discussion by 
claiming unfamiliarity with the discussion and his age makes him unsuitable as an 
interlocutor – for he will not benefit from the discussion, whereas someone younger 
would.272  We do, however, learn that he engages in discussions about geometry; 
Theaetetus offers that Theodorus was demonstrating powers to both him and the younger 
Socrates with the use of diagrams (147d).  Socrates allows him to bow out of the 
discussion, though it is interesting to compare his reason, old age, with the conclusion of 
the Laches, where everyone there enthusiastically desires further instruction, regardless 
of age.  Of course, that scene in the Laches served the purpose of acknowledging what 
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Socrates’ dialectic brings – awareness of ignorance – and a revision of educational 
practice.  Here, Theodorus’ comment on age perhaps reinforces the educational program 
in the Republic where the guardians-in-training must start there education at a very young 
age.  It suggests that Socrates may have changed his position from the one he held earlier 
in his (dramatic) life.  Has he accepted that some people will not change? 
Later in the dialogue, Socrates declares Theodorus a “lover of discussion” – a 
description to which Theodorus readily agrees.  This enables Socrates to bait Theodorus 
by asking him to defend his friend, Protagoras.  Theodorus resists, because if he takes 
part in the discussion, he will be helping to refute his friend but acknowledges that the 
refutation may be something he will agree.  This, again, shows that Theodorus is a man 
interested in truth, not falsehood.  He knows that his diligence to what is logically true 
must win out over his friendship.  But his loyalty to his friend is what keeps him out of 
the discussion (for a little while), which speaks both highly of his moral character and 
poorly of his intellectual character.  Most people in the dialogues who resist entering into 
a conversation with Socrates do so out of fear:  they are afraid they will be made fools of, 
or shown to not possess the knowledge they claim to have.  After a brief exchange with 
Theaetetus, Socrates once again invites Theodorus to participate by claiming Theodorus 
is ‘guardian’ of the ‘orphan’ of Protagorean relativism – orphaned because Protagoras is 
not present.  Again, Theodorus begs off, claiming the true guardian of the Protagorean 
orphan is Callias, and that he himself is “very soon inclined away from abstract 
discussion to geometry” (165a).273  Theodorus will “get tripped up” (165b) if he is 
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Socrates’ interlocutor and likens talking with Socrates to wrestling, accusing him of 
playing Antaeus (169a-b).  Theodorus admits at 165b that that he is concerned for his 
own dignity and begins to sound like the typical resistant interlocutor of the aporetic 
dialogues: “Tell us both, Socrates; but the younger had better answer.  It will not be so 
undignified for him to get tripped up” (165b).  On Socrates’ third attempt, Theodorus 
quits resisting Socrates, and allows himself to be pulled into the discussion, although he 
accuses Socrates of using the methods of Sciron (169a).274  By maligning Socrates, 
Theodorus shows us that he sees Socrates as a sophist, someone who is pursuing winning 
– which in this case, means Theodorus participating in the discussion – and Socrates 
quickly reinforces the analogy, claiming he has met “many a Heracles and Theseus in my 
time, mighty men of  words” (169b).  Socrates does not attempt to change Theodorus’ 
mind, but simply states the truth, that he has met and spoken with powerful and clever 
men.  Theodorus must come to the conclusion that Socrates’ discourse is different from a 
sophist’s.  Indeed, we see that Socrates urges Theodorus to reflect on what he thinks of 
Socrates and Protagoras, in the discussion that ensues.  Socrates remarks that Theodorus 
sees him as “a sort of bag of arguments” (161a) – it is evident that Socrates observes that 
Theodorus does not perceive a difference between Socrates and other sophoi such as 
Protagoras.  By making this observation present to Theodorus, Socrates invites 
Theodorus to examine the statement to determine if it is true, viz., whether it is true that 
Socrates is a bag or arguments or whether Socrates is doing something else.  From the 
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perspective of the external audience, however, we can see that because Theodorus is 
standing in for Protagoras, acting as a guardian for Protagoras’ orphan.  Plato likens 
mathematics, which Theodorus stands for with sophistry, to what Protagoras stands for.  
Rather than seeing Socrates as a sophist, Plato equates Theodorus’ practice with 
sophistry, albeit in a gentle manner. 
 If mathematics is placed next to philosophy in the intelligible portion of the 
divided line, then its practitioners should be able to think abstractly as well.  Indeed, 
Theodorus groups himself with the philosophers at 173b, claiming that ‘they’ are the 
masters of their arguments, not the slaves (173b-c):  “We have no jury, and no audience 
(as the dramatic poets have), sitting in control over us, ready to criticise [sic] and give 
orders” (173c).  The claim here is that unlike politicians, sophists, or poets, philosophers 
have no concern for the performative aspect inherent in all of the above practices.  
Mathematical science, as well, has no need to ‘perform’ – being a wise mathematician, 
geometer, astronomer, or philosopher has nothing to do with an audience, that is, these 
disciplines have nothing to do with non-rational persuasion.  In the Republic, Socrates 
implies that studies are only valued insofar as they are useful to the city – this is why no 
city has developed solid geometry (Rep. 528b-d).  What is useful, besides the obvious 
crafts that a city requires, is persuasive speech.  Controlling and influencing opinion 
through public discourse is extremely useful in the democratic polis.  Those skilled 
sophoi, Nightingale says, Plato relegates to the banausic class of workers: 
[In the Republic] Plato defines the philosopher, in part, by way of opposition: he 
juxtaposes this new kind of sage to a disparate group of individuals identified as 
nonphilosophers.  In particular, Plato targets intellectuals and sophists who 
offered serious competition to his own programme – men reputed to be wise and 
powerful … Plato portrays these men as banausic ‘laborers for hire’ in contrast to 
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the philosophic theorist: the servility of the nonphilosophers stands in diametrical 
opposition to the freedom of the theoretical philosopher.275 
 
Only the philosopher is free to be impartial regarding all political, social, and ethical 
matters.  By considering these wise men as banausic, Plato is relating them to the 
mercantile class, telling the audience that the sophoi are interested in power and wealth 
but not truth.  Indeed, the coinage of power in Athenian democracy was persuasive public 
speech. 
 Theodorus’ characterization of the Heracliteans highlights their lack of epistemic 
virtue by depicting them as “always on the move” (179e); not giving answers or 
maintaining consistency with what they have said before (180a); also, they use 
“enigmatic phrases,” give “no conclusions,” their philosophy is full of “strange turns of 
language” such that they “give no account of themselves” (179e-180c).  Theodorus 
denigrates the Heraclitians and advocates that he and Socrates “take the doctrine out of 
their hands and consider it for ourselves, as we should a problem in geometry” (180c).  
This shows that Theodorus is interested in the answer, not the way to the answer; if he 
were to wrest the doctrine from the Heracliteans and ‘solve’ it, he has a solution but no 
action has been conducted.  The Heracliteans can not learn anything by the answer alone 
– only by going through the process of obtaining the answer can they understand and 
fully accept it.  The problem with Theodorus being a “lover of discussion” is that he is 
not going through the process of dialectic – he wants to be entertained, and then he wants 
the answer, like someone reading a mystery novel.  The reader will not be happy with the 
author of the text unless both of those conditions are met.  But, Socrates points out the 
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importance of method to Theodorus, for the Heracliteans used poetry to discuss the 
doctrine of flux, and this is a problem ‘inherited from the ancients.’  Poetry, he says, is 
used to make their theory, that every thing is in motion, intelligible to all men.  
Theodorus happily ducks out of the role of interlocutor, claiming that “when these 
matters were concluded I was to be set free from my task of answering you, according to 
our agreement, which specified the end of the discussion of Protagoras’ theory” (183c).  
Theaetetus immediately protests for that leaves the other half of the discussion, the 
discussion of Parmenides, untouched and unfinished.  Theodorus accuses Theaetetus of 
attempting to teach him to be unjust, as he would break his agreement.  Again, we see 
Theodorus is reluctant to pursue the inquiry and so he again takes up the role of spectator.   
If we consider the place of mathematics and geometry in the Republic, we find 
that their place on the divided line is with philosophy in the intelligible portion.  The 
mathematical disciplines rely on figures and begin “from hypotheses, proceeding not to a 
first principle but to a conclusion” (Rep. 510b).  Thus the hypotheses, in mathematics, are 
treated as first principles.  While both mathematics and philosophy deal with abstractions, 
mathematics inevitable relies on demonstrations – images – and does not question its 
hypotheses.  Polansky conjectures that Theodorus opposes speculation and philosophical 
discussion – that he may “well view the foundations of his science, its ultimate 
hypotheses, as merely conventional, human suppositions.”276  Theodorus aligns himself 
with philosophy insofar as it promotes abstract, rational thought and does not rely on the 
empirical, relative appearances, and yet he sees no difference between the rhetorical 
techniques of the sophists and what Socrates does.  This is reflected in the structure of the 
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dialogue, as Socrates speaks for Protagoras.  Plato clearly points out that what Protagoras 
does, and what Socrates does, is very similar and easily conflated.  The dialectic Plato 
portrays is meant to be different from the dialectic used by the sophists and dramatized 
by the poets.  In philosophic dialectic, there is no assumed end.  It is not necessarily a 
search for ‘the answer,’ as in mathematics.  As such, philosophical dialectic requires from 
its participants characteristics that Socrates has and Theodorus clearly does not.  It is 
through the character of Theodorus that the audience is able to see the limitations of 
mathematics but also the limitations of his generation.  All of Theodorus’ complaints 
about dialectic being for the young lead the audience to believe that this is something that 
older men cannot do (notice Theodorus is never specific in his attempts to bow out of the 
conversation – it is always the young, like Theaetetus, not Theaetetus only and 
specifically).  This is most likely the reason that Theodorus is paired with Socrates for the 
“digression” rather than Theaetetus.  Plato is presenting what the older generation 
believes about philosophy, and perhaps why the older generation are causing the polis 
problems. 
Socrates, the Philosopher 
While it is a mistake to understand Socrates to be Plato’s mouthpiece, there can 
be no doubt that Socrates stands as the paradigm for a philosopher in the dialogues.  
What Socrates does and how he does it, what Socrates says and how he says it, and the 
effect Socrates has on those around him tell Plato’s audience what a philosopher is and 
does, and in so doing, what philosophy is.  Guthrie believes the lesson of the “digression” 
is easily seen:  
 136 
The attempts to define knowledge in the main part of the dialogue are carried out 
by every means short of the doctrine of Forms, and end in failure.  The digression 
assures us that the teaching of Phaedo and Republic, Symposium, and Phaedrus 
has not been abandoned, and that a successful search for the nature of knowledge 
lies beyond Plato’s self-imposed limitations here.277 
 
I believe the purpose of the digression is quite different than what Guthrie believes.  The 
digression seems more for the audience of the dialogue than the audience in the dialogue, 
for it is speaking to a fourth century audience that would be aware of the irony of 
Socrates’ presentation of the lawyer in light of the philosopher.  If the main discussion is 
with the young then perhaps it is for the young (in terms of education – education for the 
young); but in the digression, Socrates insists that Theodorus take up the role of 
interlocutor.   
Theodorus points out that they have “no jury and no audience (as the dramatic 
poets have)” – an observation that Theaetetus echoes later in the dialogue.  Socrates 
decides to tackle Theodorus’ assumptions head on, that is, Theodorus’ perceptions of the 
lack of difference between sophists and philosophers.  In doing so, Socrates enters into a 
‘digression’ that compares the two lives, the two types of education that lead them to live 
their lives, and then evaluates the two lives.  First, he evaluates the lives from the 
standpoint of the general citizenry and second, he uses standards based on ‘universals’.  
The practical man, the lawyer or sophist, speaks with one eye on the clock and the other 
on his opponent.  His speeches are composed for a specific purpose; he cannot speak on a 
subject of his choosing.  Socrates likens him to a slave serving a master, the master being 
the demos (172e).  And of course, any speaker concerned with persuading the demos, 
with gaining political power, must, in the end be more concerned with them and their 
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endorsement then with the content of his speech – or the truth of his words.  A man of the 
law-courts does not have the ‘luxury’ of truth for truth’s sake.  Socrates describes him as: 
“keen and highly-strung, skilled in flattering the master and working his way into favour; 
but cause his soul to be small and warped” (173a).  The conditions of the lawyer’s life 
“forces him into doing crooked things … and so [he] resorts to lies and to the policy of 
repaying one wrong with another” which drains the vitality from his now-stunted soul 
(173a).  Socrates describes this morally-deficient man as believing himself to be “a man 
of ability and wisdom” (173b).  Clearly, the lawyer is lacking in at least one more area: 
he lacks the self-knowledge that would inform him that he is not a man of ability and 
wisdom.  Besides lacking in moral virtues, the lawyer lacks the desire for the truth that 
governs the philosopher, i.e. proper epistemic motivation; he also takes no epistemic 
responsibility for the persuaded jury or demos, for he is persuading for the sake of 
someone else.  It is no surprise, then, that his soul becomes so warped. 
This discussion occurs in the midst of refuting Protagoras’ relativism, and it easily 
relates to that surrounding argument.  The life of the lawyer is lived as if he were a slave; 
in fact, he is slave to the ever-changing beliefs and emotions of the people.  His ‘truth’ 
will, therefore, be relative to the people and must change with their caprice.  The 
philosopher, on the other hand, has no constraints and is in a position to seek Truth. 
The listening or reading audience learns that participating in inquiry about topics 
such as knowledge, virtue, and beauty is itself a particular way of life – for these are the 
marks of a free man and a philosopher.  Engaging in speech only for a set purpose, say to 
win an argument or a case, is damaging to the soul.  For instance, in the Republic Book 
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VII Socrates has a great deal to say about sophists, and it complements what he says in 
the Theaetetus: 
There are other ways of living, however, opposite to these and full of pleasures, 
that flatter the soul and attract it to themselves but which don’t persuade sensible 
people, who continue to honor and obey the convictions of their fathers…And 
then a questioner comes along and asks someone of this sort, ‘What is the fine?’  
And, when he answer what he has heard from the traditional lawgiver, the 
argument refutes him, and by refuting him often and in many place shakes him 
from his convections, and makes him believe that the fine is no more fine than the 
shameful …from being law-abiding he becomes lawless (538d – 539a). 
 
The problem with shaking someone from his convictions is that, if there is nothing 
offered in return, the person may end up believing everything is equal and relative, and 
that what is good is equivalent to what is shameful.  That type of elenchus is utterly 
destructive and not instructive – it does not give the person tools with which to then seek 
an answer – that is, such elenchus does not instruct the person on how to inquire.  The 
paideia that Socrates offers is instructive – the interlocutors learn, through dialectic, skills 
such as the appropriate way to inquire (which will turn out to be epistemic virtue), 
something about the topic under investigation, and the notion that there is an objective 
standard.  Interlocutors learn that values should not be relative, based solely on the 
current, non-lasting opinion of the demos.  Socrates implies that it is that very lack of 
objective standard that allows people to stray and to become unjust.  Part of the art of 
sophistry is to argue both sides (antilogic) of an argument, and to argue them equally 
well, regardless of the sophist’s own beliefs.278 
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 The philosopher of the digression seems a description of the exact opposite of 
Socrates, for the philosopher of the digression is not acquainted with his neighbor, does 
not know the way to the marketplace, the courts, or the assembly.  This description 
echoes Aristophanes’ caricature of Socrates in the Clouds.  When the philosopher is 
forced to discuss phenomena, his words are comedic to everyone who hears them.  
Because he keeps himself outside of society he is entirely unaware of the current gossip.  
He places no value in the landholding of citizens, or how noble a pedigree is – attributes 
which were important measures of a citizen’s status, in ancient Greece (and even today).  
The philosopher is characterized as someone removed from the social and political world.  
When the philosopher does have to engage with the common man, he is socially inept 
and awkward – a great source of amusement to any observer.  The philosopher, too, is 
clumsy, in line with the anecdote about Thales falling into a well.  The picture that 
Socrates initially paints for Theodorus is a mocking distortion of a philosopher – the 
philosopher of the digression appears as the Oliver Hardy of Classical Greece.  We know 
Socrates’ character from this dialogue and the other dialogues and indeed, he is very 
familiar with all his neighbors, spends most of his time in public places, is curious about 
the latest gossip; in short, Socrates is only concerned with politics and ethics.  The 
philosopher of the digression is not concerned with concrete instances of politics and 
ethics, he is only concerned with the abstract.  While there is nothing in the dialogues to 
attest Socrates possessing physical gracefulness, Socrates knows how to handle himself 
on a battlefield – as well as a courtroom.  Even if we limit our evidence to the Theaetetus 
itself, we can see that when Theodorus introduces Theaetetus, Socrates does take an 
interest in Theaetetus’ pedigree, calling him a “thorough-bred;” this provides some 
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evidence that Socrates is not describing the philosopher as Plato sees him, but the 
philosopher as seen from a satirical perspective (144b-d). 
Socrates describes a philosopher that seems at odds with his own behavior.  When 
we study carefully, we see that the philosopher does not value things that are becoming, 
things that change, things that grow and decay.  There are some similarities with 
Socrates, once the description of the imaginary philosopher is generalized and abstracted.  
Neither the philosopher nor Socrates are concerned with obtaining and holding political 
power.  They are interested in the intelligible, universal, and the abstract and their values 
are not ‘in line’ with the values of the demos.  They concern themselves with inquiry into 
the essence of “human happiness and misery in general,” which is surely the purview of 
ethics (175c).279  Moreover, they are both concerned with “the proper method by which 
the one [happiness] can be obtained and the other [misery] avoided” (175d). 
Theaetetus, the Potential Guardian 
 Theaetetus is forcefully depicted as a youthful Socrates in all but name – for there 
is a younger Socrates present, but he is given none of the attributes ascribed to 
Theaetetus.  Theodorus describes him as “snub-nosed, with eyes that stick out,” although 
the features that have cursed Socrates to be ugly are luckily not as pronounced in 
Theaetetus (143e).  The physical resemblance between the two speaks to a few things: it 
alludes to parentage, with Socrates as father obviously, it is also a curious take on the 
typical Greek view that beauty on the outside means beauty on the inside (though we 
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know, and Plato shows us time and again, that this is not the case.280  Socrates has 
hitherto been the exception).  The likeness between the two gives rise to the question of 
how far that likeness stretches – can we use our perception of Theaetetus (via his 
appearance) to determine anything at all about him, but chiefly, if Theaetetus is virtuous?  
Here, it is very clear that virtue in this dialogue is not the moral virtues alone, but has just 
as much to do with intellectual faculties.  If knowledge is virtue, as the Platonic dialogues 
imply, and the only thing our moral exemplar knows is his own ignorance, then this 
knowledge, his self-knowledge, is the condition for the possibility of virtue is self-
knowledge, as is suggested in the Charmides and the Phaedrus.281   
Though the dialogue ostensibly ends in aporia, there are more dissimilarities than 
similarities between the Theaetetus and the aporetic (early) dialogues.  From that break in 
pattern, we may expect that Theaetetus’ behavior should be different from a Euthyphro or 
a Nicias.  Theaetetus is special because he does not follow the pattern of a typical 
interlocutor.  First, Theaetetus claims no expertise, so there is no assumption of 
knowledge that Socrates must try to move the interlocutor past.  Second, though the 
dialogue does deal with Plato’s typical compare and contrast between the knowledge and 
method of philosophy and the knowledge and method of the sophists, Theaetetus does not 
manifest a sophist’s traits, nor answer with a sophist’s words – he is no Meno, speaking 
for Gorgias, or Nicias, speaking for Damon. 
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Plato’s concern with paideia can easily be seen as present in the other aporetic 
dialogues; that this dialogue is also aporetic begs the question of why.  Why, if scholars 
are in any way correct about the chronological composition, return to an earlier form of 
composition when Plato has been creating dialogues of a different nature?282  The 
Theaetetus has some of the elements of an aporetic dialogue: the dialogue opens with 
Socrates’ interest in young men, Theaetetus’ first definition is an enumeration, the 
question put to the interlocutor is in a ‘what is x?’ format, and the dialogue ends in 
aporia.  Yet in content it is quite different from the other aporetic dialogues.  Socrates has 
a worthy interlocutor that does not have a terrible future in front of him;283 Socrates’ 
treatment of the interlocutor is quite mild in comparison to the rough way he treats 
interlocutors in the other aporetic dialogues; the topic under consideration is not 
technically a moral virtue (though it has close ties to the moral virtues).284  The absence 
of the moral virtue as the topic of inquiry does not dismiss the question of virtue from the 
dialogue; rather, it presupposes it.  From the very beginning, Theaetetus’ character is 
under scrutiny and at stake.   
Ruby Blondell suggests that Theaetetus may be seen as a guardian in training.  At 
146a, Socrates mentions a game where the winner will be King and make the others 
answer “any question he likes” – which is perhaps a reference to the philosopher-kings of 
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the Republic.  In the Republic Socrates reminds his audience that the guardians are 
chosen based on “natural qualities conducive to this education;” that is, that they excel at 
learning, have a good memory, are persistent, and enjoy the effort – both mental and 
physical (Rep. 535b-c).  Moreover, Socrates adds to this list of qualities that a guardian 
should be virtuous and interested in truth.  When compared with the description of 
Theaetetus introduced by the Megarians and by Theodorus, the similarities between the 
two abound.  The Megarians tell us that a wounded Theaetetus shows his devotion to 
Athens with his desire to return home (presumably to die) even though the journey 
evidently will be painful; he has suffered grave injury in battle for Athens and we are told 
that he distinguished himself in battle, so he possesses the andreia that we learn in 
several dialogues that Socrates possessed; Theaetetus is skilled in mathematics and 
historically, we know that the Theaetetus developed that skill, so it is clear that he is 
intelligent and loves knowledge.  Theodorus tells us that the youth Theaetetus is quick, 
temperate, manly, generous, with an intellectual capability garnished with a good 
memory and presumably a maturity that belies his youth (144b).  Throughout the 
dialogue, Theaetetus demonstrates both a desire for truth and persistence in inquiry.  
Plato’s audience would surely make the comparison and find Theaetetus the embodiment 
of a guardian.  If all the above evidence is not enough, Socrates labels Theaetetus the 
kind of person has a predisposition to philosophy: “For this is an experience 
characteristic of a philosopher, this wondering: this is where philosophy begins and 
nowhere else” (155d). 
As is often the case in the dialogues, the focus of this dialogue, too, is paideia – 
specifically, the Theaetetus is about the education of one with a philosophic nature, the 
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educational program for the philosopher.  It seems that Socrates is testing Theaetetus; is 
he graduating from studying mathematics, geometry and astronomy with Theodorus to 
the study dialectic, with Socrates?  Mathematics is the propaedeutic to philosophy, 
according to the Republic, and Theaetetus has been studying mathematics.  Theaetetus 
seems to be a reflection of Socrates in many ways.  Yet the defining characteristic of 
Socrates, in contrast to many of his interlocutors, is his recognition of his ignorance.  In 
the Republic, we find that it is not enough for a philosopher king to possess moral virtue.  
What is required is intellectual virtue as well as a natural disposition towards 
philosophy.285  Like the moral virtues, intellectual virtue is a skill.286  We see Theaetetus’ 
intellectual virtue improve through the course of the inquiry; by the end of the dialogue, 
he demonstrates eagerness rather than reluctance; he is motivated by truth rather than any 
decaying phenomena, such as power, fame, winning, or goods; and from the very 
beginning, Theaetetus was presented – and presents himself – as having a good character, 
the capacity for abstract thought, and the gift of persistence. 
The method of philosophy demonstrated in the Platonic dialogues has a purpose 
that is traditionally brushed aside as irrelevant: to encourage the interlocutor to engage in 
critical self-reflection through recognition of a contradiction in her beliefs or values.  
Rational recognition of a contradiction forces a confrontation within the self and tests the 
character of the interlocutor.  An epistemically virtuous person, for Plato, will let go of 
her irrational belief A once she has recognized the status of belief A.  This happens via the 
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rational persuasion which is the purpose of Socratic elenchus.  The interlocutor is 
rationally persuaded of a contradiction in her belief: the result of this persuasion is 
aporia.  Once she experiences aporia she has a choice to make: to continue inquiring 
(aiming for truth) or to ignore the contradiction.  Thus, the inquiry itself becomes a 
virtuous act because it demonstrates a virtuous character – one who has the andreia to 
continue the inquiry, the sophia to know that one does not know, and the sophrosune to 
subsume the potential emotions from entangling reason and halting the inquiry.  Neither 
poetry nor sophistry induces the kind of labor pains involved in dialectic; neither practice 
forces a contradiction in a person’s beliefs or values.  It is the contradiction that is 
essential to the instruction philosophy gives its students.  The success of the instruction 
hinges on the epistemic virtues of the interlocutor – what the interlocutor does once the 
contradiction a recognized. 
If self-knowledge is defined as knowledge of knowledge (episteme epistemes, as 
in the Charmides), and we understand Plato to say that Socrates is his moral exemplar, 
then self-knowledge plays a strong role in establishing a virtuous character.  The ‘only’ 
thing that Socrates knows is that he does not know; Socratic ignorance is a major 
component of Socrates’ character.  The only manner by which one can know that one 
does not know is through inquiry.  One can achieve knowledge (thus a Theaetetus) only 
by rooting out (and uprooting) beliefs.  The logos comes into play when attempting to 
determine understanding (episteme).  It is possible to have beliefs that one does not 
understand; therefore the sophists are quite dangerous.  If one is persuaded into accepting 
a belief and there is no understanding, the belief may fade into the background of 
preconceptions – unexamined preconceptions.  An epistemically virtuous agent does not 
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express akrasia – in action, choice, or intention against one’s best judgment.287  Mark 
Gifford observes that: 
On several occasions Plato announces that what Socrates investigates through his 
surgical questioning is not simply the philosophical acceptability of the prevailing 
ethical ideas of the day, but the actual lives of the interlocutors.  Socrates wants to 
learn the views his conversation partners hold about justice, courage, and so on, 
not merely in order to determine the abstract merits of those ideas, but also so that 
he can examine the ethical standards by which these individuals are directing their 
actions and thereby assess the ethical worth and overall value of the lives so 
lived.288 
 
Socrates is examining not just the ideas of the interlocutor, but the interlocutor himself.  
He examines Charmides (and perhaps Critias) for sophrosūne, Laches and Nicias for 
andreia, Glaucon and Adeimantus for justice – but he does not examine Theaetetus nor 
Theodorus for knowledge.  He examines them for the conditions of knowledge: the 
intellectual virtues.  When there is an interlocutor with a natural disposition towards 
philosophy, the dialogue shows that interlocutor gaining intellectual virtue through the 
very act of inquiring, as is the case in the Theaetetus.  Theaetetus shows increasingly 
greater intellectual virtue as the dialogue progresses. 
It would seem that if Theodorus is correct about the likeness between Theaetetus 
and Socrates, then Theaetetus must demonstrate the quality of self-knowledge (the 
condition for the possibility of virtue).  Griswold notes that “towards the start of the 
Phaedrus Socrates declares in extremely strong terms that he cares only about knowing 
himself, every other pursuit being ‘laughable’ to him so long as self-knowledge is lacking 
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(Phae. 229e4 ff.)”289  Socrates makes a similar claim in the Apology:  “it is the greatest 
good for a man to discuss virtue every day and those other things about which you hear 
me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living 
for men” (Apol. 38a).  To say the unexamined life is not worth living is to make a strong 
normative claim that privileges examination; thus it becomes a clearly laid out path to 
becoming good: to continue examining one’s self to discover one’s preconceptions 
(beliefs) and examine them to see if the one belief stands in contradiction to the rest of 
your beliefs, to see if it is logically consistent (true), to see if it is the kind of belief that 
will lead to the Good.  This self-knowledge is expressed and demonstrated through 
inquiry.  What are the results?  Knowledge, or self-knowledge, or towards what does 
Socratic inquiry aim?  And we, the audience, witness this in the dialogue; as Blondell 
remarks, “Through Sokrates, Theaitetos, Theodoros, and their interactions, Plato explores 
yet again the conditions under which Socratic pedagogy may successfully take place.”290  
Does the Theaetetus show a successful inquiry?  Did the interlocutors learn anything?  
While I do not believe the dialogue is a ‘failure’, as scholars historically have deemed the 
aporetic dialogues, for failing to achieve a propositional definition of a concept, I believe 
the majority of the educating, the learning, occurs with the external audience.  Griswold 
believes that “Socrates wants to connect self-knowledge with leading a morally right life” 
and though Griswold is concerned solely with the Phaedrus, I think this holds true for the 
Theaetetus as well.291  The very idea of ignorance of one’s ignorance is both shameful 
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and fearful to Socrates.  Socrates claims that he is “annoyed at his own stupidity” for fear 
that someone might ask him about false judgment and Socrates would answer ‘yes’ 
(195c-d).  Ignorance of one’s own ignorance is a stumbling block, or rather a wall, that 
must be eradicated before any true progress towards understanding can be achieved.  
Theaetetus, we learn, is a boy of both moral and intellectual virtue, with the potential to 
be like Socrates.  The audience does not yet know what is sufficient for knowledge, but 
they have an understanding of what is necessary, from the example they have listened to 
or read: dialectic and epistemic virtues. 
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Conclusion 
 
It is possible to interpret Plato in many ways, and of late, many scholars have 
preferred to "mine" the dialogues in an attempt to formulate Platonic "doctrines."  These 
doctrines, in turn, are knitted together — to the extent that this is possible — to comprise 
a systematic philosophy that is identified as the philosophy of Plato.  In the case of the 
Theaetetus, as I have argued in chapter four, this “doctrinal” approach to Plato takes the 
form of identifying Plato's epistemology, where 'epistemology', in keeping with 
contemporary practice, is divorced from ethical considerations.  I have argued against this 
approach to Plato on two grounds.  First, Plato chose to write philosophy in the form of 
dialogues, and it seems reasonable to assume that he did so in order to accomplish some 
goals in line with his conception of dialectic.  The choice of form is, I have found, a 
reflection of the progression of the tradition of oral and written paideia, the aim of which 
is to produce virtuous citizens.  Paideia took place originally in the form of poetry.  On 
the whole, poetry was orally performed before an audience.  Eventually writing became 
used in public institutions, first as a mnemonic device and a way of keeping records 
storage of valued public experience, or promulgating laws.  Writing, in education, was an 
imitation of the traditional oral instruction.  Traditional paideia presented the truth as the 
Muses enabled the poet to sing it, and while writing enabled poets to develop new poetic 
forms, poetry was still performed.  The rise of the polis brought another occasion and 
another means for paideia: public debate.  
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Debate became a vehicle for negotiating virtue — and truth — in the polis.  But 
one could be effective in debate without being virtuous or even having any concept of 
virtue, and power resulted from the ability to speak and debate regardless of one's 
character.  The Sophists exploited the opportunities that writing afforded to employ those 
rhetorical devices that had been proven effective.  The result was speeches, suitable for 
performances on all occasions, written in advance of the occasion of their delivery, 
without knowledge of either the problem to be resolved or the context in which public 
decisions had to be made.  The measure of truth and virtue was the ability to prevail in 
argument.  A sophos was a man who had the skill to prevail in argument or persuade 
others. 
There are certain current conceptions of philosophy that fail to recognize that 
Ancient philosophy is about a way of living – and that believing something true is a 
commitment to act and live in certain ways.  Ancient philosophical writing instructs its 
audience just as writing does in other ancient genres such as poetry.  This entails that the 
dialogues, just as other genres, are written for a specific audience, an audience that would 
appreciate and understand the insinuations and references to historical events and 
persons.  Plato's use of characters named for historical persons evokes the lives of those 
historical persons so that the audience members already possess certain assumptions 
about the characters.  As Mark Gifford remarks, ancient tragedies rely on the knowledge 
of the external audience in order to relay their educational and political message.  
Aeschylus’ The Persians, for instance, provides a lesson in hubris because the audience 
members are already familiar with the story.  Though Xerxes does not understand the 
reasons for his army's defeat, the audience knows of his hubris.  Interpreting the 
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statements of these characters with only the knowledge provided within the dialogue 
itself is to treat these characters as if they were simply 'A' and 'B'.  There would seem to 
be little point to Plato's using historical figures in the dialogues if their historicity did not 
matter in understanding their presence in the dialogues and interpreting their statements.  
The reason that Plato is invoking historical figures, Mark Gifford contends, is that it is 
necessary for the use of a literary technique that draws on the external audience's 
common knowledge: irony.   
The dialogues are a form of mimēsis, a presenting or making manifest.  With the 
poets, the singer re-presents events and characters from history and myth, creating a 
pleasurable experience for the audience.  The dialogues function as an occasion both for 
re-presenting a philosophical discussion that its audience may continue after the dialogue 
is read, and as a dramatic illustration of what comes from living – or not living – a 
philosophical life.  As mimēsis, a dialogue functions as an instance of the education 
described in the Republic, a way of making that method manifest by having the audience 
be included in the experience.  The audiences' experience of the dialogue--both 
the internal and the external audiences – is a "making manifest" that is appropriate for a 
world in which things happen and change, and are many, and are seen: a world of 
becoming.  In the Theaetetus, we are given a discussion about the philosopher: his 
education and his way of life.  The education of the philosopher in the Republic points to 
Theaetetus' actual education; the young man is not only receiving instruction in 
mathematics, but he excels in the subject.   
Theaetetus is moving from mathematics to dialectic.  Theaetetus begins with 
knowledge as aisthēsis, what we know by our senses and where we all begin – but we 
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must move beyond our senses.  The difficulty of that move is reflected in the lengthy 
discussion of the second definition for knowledge.  To make sense of aisthesis--and 
doxa--something more is required: intellectual virtue that arises from a passion for 
inquiry.  That passion cannot be communicated by propositions or even described in the 
abstract curriculum of the Republic – it must be ignited by watching someone live this 
way.292  Aisthesis is not enough; participation, doing, is required if one is to reach 
knowledge.  One must inquire and do so virtuously.  Knowledge is not an accumulation 
of statements, like those of the Sophists, divorced from knowing how to live a virtuous 
life.  Knowledge is part and parcel of the good life, for open-ended inquiry is itself a way 
of living – the way a philosopher lives.293   
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aisthesis to episteme.  When one moves along the divided line from aisthesis, one reaches mathematics.  
The knowledge one obtains from sense experience is hopelessly corrupted by the unreliability of the senses 
– if one is uncritical of the senses.  The cognition one receives from sensation is doxa, while logos is an 
opinion which stems from the exercise of the senses giving it reasons. 
    
 
 153 
 
 
 
References 
 
Adalier, Gokhan. "The Case of Theaetetus." Phronesis: A Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
46.1 (2001): 1-37. 
 
Alcidamas.  On the Sophists.  Trans. LaRue Van Hook.  20 Classical Weekly (1919) 10 
Aug. 2006 <http://classicpersuasion.org/pw/alcidamas/alcsoph1.htm>. 
 
Annas, Julia.  “The Structure of Virtue.” Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics 
and Epistemology.  Ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski.  Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2003. 15-33. 
 
Anton, John P. “From Sophia to Philosophia: The Greek Conception of Philosophy,” 
Conceptions of Philosophy: Ancient and Modern.  Ed. K. Boudouris.  Athens: 
Ionia Publications, 2004.  26-37.  
 
---.  "Plato as Critic of Democracy, Ancient and Contemporary.”  Philosophical Inquiry: 
International Quarterly 20.1-2 (1998): 1-17. 
 
Arieti, James A.  Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama.  Rowan and Littlefield: 
1991. 
 
Aristophanes.  Frogs.  The Complete Works of Aristophanes.  Ed. Moses Hadas.  1962 
New York: Bantam Books, 1988.  101-142. 
 
Aristotle.  Metaphysics.  Trans. W. D. Ross.  The Basic Works of Aristotle.  Ed. Richard 
McKeon.  New York: Random House, 1941. 
 
---.  Physics.  Trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.  The Basic Works of Aristotle.  Ed. 
Richard McKeon.  New York: Random House, 1941. 
 
---.  Poetics.  Trans. Ingram Bywater.  The Basic Works of Aristotle.  Ed. Richard 
McKeon.  New York: Random House, 1941. 
 
Ausland, Hayden.  “On Reading Plato Mimetically.”  AJP 118 (1997): 371-416. 
 
Austin, J. L. How to do Things with Words.  Harvard UP: Cambridge, 1962. 
 
Benitez, Eugenio, and Livia Guimaraes. "Philosophy as Performed in Plato's Theaetetus.”  
Review of Metaphysics 47.2 (1993): 297-328. 
 
 154 
Berger Jr., Harry.  “Levels of Discourse in Plato’s Dialogues.”  Literature and the 
Question of Philosophy.  Ed. Anthony Cascardi.  Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 
1987.  75-100. 
 
Bernadete, Seth.  Plato’s Theaetetus: Part I of The Being of the Beautiful.  1984 Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986. 
 
Blondell, Ruby.  The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2002. 
 
Bloom, Alan.  The Republic of Plato.  New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968. 
 
Alan C. Bowen, “On Interpreting Plato,” Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, ed. 
Charles L. Griwold, Jr.  New York: Routledge, 1988. 49-65. 
Brandwood, Leonard.  The Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1990. 
Brinckman, A. “Ein Brief Platons.” RhM LXVI 1911: 226-30. 
 
Brisson, Luc.  Platon: Lettres.  Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1987. 
 
Burnyeat, M. F.  “Postscript on Silent Reading.”  The Classical Quarterly ns 47.1 (1997): 
74-76.  
 
---.  “Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration.”  Bulletin of the Institute of Classical 
Studies 24 (1997): 7-16. 
 
Butler, Judith.  Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative.  New York: Routledge, 
1997. 
 
Buxton, Richard.  From Myth to Reason? Studies in Development of Greek Thought.  Ed. 
Richard Buxton Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005. 
 
Cherniss, Harold Fredrik.  Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy.  1935 New 
York: Octagon Books, 1964. 
 
Cornford, F. M.  From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western 
Speculation.  New York: Harper & Row, 1957.   
 
---.  Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist.  1957 Mineola: 
Dover, 2003.  
 
Clay, Diskin. “The Origins of the Socratic Dialogue.”  The Socratic Movement.  Ed. Paul 
Vander Waerdt.  Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1994. 
 155 
 
Cole, Thomas.  The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece.  Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 
1991. 
 
Cox, D. R.  and L. Brandwood. “On a Discriminatory Problem Concerned with the 
Works of Plato.”  Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (1959):  195.   
 
Deane, Philip.  “Stylometrics do not Exclude the Seventh Letter.”  Mind ns 82.325 
(1973): 113-117. 
 
Detienne, Marcel.  The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece.  Trans. Janet Lloyd.  New 
York: Zone Books, 1996. 
 
Desjardins, Rosemary.  The Rational Enterprise:  Logos in Plato’s Theaetetus.  New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1990. 
 
Dewey, John.  The Quest for Certainty.  1929 New York: Capricorn Books, 1960.  
 
Edelstein, Ludwig.  Plato’s Seventh Letter.  Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966. 
 
---.  “Platonic Anonymity.”  The American Journal of Philology.  83.1 (1962) 1-22. 
 
Edie, James M.  “Expression and Metaphor.”  Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 23.4 (1963): 538-561. 
 
Empedocles.  The Poem of Empedocles.  Trans. Brad Inwood.  1992 Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2001. 
 
Ferrari, G .R. F..  “Plato and Poetry.”  Cambridge History of Literary Criticism.  Ed. G. 
A. Kennedy.  Vol. 1.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.  134-140. 
 
Festugiere, A. J.  Contemplation et vie Contemplative Selon Platon.  Paris: J. Vrin, 1936. 
 
Findlay, John.  Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines.  London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1974. 
 
Fine, Gail.  “Knowledge and Logos in the Theaetetus.”  Plato on Knowledge and Forms: 
Selected Essays.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.   
 
Friedländer, Paul.  Plato: An Introduction.  Princeton:  Princeton UP, 1969. 
 
---.  Plato III, The Dialogues: Second and Third Periods.  Trans. Hans Meyerhoff.  
Princeton, Princeton UP, 1969. 
 
 156 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg.  Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato.  
Trans. P. Christopher Smith.  New Haven:  Yale UP, 1980. 
 
---.  Truth and Method.  Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall.  2nd Rev. Ed. 
New York: Continuum, 2000. 
 
Gifford Mark.  “Drama and Dialectic in Republic I.”  Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy 20 (2001): 35-106. 
 
Gentili, Bruno.  Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the Fifth 
Century.  Trans. Thomas A. Cole.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1988. 
 
Gonzalez, Francisco.  Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry.  
Evanston:  Northwestern UP, 1998. 
 
---.  “A Short History of Platonic Interpretation and the ‘Third Way’.”  The Third Way: 
New Directions in Platonic Studies.  Ed. Francisco J. Gonzalez.  Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.  1995. 
 
Gordon, Jill.  Turning Toward Philosophy.  University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 
1999. 
 
Griswold Jr., Charles L..  Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus.  University Park: 
Pennsylvania State UP, 1986. 
 
 Grube, G. M. A. “How Did the Greeks Look at Literature?”  Lectures in Memory of 
Louise Taft Semple: Second Series, 1966-1970.  Ed. C. G. Boulter.  
Norman” University of Oklahoma Press, 1973. 
 
Guthrie, W. K. C.  A History of Greek Philosophy: The Later Plato and the Academy.  
Vol. 5.  Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978. 
 
---.  The Sophists.  New York:  Cambridge UP, 1971.  
 
Halperin, David M.  One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and Other Essays on Greek 
Love.  New York: Routledge, 1990. 
 
Harris, William V.  Ancient Literacy.  Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989. 
 
Harrison, Joan C.  “Plato's Prologue: Theaetetus 142A-143C.” Tulane-Studies-in-
Philosophy 27 (1978): 103-123. 
 
Havelock, Eric. “The Alphabetization of Homer.”  Communication Arts in the Ancient 
World.  Ed. Eric A. Havelock and Jackson P. Hershbell.  New York: Hastings 
House, 1978.  3-22. 
 157 
 
Havelock, Eric.  The Greek Concept of Justice: From Its Shadow in Homer to Its 
Substance in Plato.  Cambridge: Harvard UP: 1978. 
 
---.  “The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics.”  Language and Thought in Early Greek 
Philosophy.  Ed. Kevin Robb.  La Salle: The Hegeler Institute, 1983.  7-82. 
 
---.   The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences.  Princeton UP : 
1982. 
 
---. The Muse Learns to Write.  New Haven: Yale UP, 1986. 
 
---.  Preface to Plato.  Harvard UP: Cambridge, 1963. 
 
---.  Prologue to Literacy.  Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati, 1971. 
 
---.  “The Socratic Problem: Some Second Thoughts.” Essays in Ancient Greek 
Philosophy. Ed. J. P. Anton and A. Preuss. Vol. 2, Albany: SUNY Press, 1983.  
147-73. 
 
Heraclitus.  Heraclitus: Fragments.  Trans. T. M. Robinson.  1987 University of Toronto 
Press: Toronto, 1991. 
 
Heidegger, Martin.  The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus. 
Continuum New York, 2002 
 
Henderson, Jeffrey.  “The Demos and the Comic Competition.”  Nothing to do With 
Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context.   Ed. John J. Winkler and Froma 
I. Zeitlin.  Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990.  271-313. 
 
Hershbell, Jackson P.  “Reflections on the Orality and Literacy of Plato’s Dialogues.”  
The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies.  Ed. Francisco J. Gonzalez. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.  1995.  25-40.   
 
Hesiod.  Theogony.  Trans. Richard Lattimore.  Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1959. 
 
Homer.  The Iliad.  Trans. Richmond Lattimore.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1951. 
 
Hookaway, Christopher.  “Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Virtue.”  Virtue 
Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility.  Ed. Abrol 
Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski.  Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001.  178-199. 
 
 
 158 
Irwin, Terence.  Plato’s Ethics.  Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995. 
 
---.  “Reply to David Roochnik.” Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings.  Ed. Charles L. 
Griwold, Jr.  New York: Routledge 1988.  183-193. 
 
Jaeger, Werner.  Archaic Greece: The Mind of Athens.  New York:  Oxford UP, 1939.  
Vol. 1 of Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture.  3 vols.  1939-1944. 
 
---.  Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung.  Berlin: Weidmann, 
 1955. 
 
---.  In Search of the Divine Centre.  New York:  Oxford UP, 1943.  Vol. 2 of Paideia: 
The Ideals of Greek Culture.  3 vols.  1939-1944. 
 
James, William.  The Principles of Psychology.  Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1981. 
 
Kahn, Charles H.  Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary 
Form.  Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. 
 
---.  “Plato’s Methodology in the Laches.”  Revue-Internationale de Philosophie.  40 
(1986):  7-21. 
 
Kirk, G. S.  “Orality and Sequence.”  Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy.  
Ed. Kevin Robb.  The Hegeler Institute: LaSalle, 1983. 
 
Klein, Jakob.  A Commentary on Plato’s Meno.  1965 Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1989. 
 
Ledger, Gerard R.  Re-counting Plato: A Computer Analysis of Plato’s Style.  New York: 
 Oxford University Press, 1989 
 
Leveque, Pierre and Pierre Vidal-Naquet.  Cleisthenes the Athenian: An Essay on the 
Representation of Space and Time in Greek Political Thought.  Trans. David 
Ames Curtis.  The Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1996. 
   
Levinson, Ronald Bartlett.  In Defense of Plato.  New York: Russell and Russell, 1953. 
 
Levinson, M., Q. Morton and A. D. Winspear. “The Seventh Letter of Plato.”  Mind ns 
77.307 (1968): 309-325. 
 
Long, Alex.  “Refutation and Relativism in Theaetetus 161-171." Phronesis: A Journal of 
Ancient Philosophy 49.1 (2004): 24-40. 
 
McKirahan, Jr., Richard D.  Philosophy Before Socrates.  Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994. 
 
Meautis, Georges. Platon Vivant.  Paris: Albin Michel, 1950. 
 159 
 
Meier, Christian.  The Greek Discovery of Politics.  Trans. David McLintock.  
 Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1990. 
 
Morrow, Glen R.  Plato’s Epistles.  Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962. 
 
Nagy, Gregory.  The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek 
Poetry.  Rev. ed.  Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1999. 
 
Nails, Debra.  The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics.  
Hackett: 2002.  
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich.  The Birth of Tragedy.  Trans. Walter Kaufmann.  Random House: 
Toronto, 1967. 
 
Nightingale, Andrea Wilson.  Genres in dialogue: Plato and the construct of philosophy.  
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995. 
 
---.  Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Cultural Context.  
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004. 
 
Norwood, Gilbert.  Greek Comedy.  1931 London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1964. 
 
Ober, Josiah.  The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and 
Political Theory.  Princeton: Princeton UP, 1996. 
 
--- and Barry Strauss.  “Drama, Rhetoric, Discourse.”  Nothing to do with Dionysos? 
Athenian Drama in its Social Context.  Ed. John J. Winkler and Froma I. Zeitlin.  
Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990.  237-270. 
 
---.  “I, Socrates … The Performative Audacity of Isocrates’ Antidosis.”  Isocrates and 
Civic Education.  Ed. Takis Poulakos and David DePew.  Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2004.  21-43. 
 
Palaima, T. G. "Comments on Mycenaean Literacy." Minos 20-22(1987): 499-510. 
 
Parry Milman. The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry. 
Ed. Adam Parry.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. 
 
Plato.  Apology.  Trans. G.M.A. Grube.  Plato:  Complete Works.  Ed. John M. Cooper.  
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. 
 
---.  Ion.  Trans. Benjamin Jowett.  Plato: Collected Dialogues.  Ed. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns.  Princeton, Princeton UP: 1989. 
 
 160 
Plato.  Meno.  Trans. W.K.C. Guthrie.  Plato: Collected Dialogues.  Ed. Edith Hamilton 
and Huntington Cairns.  Princeton, Princeton UP: 1989. 
 
---.  Phaedo.  Trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve.  Plato:  Complete Works.  Ed. 
John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. 
 
---.  Protagoras.  Trans. Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell.  Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992. 
 
---.  Republic.  Trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve.  Plato:  Complete Works.  Ed. 
John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. 
 
---.  Seventh Letter.  Trans. L. A. Post.  Plato: Collected Dialogues.  Ed. Edith Hamilton 
and Huntington Cairns.  Princeton, Princeton UP: 1989. 
 
---.  Symposium.  Trans. Michael Joyce.  Plato: Collected Dialogues.  Ed. Edith Hamilton 
and Huntington Cairns.  Princeton, Princeton UP: 1989. 
 
---.  Theaetetus.  Trans. M. J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat.  Ed Bernard Williams.  
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992. 
 
---.  Theaetetus.  Trans. John McDowell.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. 
 
Press, Gerald A. "The State of the Question in the Study of Plato.”  Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 34.4 (1996): 507-32. 
 
Polansky, Ronald M.  Philosophy and Knowledge: A Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus.  
Cranbury: Associated UP, 1992. 
 
Reale, Giovanni.  A History of Ancient Philosophy II: Plato and Aristotle.  Trans. John R. 
Catan.  Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990 
 
Richardson, Frank C., Blaine J. Fowers and Charles B. Guignon.  Re-envisioning 
Psychology: Moral Dimensions in Theory and Practice.  San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass Publishers, 1999. 
 
Robb, Kevin.  “Asebeia and Sunousia: The Issues Behind the Indictment of Socrates.”  
Plato’s Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations.  Ed. Gerald A. Press.  
Lanham:  Rowman and Littlefield, 1993.  77-106. 
 
---.  Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece.  Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984. 
 
---.  “Poetic Sources of the Greek Alphabets.”  Communication Arts in the Anceint World.  
Ed. Eric A. Havelock and Jackson P. Hershbell.  New York: Hastings House, 
1978.  23-38. 
 
 161 
Robin, Léon.  Platon.  Paris: F. Alcan, 1935. 
 
Rutherford, R. B.  The Art of Plato:  Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation.  Cambridge: 
 Harvard UP, 1995. 
 
Ryle, Gilbert.  Plato’s Progress.  Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1966. 
 
Saenger, Paul.  Space Between Words: The Origins of Silent Reading.  Stanford: Stanford 
UP, 1997. 
 
Sayre, Kenneth M.  Plato’s Literary Garden: How to Read a Platonic Dialogue.  Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995. 
 
---.  “Why Plato Never Had a Theory of Forms.”  Boston Area Colloquim in Ancient 
Pjilosophy.  9: 1993.  Lanham: UP of America.  167-199. 
 
Scolinov, Samuel.  Plato’s Metaphysics of Education.  London: Routledge, 1988. 
 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich Ernst Daniel.  Schleiermacher’s Introductions to the Dialogues 
of Plato.  Trans. William Dobson.  New York: Arno Press, 1973. 
 
Sedley, David.  The Midwife of Platonism:  Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus. 
 Oxford:  Clarendon, 2004. 
 
Segal, Charles.  “Spectator and Listener.”  The Greeks.  Ed. Jean-Pierre Vernant.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
 
Shorey, Paul.  What Plato Said.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933. 
 
Slater, Niall W. “Literacy and Old Comedy.”  Voice Into Text.  Ed. Ian Worthington.  
Leiden: Brill, 1996. 99-114. 
 
Smith, P. Christopher.  "Between the Audible Word and the Envisionable Concept: Re-
Reading Plato's Theaetetus After Gadamer.”  Continental Philosophy Review 33.3 
(2000): 327-44. 
 
Snell, Bruno.  The Discovery of Mind in Greek Philosophy and Literature.  New York: 
Dover: 1982. 
 
Sophocles.  King Oedipus.  The Theban Plays.  Trans. E. F. Watling.  Baltimore: 1957. 
 
Steiner, Deborah.  The Tyrant's Writ:  Myths and Images of Writing in Ancient Greece.  
Princeton:  Princeton UP, 1994.   
 
Stoelzel, C.  Die Behandlung des Erkenntnisproblems bei Platon.  Halle, 1908. 
 
 162 
Stokes, Michael.  Plato’s Socratic Conversations: Drama and Dialectic in Three 
Dialogues.  Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins UP, 1986. 
 
Strauss, Leo. Persecution and the Art of Writing.  3rd reprint Greenwood Press, 1977. 
 
Svenbro, Jesper.  Phrasikleia:  An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece.  Trans. 
Janet Lloyd.  Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993. 
 
---.  “The ‘Interior’ Voice: On the Invention of Silent Reading.” Nothing to Do with 
Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context.  Ed. John J. Winkler and Froma 
I. Zeitlin.  Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990.  366-384. 
 
Tarrant, Harold.  “Orality and Plato’s Narrative Dialogues.”  Voice Into Text: Orality and 
Literacy in Ancient Greece.  Ed. Ian Worthington.  Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996.  129-
148. 
 
Teloh, Henry.  Socratic Education in Plato’s Early Dialogues.  Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1986. 
Thesleff, Holger. “Looking for Clues: An Interpretation of some Literary Aspects of 
Plato's Two- Level Model.”  Plato’s Dialogues:  New Studies and Interpretations.  
Ed. Gerald A. Press.  Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 1993.  17-45. 
---.  "Platonic Chronology." Phronesis: A Journal of Ancient Philosophy 34 (1989): 1-26.  
---.  Studies in the Styles of Plato.  Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica, 1967.  
Thomsas, Rosalind.  Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1992. 
 
---.  Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens.  Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1989. 
 
Tigerstedt, Eugene.  The Decline and Fall of the Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato: An 
Outline and Some Observations.  Helsinki: Societas Scientariarum Fennica, 1974. 
 
---.  Interpreting Plato.  Stockholm Studies in the History of Literature.  1977. 
 
Vernant, Jean-Pierre.  Mortals and Immortals.  Princeton, Princeton UP: 1991. 
 
---.  Myth and Thought Among the Greeks. Trans. Janet Lloyd with Jeff Fort.  1983 
Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2006. 
 
Vlastos, Gregory.  “The Paradox of Socrates.”  The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection 
of Critical Essays.  Ed. Gregory Vlastos.  New York: Anchor Books, 1971.  1-21. 
 163 
 
Walker, Jeffrey.  Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity.  Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000. 
 
Waugh, Joanne B.  “Art and Morality: The End of an Ancient Rivalry?”  The Journal of 
Aesthetic Education.  20.1 1986. 
 
 ---.  “Mimēsis and Logos: Rethinking Plato’s Critique of the Arts.” Greek Philosophy 
and the Fine Arts.  Ed. Konstantine Boudouris.  Athens: International Society for 
Greek Philosophy and Culture, 2000.  233-248. 
 
---.  “Neither Published Nor Perished: The Dialogues as Speech, Not Text.”  The Third 
Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies..  Ed. Francisco J. Gonzalez.  Lanham: 
Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 1995. 
 
---.  “Socrates and the Character of Platonic Dialogue.”  Who Speaks for Plato?  Studies 
in Platonic Anonymity.  Ed. Gerald A. Press.  Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2000.  39-52. 
 
West, Elinor J. M.  “Plato’s Audiences, or How Plato Replies to the Fifth-Century 
Intellectual Mistrust of Letters.”  The Third Way.  Ed. Francisco J. Gonzalez.  
Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 1995. 
 
Winkler, John.  Introduction.  Nothing to do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social 
Context.  Ed. John J. Winkler and Froma I. Zeitlin.  Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1990.  3-11. 
 
Xenophanes.  Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments.  Trans. J. H. Lesher. 1992 Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001. 
 
Young, Charles M.  “Plato and Computer Dating.”  Plato: Critical Assessments.  Vol. 1   
Ed. Nicholas D. Smith.  London: Routledge, 1998.  29-49. see Charles M. Young, 
“Plato and Computer Dating,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy 12 (1994): 227-250. 
 
Zeller, Eduard.  Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. Trans. L.R. Palmer.  New 
York: The Humanities Press, 1980. 
 
Zagzebeski, Linda.  Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the 
Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.  Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. 
 
 164 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Bluck, R.S. “Plato’s Biography: The Seventh Letter.”  The Philosophical Review 58.5 
(1949): 503-509. 
 
Bremmer, Jan.  “Walkng, Standing and Sitting in Ancient Greek Culture.”  A Cultural 
History of Gesture.  Ed. Jan Bremmer and Herman Roodenburg.  Cornell UP: 
New York, 1992. 
 
Castagnoli, Lisa.  “Protagoras Refuted: How Clever is Socrates’ Most Clever Argument 
at Theaetetus 171a-c?  Topoi 23.1 (2004) 3-32. 
 
Ehrenberg, Victor.  From Solon to Socrates: Greek History and Civilization During the 
6th and 5th Centuries BC.  2nd Ed.  New York: Routledge, 1973. 
 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. The Idea of the Good in Platonic and Aristotelian Philosophy.  
Trans. P. Christopher Smith.  New Haven: Yale UP, 1986. 
 
Gerson, Lloyd P. Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2003.    
 
Havelock, Eric A.  The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics.  New Haven: Yale UP, 1957. 
 
Hyland, Drew.  Finitude and Transcendence in Plato’s Dialogues.  Albany: SUNY Press, 
1995. 
 
Kagan, Donald.  Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy.  New York:  The Free 
Press, 1991. 
 
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson.  Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its 
Challenge to Western Thought.  New York: Basic Books, 1999. 
 
Merlan, Philip.  Form and Content in Plato’s Philosophy.  Journal of the History of 
Philosophy.  8.4 (1947): 406-430. 
 
Michelini, Ann N.  Plato as Author: The Rhetoric of Philosophy.  Leiden: Brill, 2003. 
 
Klagle, James C. and Nicholas Smith.  “Methods of Interpreting Plato and His 
Dialogues.”  Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume.  
Oxford: Oxford UP: 1992. 
 
 165 
Patterson, Richard.  “The Platonic Art of Comedy and Tragedy.”  Philosophy and 
Literature 6:76-83. 
 
Moline, Jon.  Plato’s Theory of Understanding.  Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1981. 
 
Nehamas, Alexander.  Virtues of Authenticity.  Princeton UP: 1989. 
 
O’Brien, Michael J.  The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind.  Durham: The 
University of North Carolina Press: 1967. 
 
Penner, Terrence.  “What Laches and Nicias Miss – and Whether Socrates Thinks 
Courage Merely a Part of Virtue.”  Ancient Philosophy 12 (1992):  1-28. 
 
Robinson, Richard.  Essays in Greek Philosophy.  Oxford: Oxford UP, 1969 
 
Scott, Dominic.  Recollection and Experience:  Plato’s Theory of Learning and Its 
Successors.  Cambridge, Cambridge UP: 1995. 
 
Seeskin, Kenneth.  Dialogue and Discovery: A Study in Socratic Method.  Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1987. 
 
Sprague, Rosamond Kent.  Plato’s Use of Fallacy: A Study of the Euthydemus and Some 
Other Dialogues.  1962 New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963. 
 
Stenzel, Bertha.  “Is Plato’s Seventh Epistle Spurious?”  The American Journal of 
Philology 74.4 (1953): 383-397. 
 
Strauss, Leo.  The City and the Man.  1964 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. 
 
Taylor, A. E.  Plato: the Man and his Work.  London: 1949.   
 
Teloh, Henry.  “The Importance of Interlocutors' Characters in Plato's Early Dialogues.”  
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1986): 25 -
38. 
 
Tomasi, John.  “Plato’s Statesman Story: The Birth of Fiction Reconceived.”  Philosophy 
and Literature (1990): 348-358. 
 
Vernant, Jean-Pierre.  Myth and Society in Ancient Greece. Trans. Janet Lloyd.  1980 
New York: Zone Books, 1996. 
 
---.  The Origins of Greek Thought.  Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1982. 
 
Watanabe, Kuno.  “The Theaetetus on Letters and Knowledge.”  Phronesis 32.2 (1987). 
 166 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: The Authenticity of the Seventh Letter 
The Seventh Letter is of particular import to scholars of Plato’s philosophy, as it 
contains a significant digression detailing a method that is concerned with metaphysical, 
epistemological and linguistic issues (340c-345c).  If the letter were proven authentic, 
this digression would be the most straightforward writing by Plato on those concerns and 
could settle several major debates regarding interpretation.  Yet it is also this 
controversial section of the Letter that ostensibly provides evidence for the letter’s 
inauthenticity.  I argue that due to scholars’ interpretative strategies, the Seventh Letter is 
claimed to be inauthentic.  Scholars for, or against, the authenticity of the Seventh Letter 
must eventually rely on the degree of consistency between their interpretation of the 
philosophical digression and Plato’s philosophy.  In many cases, those interpretations are 
based on the tenuous assumption that Plato has doctrines.294  The result of situating the 
Seventh Letter within a doctrinal interpretative strategy is unreliable.  The content is 
forced to fit the scholar’s assumptions about Plato’s “philosophical system” and, if it does 
not fit, the letter is thrown out as spurious.   
The persistent problem of certifying the authenticity of the Seventh Letter stems 
from a lack of historical records regarding the letter as well as the particularities of the 
history of imitative letter writing.  According to Glen Morrow, the first reliable reference 
to Plato’s Letters occurs in “the canon of Platonic works drawn up by Aristophanes of 
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Byzantium toward the end of the third century B.C., and also in the canon of Thrasyllus, 
dating from the first century after Christ.”295  We do not know which, or how many, 
letters were included in the list by Aristophanes.  Even though authors such as Plutarch 
and Cicero refer to the letters as authentic, the evidence along this line of certifying the 
authenticity of the letters remains circumstantial.  There is also the difficulty of how the 
letters were kept and discovered; there is “no positive record of their existence prior to 
the flourishing of the great library at Alexandria.”296  In antiquity, it was common for 
students of the schools of rhetoric to compose letters in the styles of famous men such as 
Plato.297  Thus, the possibility of a forgery entering the library under the name of Plato is 
likely.  That the letter is inauthentic is, of course, possible since we have no certain 
evidence that the letter was composed by Plato.   
There are three main ways with which to investigate the Seventh Letter’s 
authenticity: to compare historical content, stylometric analysis, and the consistency of 
content with the ‘authentic’ dialogues.  Scrutiny of the historical content confirms that the 
letter is genuine.  Stylometry as a technique has varying results, depending on the criteria 
used in analysis.  The methodology of stylometry differs but generally, it involves 
analysis of grammatical structure or analysis of words – that is, lexical techniques that 
examine, for example, word length, sentence length, or ubiquitous words such as (and).  
One stylometric analysis in particular is referred to as the standard: an analysis conducted 
in 1968 by Levinson, Morton and Winspear.  Earlier, a study by Cox and Brandwood 
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used stylometric analysis to formulate a chronological sequence for all the works of 
Plato.  Based on their study of the last syllables of sentences, they formulated a sequence 
indicating the order in which the dialogues were written.298  This study placed the 
Seventh Letter between the Critias and the Statesman, something that Levinson et. al.  
claim that most scholars find unacceptable.299  The Levinson group’s own stylometric 
analysis does not attempt to sequence Plato’s works; rather, using different techniques, 
they compare the Seventh Letter to the Apology and determined that the results indicate 
the letter is not authentic. 
In 1965, Morton had argued that “the sentence length distributions are constant 
for the works of an author unless these are separated by a large period of time allied with 
a considerable difference in literary form.”300  Levinson’s group used the principle 
developed by the sentence length distribution survey conducted by Morton as their 
criteria: “the distribution of the conjunctive kai,” and “distribution of the particle de as 
second or third word in sentences.” 301  The group agrees, to varying degrees, that the 
Seventh Letter is not entirely a work of Plato’s, and perhaps not written by him at all, but 
in all likelihood the philosophical digression is most certainly not authentic, and, they 
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conclude, the letter was likely written or edited by Speusippus, Plato’s nephew and 
successor at the Academy. 
There are serious concerns about the stylometric analysis conducted by Levinson, 
Morton and Winspear.  Philip Deane calls into question the criteria used for the analysis 
and opens a space for the possibility that the letter is authentic.  The tests, by their own 
admission, fail a work of Isocrates’ that is believed to be authentic.  They account for the 
discrepancy by claiming that Isocrates was senile.  Yet, they do not extend that same 
probabilistic reasoning to the Seventh Letter.  I submit that their study cannot be 
sufficiently objective, for their conclusion depends on a sequencing of the dialogues 
which is still in question.  The selection of dialogues they chose for indicators in their 
study is suspect for it relies on the idea that the Apology is an ‘early’ dialogue and that the 
Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias and Laws are all ‘late’ 
dialogues that were written close together.  If stylometric analyses are as debatable as the 
authenticity of the letter, arguments must, in the end, rely on the degree of consistency 
found between the content of the letter and the content of Plato’s dialogues.302     
Having touched on some of the problems with the use of stylometric analysis to 
determine the Letter’s authenticity, I will now discuss the interpretative strategies that are 
used in analyzing the philosophic content.  The choice of interpretative strategy involved 
requires examination, in these instances, for the methodology of interpreting Plato’s 
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dialogues has been a point of disagreement among philosophers since Plato’s death.  The 
question of the most appropriate way to interpret the dialogues has yet to be settled.  
Historically, interpretations of Plato fit into one of two categories.  The first type 
of interpretative strategy is constructive; it assumes that the dialogues are statements 
forming Plato’s doctrines, generally this occurs by first advancing a developmentalist 
position.  Adopting a developmental thesis means that the scholar constructs doctrines by 
stringing together pieces of the dialogues in accordance with a chronology.  The 
assumptions involved in this strategy are that 1) Plato does indeed have doctrines, 2) that 
these doctrines develop over time in accordance with the pre-established sequence and 3) 
the chronology the scholar subscribes to is accurate.  In the past three centuries, 
philosophers have approached Plato’s dialogues as if approaching a modern philosopher, 
drawing conclusions about Plato’s philosophy via such a developmental thesis.  It is 
unquestionable that theses regarding the developing thought of Leibniz or Kant have 
grounds for their claims – however, the distance in time and the lack of records, makes 
any certainty regarding the chronology of the dialogues impossible and as such, any 
thesis dependent upon a particular ordering of dialogues is dubious at best.  It is also the 
case that scholars tend to anachronistically ‘read in’ questions that, while we take for 
granted are important, the Greeks would not have considered, such as questioning the 
reality of the external world or the fixation with certainty that infuses philosophy 
following the Scholastic period.  A subcategory of the ‘constructive’ interpretation is the 
position that Plato had doctrines, but that they are unwritten.  Instead, these 
interpretations say that Plato delivered the doctrines orally to his students in the 
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Academy, in which case the only way to learn of his doctrines is through secondary 
sources.   
The second type of interpretative strategy is destructive, for it assumes the 
dialogues are chiefly about refuting the interlocutor(s).303  Scholars of this school of 
thought reduce the dialogues to their backbone of propositions and arguments, utterly 
ignoring the dialogue form with its dramatic and literary elements and instead, read the 
dialogues as if they were treatises.304  But no one forced Plato to write dialogues; he 
could have just as easily written treatises instead.  With that in mind, it is reasonable to 
assume there is something important about the dialogue form, something that makes it 
necessary for Plato’s philosophy.  Revealing the shortcomings in these two general 
categories of interpretation speaks to the need for a third way of interpreting Plato.  In the 
last thirty years a group of scholars has taken a hermeneutic approach to Plato’s dialogues 
in order to avoid the problems of the first two strategies.  The hermeneutical strategy 
begins by seeing the dialogue form as necessary and involves examining the dialogue as a 
unity, taking into account the literary and dramatic details for, as mentioned above, it is 
reasonable to assume that the dialogue form is necessary to convey the content. A 
hermeneutical strategy situates a text with regard to the author’s original audience.  
Attempting to situate the text in its original context requires an examination of the 
assumptions made about the past.  By addressing the fact of presuppositions, the 
interpretation is left open for future revision.  The result is a completely irreconcilable 
                                                 
303
  Gonzalez, Third 1. 
 
304
 For an explanation of why these two interpretative strategies do not do justice to Plato’s 
dialogues as well as the historical lineage of the strategies, see Gonzalez Short. 
 
 172 
position with both the aforementioned groups, because these scholars shun the notion of 
unwritten doctrines, and, in fact, call into question whether Plato had doctrines at all.  
Most notably, they point out that there is little evidence in the dialogues for the 
traditionally accepted ‘doctrine of Forms’.305   
Generally speaking, scholars have two primary problems with the philosophical 
digression of the Seventh Letter, all of which are grounded in their interpretative strategy.  
(1) The digression claims that Plato never put his philosophy (specifically, the philosophy 
of first principles) in writing and (2) the digression makes mention of first principles 
without referring to the Forms.  Morrow writes that “The chief difficulty in accepting this 
passage as genuinely Platonic arises from the statement that Plato has never written about 
‘these matters’ that were the subject of Dionysius’ book.”306  In fact, the author goes a 
step further and claims that ‘these matters’ can not be expressed in words, like other 
disciplines.  ‘These matters’ are almost certainly first principles.  When ‘first principles’ 
are presumed to mean Forms then the letter is shown as inauthentic, for on a 
constructivist interpretation, there appear to be in the dialogues clear discussions of the 
Forms as first principles.   
There is nothing strange or non-Platonic about the author’s critique of the written 
word; language, in both oral and written form, fails to capture certain kinds of 
knowledge.  A simplistic example is color; it is impossible to explain color in general, or 
a specific color, without the coinciding experience.  One can know all there is to know 
about the color red, but there is something lacking in an understanding of the color if it 
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does not include the actual experience of red.  Experience is the kind of knowledge that 
cannot be expressed propositionally – not completely, anyway.  There is always 
something lacking in propositions about an experience.   
Earlier, the author of the Seventh Letter claims that one may know any object in 
five ways, through names, images, and accounts, which taken together form the fourth 
type, episteme (scientific understanding) and finally, nous, intuitive apprehension taken 
directly into the soul.  None of these results in actual knowledge of the object.  The 
closest we can get, the author says, is the fifth type, nous.  The digression indicates that 
knowledge of true being is gained as an insight by means of a particular method, 
dialectic, that ‘rubs together’ (tests) names, images, and accounts (propositions).  
Language is defective in that it can only describe qualities of the thing itself, but even so, 
nous, or insight, may be gained using it.  The author writes “Yet the process of dealing 
with all four, moving up and down to each one, barely gives birth to knowledge of the 
ideal nature in someone with an ideal nature.”307  Because the author carefully says 
‘barely’, we can not see this method as producing an end to inquiry – a static, stable 
knowledge.308   
The beginning of the letter stating the author’s disappointment in the ethics of 
Athenian political leaders fits with the dialogues’ emphasis on virtue; however, a key 
element to the Platonic catchphrase “virtue is knowledge” is understanding what, exactly, 
Plato intends by ‘knowledge’.  Knowledge is gained when “living with the subject itself 
in frequent dialogue suddenly, as a light kindled from a leaping flame, [knowledge] 
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comes to be in the soul.”  To gain knowledge of the subject matter requires attention to 
the subject.  It is by engaging the subject that knowledge may be acquired.  This is true 
for any practice.  One cannot ‘know’ how to build a chair until one builds the chair; once 
one knows how to build a chair one cannot pass on that knowledge using language.   If 
virtue is construed as a practice then it makes perfect sense for the author to claim that 
language fails to present knowledge of virtue because language is static.  Writing, of 
course, is more static than speaking; in a discussion, accounts can be revised to promote a 
better understanding, something that can not be done with a text, particularly an ancient 
text, for classical Greek was written scripta continua on scrolls of papyrus.  Revision was 
all but impossible without recreating the entire scroll.  What language can do is provide 
the starting point for understanding.  Dialogue, a process, becomes a method by which 
one can gain knowledge.  This is evident from every one of Plato’s dialogues.   
However, as Paul Friedländer remarks: “I repeat August Boeckh’s methodological 
principle that only forgery, not authenticity, can be proved conclusively – in the absence 
of external evidence, to be sure.”309  The evidence presented to reject the authenticity of 
the Seventh Letter may serve equally as well to promote its authenticity.  Since the 
arguments regarding content are almost entirely based on the scholar’s interpretation of 
Plato’s dialogues, it is possible that a new type of interpretation will show consistency 
between the content of the Seventh Letter and the content of the dialogues – for example, 
the excursus (Seventh Letter 340c-345c) is often seen as contrary to the philosophical 
content of the dialogues.310  As Gilbert Ryle has noted, we should be concerned with the 
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accuracy of the content of the Seventh Letter, which will stand or fall regardless if the 
letter is authentic.  To understand the precise difficulties with ascertaining the 
authenticity of the Seventh Letter, see W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy: 
The Later Plato and the Academy, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978) 401n, 
Shorey; Léon Robin, Platon (Paris: F. Alcan, 1935), Ronald Bartlett Levinson, In 
Defense of Plato (New York: Russell and Russell 1953).  For arguments upholding the 
authenticity of the Seventh Letter, see A. Brinckman, “Ein Brief Platons,” RhM, LXVI 
1911: 226-30; Werner Jaeger,  Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner 
Entwicklung (Berlin: Weidmann,  1955) 111; Georges Meautis, Platon Vivant, (Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1950); A. J.  Festugiere, Contemplation et vie Contemplative Selon Platon 
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1936); Luc Brisson, Platon: Lettres (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1987). 
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